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The Exclusion of Pregnant, Pregnable, 
and Once-Pregnable People (a.k.a. 
Women) from Biomedical Researcht 
Vanessa Mertontt 
The barriers to women's participation as subjects in biomedical research are cur- 
rently being challenged as a matter of legislative policy, medicine, and law. This 
Article catalogs the ways in which women have been disadvantaged by their exclu- 
sion and recent developments to redress them, and goes on to dissect the underlying 
rationales for excluding women from clincial trials. The author reveals the 'funda- 
mental misconception' behind exclusionary rationales, and argues that research 
sponsors in fact have more to fear in the way of potential liability from the exclu- 
sion of women, even pregnant women and women of child-bearing capacity, than 
from their inclusion. Finally, the Article suggests strategies for achieving reform 
of these exclusionary practices. 
t This title is of course a tribute to the Supreme Court's astute distinction between pregnant 
and nonpregnant persons in Ceduldig v. Aiello. 417 U.S. 484 (1974). See infra notes 237, 252 and 
accompanying text. 
This article is dedicated to the memory of Carol H. Lefcourt, founding partner of Lefcourt, 
Kraft and Arber, the first all-woman law firm in New York; General Counsel to the New York 
State Division of Women; co-founder, Coalition on Women's Legal Issues; editor, WOMEN AND 
THE LAW (1984). named "Best Law Book of 1984" by the American Association of Publishers; 
recipient in 1990 of the Susan B. Anthony Award of the National Organization for Women. 
Carol died from breast cancer on August 25, 1991, at the age of 47. 
t t  Vanessa Merton, Associate Dean for Clinical Education and Professor of Law, Pace Uni- 
versity School of Law; B.A., Radcliffe College, 1971; J.D., N.Y.U. School of Law, 1973. I appreci- 
ate the helpful comments of Professors Lissa Griffin, Robert Levine, and John Robertson on  
earlier versions of this paper. I also wish to acknowledge the important assistance provided by 
Pace law students Kathleen Gill and Annie Mok, and by the staff of the Pace University Law 
Library, especially the extraordinary efforts of David Williams, Margaret Murray, and Susan 
Nossier. Iris Mercado, assistant administrator of the Pace Law Clinic, did a superlative job of 
editing and producing an endless progression of drafts, for which I am most grateful. 
This work was slipported in part by Pace University Law School and in part by funding from 
the Office for Protection from Research Risks (OPRR), National Institutes of Health, Public 
Health Service, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The  OPRR does not assume 
responsibility for the completeness or  accuracy of the document. The  iheas or  conclusions ex- 
pressed herein are solely those of the author. 
Completion of this article would not have been possible without the patient encouragement 
of my life partner and colleague. Steven Godeski, and the cooperation of Darrow and Rebecca 
Godeski Merton. 
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"Clinical trials have concentrated almost exclusively on middle-class 
white men." 
Charles Hennekens, M.D., Harvard School of Public Health' 
"One of the most important things we must do  is to insist on the 
political content of science and on its political role. The  pretense 
that science is objective, apolitical and value-neutral . . . obscures the 
political role that science and technology play in underwriting the 
existing distribution of power in society. Science and technology al- 
ways operate in somebody's interest and serve someone or  some 
group of people." 
Ruth Hubbard, Ph.D., Professor Emerita of Biology, 
Harvard University2 
"Mice have a better chance of getting experimental AIDS drugs than 
women." 
Poster, ACT UP and Women's Health Action and Mobilization 
demonstration at the New York University AIDS Clinical Trial Unit 
on International Women's Day, March 8, 19903 
"[Rlesearch on women's health is an issue whose time has come." 
Ruth L. Kirschstein, M.D., Acting Associate Director, Office of 
Research on Women's Health, National Institutes of Health4 
WHAT IS THE PROBLEM? 
The  problem is that women, and the health needs and concerns of wo- 
men, have largely been excluded from biomedical research. This has oc- 
curred in two ways. First, women have been barred from participating as 
subjects in clinical trials, both de jure (explicit exclusion criterion in the proto- 
col) and de facto ("inadvertent" failure to recruit women or  to conduct the trial 
in a manner that realistically permits women to pa r t i~ ipa t e ) .~  Second, the 
- - -- -- 
Gina Kolata, In Med~cal Research, Equal OpportuntQ Doesn'l Always Apply, N.Y. TIMES. Mar. 10, 
1991. at EI6. 
2 Ruth Hubbard, Snenre, Facts and Femrnrsm, tn FEMINISM A N D  SCIENCE 119, 128 (Nancy Tuana 
ed., 1989). 
3 Risa Denenberg. Treatment and T n a k .  In WOMEN, AIDS, A N D  ACTIVISM 68 (The ACT UP/ 
New York Women and AIDS Book Group ed., 1990). 
4 Ruth L. Kirschstein, Research on IVomenj Health, 81 AM. J .  PUB. HEALTH 291, 293 (1991). 
5See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HRD-93-17, WOMEN'S HEALTH: FDA NEEDS 
TO ENSURE MORE STUDY OF GENDER DIFFERENCES I N  PRESCRIPTION DRUG TESTING (October 
1992). This GAO survey of drug manufacturers that obtained FDA approval of new drugs from 
January 1988 through June 1991 concluded that gender-related differences in response do  exist 
for many drugs; that women are generally under-represented in clinical trials: and that even when 
women are included in drug trials, the investigators do  not analyze trial results to detect gender- 
related differences. 
See aLro U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PUB. NO. (PHs) 88-50206. REPORT OF PUBLIC 
HEALTH SERVICE TASK FORCE ON WOMEN'S HEALTH ISSUES, VOI. I1 (October 1985); MARK V. 
NADEL, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE GAOfl-HRD-90-38, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH: 
PROBLEMS I N  IMPLEMENTING POLICY ON WOMEN I N  STUDY POPULATIONS (1990) (Testimony before 
the House Subcommittee on Health and the Environment, June 18, 1990); SOCIETY FOR THE AD- 
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allocation of resources in biomedical research has been enormously skewed 
toward the investigation of health problems in and for men, and a huge list of 
health problems that primarily affect women has been neglected and 
~ n e x p l o r e d . ~  
FINDINGS OF THE SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY COMMITTEE (1991); and the collected testimony at the 
public hearings before the NIH Task Force on Opportunities for Research on Women's Health 
on June 12-13, 1991 of more than sixty witnesses (transcripts of the testimony of forty-six wit- 
nesses are on  file with the author); Paul Cotton, Is There Still Too Much Extrapolation from Data on 
Middle-Aged White Men?, 263 JAMA 1049 (1990); Jerry H. Gurwitz et al., The Exclusion of the Elderly 
and Women from Clinical Trials in Acute Myocardial Infarction, 268 JAMA 1417 (1992); Celia Hooper, 
Some Drug Trials Show Gender Bias, 2 J. NIH RES. 47 (1990); Evlin L. Kinney et al., Underrepresenta- 
lion of Women in New Drug Trials, 95  ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 495 (1981); Kolata, supra note 1, at 
E 16; Earl Lane, The Gender Gap in Medical Research, NEWSDAY, June 25, 199 1, at 63  (citing as exam- 
ples the Physicians' Health study of aspirin prophylaxis for myocardial infarction in 22,071 men, 
no  women; dietary study of recovery from heart attack in 2033 men, no women; study of behav- 
ioral link with heart disease in 3154 men, no women); Mary Lake Polan, Medical Researchers, Heal 
Thyselves of Gender Bias, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1991, at M2; Shigeko Segawa, Clinical Trials: It's Still a 
Man's World, 345 NATURE 754 (1990). 
With respect to mental health and developmental research, the picture is much the same. 
"The study of adolescence has been the study of males," noted psychologist Carol Gilligan in 
reference to the ongoing work of the Harvard University Project on the Psychology of Women 
and the Development of Girls. Lindsay Van Gelder, The Importance of Being Eleven: Carol Gilligan 
Takes On Adolescence, Ms., July-Aug. 1990, at 77; see also U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., PUB. 
HEALTH SERV., ALCOHOL, DRUG ABUSE, AND MENTAL HEALTH ADMIN., PUB. NO. (ADM) 86-1447, 
WOMEN AND DRUGS: A NEW ERA FOR RESEARCH v (Barbara Ray & Monique Braude eds., 1986) 
("The history of drug abuse research shares with other sciences a relative paucity of knowledge 
about females in particular and about gender effects in general. This bias in knowledge stems 
from the tradition of using male subjects for animal and human experiments and an unexamined 
assumption that gender is not an important experimental variable."); Chris Raymond, Recognition 
of the Gender Dzffmces in Mental Illness and Its Treatment Prompts a Call for More Heallh Research on 
Problems Specific to Women, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 12, 1991, at A5. 
Like so many other issues of clinical research, this phenomenon has been particularly re- 
marked upon in the context of the AIDS pandemic. See Jeannette R. Ickovics & Judith Rodin, 
Women and AIDS in the United States - Epidemiology, Natural History, and Mediating Mechanisms, 11 
HEALTH PsycHo~.,Jan. 1992, at 1 (although women represent more than one-third of all cases of 
AIDS globally and die significantly sooner after diagnosis than men with AIDS, and despite im- 
portant gender differences in all phases of the disease process, from prevention and exposure to 
diagnosis and treatment, women are still excluded from most biomedical and psychosocial re- 
search); INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, EXPANDING ACCESS TO INVESTIGATIONAL THERAPIES FOR HIV IN- 
FECTION AND AIDS 64 (1991) (white males predominate in almost all clinical AIDS trials); 
Kenneth Mayer & Charles Carpenter, Women and AIDS, 266 SCI. AM. 1 I8  (1992) (marked under- 
representation of women in HIV-related clinical research); Gina Kolata, AIDS Research on iVew 
Drugs Bypasses Addicts and Women, N.Y. TlMEs,Jan. 5 ,  1988, at C1, C7. That this was no oversight 
is well-documented in GENA COREA, THE INVISIBLE EPIDEMIC: THE STORY OF WOMEN AND AIDS 
(1992) (recounting the heroic, but unsuccessful, efforts of leading epidemiologist Dr. Zena Stein 
to get funding from NIH and the American Foundation for AIDS Research to study the disease in 
women). 
The  problem of exclusion is not confined to United States research. See Robert Walker, 
Heart Studies Ignore Women, CALGARY HERALD, Oct. 19, 1991, at B2 (report on presentations at the 
annual meeting of the Canadian Cardiovascular Association); Caroline Mallan, MDs Assume Men 
Need Better Care, TORONTO STAR, July 26, 1991, at A26 (Canadian men over the age of 45 more 
than twice as likely as women with similar heart disease to undergo diagnostic angiography and 
three times as likely to have bypass surgery; doctors don't offer heart surgery to women because 
they may believe that women don't need to return to work after heart attacks). 
ti See attached Toward A W'omen's Health Agenda, Appendix A. This still quite incomplete list 
was generated from the written testimony offered by witnesses at the NIH Hearing on the Task 
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My objective is to explore some of the barriers to women's participation 
as subjects in biomedical research. These barriers are under siege: Witness 
the following constellation of events, all within the last three years: in Sep- 
tember 1990 the National Institutes of Health ("NIH"), the federal complex 
of research institutes and premier funding source for biomedical research in 
this country, opened a new Office of Research on Women's Health;' in 1992, 
the prestigious Institute of Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences 
convened a working group on the inclusion of women in clinical trials, whose 
report is due in December 1993;8 and in the summer of 1993, Georgetown 
University Medical Center sponsored the first major Continuing Medical Edu- 
cation conference on the inclusion of women in clinical  trial^.^ The spring 
and summer of 1993 also saw the inauguration of the first large-scale study of 
women's health, the Women's Health Initiative, a fifteen-year, $625 million 
study projected to involve more than 160,000 female subjects.'O In June of 
1993, President Clinton signed an NIH appropriations bill that codified as 
statute several policies supporting the participation of women in research 
both as subjects and as investigators." Finally, on July 22, 1993, the Food 
and Drug Administration ("FDA") issued proposed new regulations that re- 
vise its guidelines for the drug development process in favor of the inclusion 
of women.'* 
The symbolic and real importance of these developments should not be 
minimized, but neither should their impact be overestimated. Careful scru- 
tiny of the text of the new law and regulations,18 or for example the WHI 
protocol,I4 reveals that women still are regarded as add-ons, requiring special 
and different treatment than the male standard. Historically, "special" treat- 
Force on Opportunities for Research on Women's ~ e a l t ' h  (June 12-13, 1991); of reports created 
by the new Society for the Advancement of Women's Health Research; and of legislative commit- 
tee reports on the proposed Women's Health Equity Act. A more definitive list may be found in 
the recent NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., PUB. NO. 92- 
3457A. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH: OPPORTUNITIES FOR RESEARCH O N  WO- 
MEN'S HEALTH (1992). See aho National Wornen's Health Network, Research T o  Improve Wo- 
men's Health: An Agenda for Equity (Dec. 1991) (on file with author). 
Philip J. Hilts, N.I.H. Slarls Women's Health Oj'ice, N.Y. TIMES, ept. 11, 1990, at C9. In 
March 1993 the Office held two days of public hearings on issues in the recruitment and reten- 
tion of women in clinical trials. See 58 Fed. Reg. 12,366-67 (Mar. 4, 1993). The  National Insti- 
tutes of Health Revitalization Act of 1993 codifies the creation of this office and defines its 
mandate as promoting research on women's health. 42 U.S.C.A. 5 201d (West Supp. 1993); see 
infra notes 11, 276. 
The  report entitled WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH: ETHICAL A N D  LEGAL ISSUES OF INCLUD- 
ING WOMEN I N  CLINICAL STUDIES (on file with author) was issued as this article went to press. 
Georgetown University Medical Center. Conference on the Inclusion of Women and Mi- 
norities in Clinical Research (June 28-29. 1993) (brochure on file with author). 
'0 U.S. Health Study to Involve 160,000 Women at 16 Centers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1993, at A21; 
Sandra Freidland, A Medical Study on Older Women, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1993, at NJI, NJ16. 
The  National Insitutes of Health Revitalization Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C.A. 8 201 (West 
Supp. 1993); see infra note 276. 
12 Guideline for the Study & Evaluation of Gender Differences in Clinical Evaluation of 
Drugs. 58 Fed. Reg. 39.406 (July 22, 1993). 
13 See in/ra notes 97-128, 276-287 and accompanying text. 
l4 All the women in the WHI will be post-menopausal: between the ages of 50 and 79. See 
Freidland, supra, note 10. While there is some scientific logic to the age range, in that the study is 
trying to identify causal factors of heart disease, cancer, and osteoporosis, which usually become 
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ment for female subjects has translated into poorer medical care for women. 
This article argues that while all these initial steps are heartening, they are far 
from sufficient to redress the secondary status women have endured in the 
world of biomedical research. 
WHY WOMEN HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED FROM RESEARCH 
Arguably, among the most significant practical reasons for this exclusion 
has been the gender identity of those conducting and funding clinical re- 
search, and their preoccupation, not always conscious, with medical problems 
that resonate for them.15 On a more sociological or perhaps political level, 
manifest during those years, many suspect that once again, women of child-bearing potential are 
being systematically excluded. 
In the eloquent phrase of Representative Patricia Schroeder, the Congressional leader 
who has perhaps done more than anyone else to make this issue visible. "[Ylou fund what you 
fear. When you have a male-dominated group of researchers, they are more worried about pros- 
tate cancer than breast cancer." Ellen Goodman, A Health-Research Bias. BOSTON GLOBE, June 21. 
1990, at 15. This widely distributed column was, 1 believe. the first to make the point that even 
basic animal research is generally conducted with male white rats. One  particularly graphic ex- 
hibit attached to the NIH Task Force on Opportunities for Research on Women's Health testi- 
mony of the Interstitial Cystitis Association of America, Inc., compared NIH expenditures on 
male and female urological research. NIH Task Force on Opportunities for Research on Women's Health 
(exhibit to testimony of the Interstitial Cystitis Ass'n of America, Inc.). The  annual expenditure 
of NIH research dollars on  predominantly male urologic disease was $6.49 per person affected; 
the comparable expenditure on predominantly female urologic disease was 5.35 per person af- 
fected. (Appendix A, attached.) 
More women than ever have entered the profession of medicine. Female first-year medical 
school enrollment has steadily grown, from 4% in 1930, to 9% in 1969, to over 40% in 1990. 
But women remain under-represented in the ranks of academic medicine, the major locus of 
training and nurturing of clinical investigators. See Bernadine Healy, Womm in Science: from Panes 
to Ceiling, 255 SCIENCE 1333 (1992). One  dean of an American medical school is female. Three 
per cent of all department chairs are female. Women comprise about 22% of medical school 
faculty, but they are clustered in the lower ranks; on average, male faculty are promoted twice as 
fast as women. See FEMINIST M A J O R I ~  FOUNDATION A D AMERICAN MEDICAL WOMEN'S ASSOCIA- 
TION, EMPOWERING WOMEN IN MEDICINE 2 (1991); AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, 
Gmder Dism'mination in the Medical Profession, 4 WOMEN'S HEALTH ISSUES 1 (1994). Although in 
1987 women earned 35% of all doctorates in life sciences, and 17% in physical sciences, a recent 
blue-ribbon panel on the crisis in funding of research projects strongly recommended creation of 
more programs to encourage more women and minorities to pursue careers in health sciences 
and academic medicine. See Report of the Committee on Policies for Allocating Health Sciences Research 
Funds of the Institute of Medicine, in FUNDING HEALTH SCIENCES RESEARCH (Floyd E. Bloom & Mark 
A. Randolph eds., 1990) at 13, 123. 
Women who do  seek careers in research experience the same obstacles as women in other 
non-traditionally-female career paths. See, e.g., ~ g ~ ~ i e  Garb, U.S. Health Institutes Face Sex Dism'mi- 
nation Suits, 24 AM. MED. NEWS 4 (1991); Rorie Sherman, Claim of Bias at IVIH Bolstered, NAT'L L.J., 
Dec. 9, 1991, at 3, 35 ($225,000 verdict against NIH for sex discrimination against senior scien- 
tist; three other sex discrimination cases pending against NIH). The  NIH, in particular, has an 
abysmal record in this regard. In 1986, a GAO report found that NIH takes longer than any 
other Public Health Service agency to resolve discrimination complaints and did not comply with 
four of eight Equal Employment Opportunity Commission requirements. See Alisa Solomon, 
Snake A t ,  MIRABELLA, pr. 1993, at 140-44. The  draft report of an internal task force convened 
in 1991 "to assess the career development and status of intermural women scientists at NIH" 
found that women make up  only 18% of the tenured scientists, although they constituted 30% of 
the last decade's post-docs (the traditional track to senior status). Extensive reports by female 
scientists of anti-woman bias at NIH range from denial of lab time and other resources, rejection 
of project proposals, and less desirable assignments, to display of degrading images of women in 
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this phenomenon may also reflect the across-the-board tendency in so many 
spheres of life, from 'the grammatical to the occupational, to define and per- 
ceive the male as generically human and the female as a special subgroup.16 
Important practical barriers are often cited to explain the much lower 
rate of participation of women even in trials that do  not formally exclude 
them. Women are far more often the principal caregivers for babies, chil- 
dren, disabled and elderly family members or  neighbors, and have much less 
mobility and ability to take "time off" to attend to their own medical needs. l 7  
Women still are far more likely to have to "account" to their male partners 
for where they go, whom they see, what they do, and how they spend their 
time than vice-versa. Women's disadvantaged economic positionla means 
the office and the use of terms like "wicked witch," "dragon lady," and "booby lady" to refer to 
women researchers. In 1992, a Washington, D.C. television station ran a six-part investigative 
report that featured dozens of female NIH researchers alleging discriminatory treatment. See id.; 
Scott Greenberger, Science Friction: The Struggle of Female Researchers at NIH,  WASH. POST, July 11, 
1993, at C3; NIH, Under Increased Scrutiny for Sex Discrimination, Seeks to Ban Researcher from Campus, 
CORP. CRIME REPORTER, Oct. 26, 1992, at 8 ,  16; and Interuiew with Margaret Jensvold, M . D . ,  Director, 
Institute for Research on Women's Health, CORP. CRIME REP., Oct. 26, 1992, at 8, 16. On  April 1, 
1994, a female researcher won the first jury verdict ever against the National Institutes of Mental 
Health for denial of opportunities afforded her male counterparts and retaliation for filing an 
EEOC complaint. Lack of Mentoring for Female Physician Considered Sex Bias by FederalJuty, 1994 Daily 
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 64, at D-1 l (April 5, 1994). Recall also the case of Dr. Frances Conley, the 
prominent neurosurgeon who resigned her tenured position at Stanford University Medical 
School to protest the administration's failure to curb the relentless sexism and harassment she 
and other women professionals had experienced in that institution. Seegenerally THE OUTER CIR- 
CLE: WOMEN I N  THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY (Harriet Zuckerman et al. eds., 1991). 
16 Thus, in the popular press one finds still ubiquitous references to the "woman firefighter" 
o r  "woman sportscaster" or, for that matter, the woman doctor o r  lawyer, while the gender of 
men in the same roles is never mentioned. In medical school, to pick a more salient example, 
students learn the anatomy and physiology of the "70-kilogram man:" what his urine output is, 
what dosages of medication he should get. A study reviewing eight major anatomy texts used in 
medical schools found that identifiably male bodies and body parts constitute 64% of the illustra- 
tions, while female bodies were used only for 11% of the illustrations (the gender of the balance 
was indeterminate) - except, of course, in the chapter on reproductive anatomy. Carol Tavris, 
THE MISMEASURE OF WOMEN 96-98 (1992); see also Kay Weiss, IVhat Medical Students Learn About 
Women, in SEIZING OUR BODIES: THE POLITICS OF WOMEN'S HEALTH 212 (Claudia Dreifus ed., 
1978), for a collection of extraordinary excerpts from standard contemporary gynecology texts. 
[Plredominantly male. . . researchers, policy makers, and practitioners. . . have typically 
dealt with differences among types of clients by placing everyone, except White middle- 
aged . . . men, in special population categories [cit. omit.]. . . . This special population 
approach provides a way to incorporate data and experience that is inconsistent with 
general expectations . . ., but reduces the need to examine and revise the fundamental 
assumptions that define the standard for normal . . . services. 
Reed, Developing I,fromen-sensitive Drug Dependence Treatment Services: IVhy So Dt@cult P, 19 J. PSYCHOAC- 
TIVE DRUGS 151, 152-53 (1987); see also Rebecca Dresser, Wanted: Single, I.lrhite Male for Afedical 
Research, 22 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 24, 28 (Jan.-Feb. 1992) (biomedical researchers define "the 
white male as the normal, representative human being"). 
17 See Judith D. Auerbach, Ph.D., Testimony on behalf of the Consortium of Social Science 
Associations before the Task Force on Opportunities for Research on Women's Health of the 
Advisory Committee to the Director of National Institutes of Health 4-5 (June 12, 1991) (on file 
with author). 
'8 "Women make up more than half the world's population. yet perform two thirds of its 
work, receive one tenth of its income and own less than one hundredth of its property." United 
Nations, Office of Public Information, United Nations Decade for Women 1976-1985, Really Only 
a 'Begmning', 22 UN CHRON., July-Aug. 1985, at ii. In the United States, the tiresome truth re- 
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that they have less to spend on transportation or  other relatively minor ancil- 
lary expenses. The powerful effect of providing minimal support in the form 
of child care, for example, has been demonstrated by the experience of the 
few substance-abuse programs that have instituted child-care facilities. Wo- 
men's attendance and utilization increase dramatically. l g  
All these factors surely make it more difficult for women to participate in 
some protocols. But the focus of this paper is neither the psychological nor 
the social structures that foster concern with male medical problems. Instead 
I seek to catalog the explicit justifications that have been used for the exclu- 
sion of women from biomedical research; to examine the validity of those 
rationales for future research decisions; and to suggest that Institutional Re- 
view Boards, research funding sources, and others concerned with the con- 
duct of biomedical research have an ethical and perhaps a legal duty to 
educate, persuade and provide incentives for clinical investigators and their 
sponsors to stop excluding women. 
Part I describes the benefits that accrue to participants in a clinical trial, 
and conversely the variety of ways in which women have been disadvantaged 
by their exclusion. In Part 11, I analyze the law-related arguments that have 
sustained exclusionary practices, and evaluate their legitimacy. Part I11 sets 
forth a proposal for genuinely equitable treatment of women in research, and 
Part IV reviews some different strategies that might accomplish that goal. 
I. THE IMPACT OF EXCLUSION FROM RESEARCH: WOMEN'S 
HEALTH AND WHAT WE DO NOT KNOW ABOUT IT 
The exclusion of potential subjects from consideration for clinical proto- 
cols has rarely been identified as a bioethical issue. This has not been for lack 
of interest in the general topic of research ethics; experimentation with 
human subjects (the eponymous title of one of the very first textbooks in the 
area)20 has been a central focus of bioethical inquiry, having spawned at least 
one journal devoted exclusively to the ~ u b j e c t . ~ '  Indeed it  might well be 
characterized as the fountainhead of what can now fairly be called the 
bioethics movement (or industry, depending on one's perspective). In re- 
viewing both the original "codes" of research ethicsz2 and the literature of 
mains that college-educated women on average have lower annual income than men with high 
school diplomas. Depression Afects Productivity, Causes Illorkplace Accidents, Experts Say. Daily Lab. 
Rep. (BNA) No. 141, at A-3 (July 23, 1991), and that women employed outside the home make 
74e for every dollar of salary paid men. Louis S. Richman, The Truth About the Rich and the Poor, 
FORTUNE, Sept. 21. 1992, at 135; Earnings Increased 3.3 Percent for IVage, Salaq llforkers, Daily Lab. 
Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at B-4 (Feb. 5, 1992) (median earnings of full-time paid women workers 74.2 
percent of full-time male workers). 
l 9  Andrea Savage-Abramowitz et al., Seruing ll1omen: The Impact of Program Structure and Re- 
sources, in 1 DRUG DEPENDENCE AND ALCOHOLISM 849 (Arnold J .  Schechter ed.. 1981); Elaine Car- 
men et al., Inequality and I.$'omen i rC1ental Health: An Overview, 138 AM. J .  PSYCHIATRY 1319, 1328 
(198 1); see also Kathleen Teltsch, In Detroit, A Drug Recove? Center That IVelcomes the Pregnant Addict, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1990, at A14. 
~OJAY KATZ ET AL., EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN BEINGS (1972). 
2' IRB: A Review of Human Subjects Research, published by the Hastings Center and now in its 
fifteenth volume. 
22 The  major ethical codes for research scientists speak only to requiring informed consent 
and ensuring the freedom to refuse to serve as a subject. See, e .g. ,  THE NUREMBERG CODE, Rule 1 
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the early years,29 as well as the definitive texts of the present,24 I have found 
almost no mention of the notion of a right to be considered for a research 
protocol or a corresponding duty not to exclude would-be subjects. The first 
report of The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of 
Biomedical and Behavioral R e ~ e a r c h , ~ ~  does state that the principle ofjustice: 
gives rise to moral requirements that there be fair procedures and 
outcomes in the selection of research subjects. . . . 
. . . Individual justice in the selection of subjects would require 
that researchers exhibit fairness: thus, they should not offkr potentially 
beneficial research only to some patients who are in their favor or select only 
"undesirable" persons for risky research.26 
(1949); WORLD MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, DECLARATION OF HELSINKI: RECOMMENDATIONS GUIDING 
MEDICAL DOCTORS I N  BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS, 5 111, Rule 3b (1975). 
Both are reprinted in ROBERT J. LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 425,427 
(2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter LEVINE, ETHICS A N D  REGULATION]. 
23 E.g. ,  BERNARD BARBER ET AL.. RESEARCH ON HUMAN SUBJECTS: PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL CON- 
TROL IN MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION (1973); HENRY K. BEECHER, RESEARCH AND THE INDIVIDUAL 
(1970); R E N ~ E  C. FOX, EXPERIMENT PERILOUS (1959); PAUL FREUND, EXPERIMENTATION O N  HUMAN 
SUBJECTS (1970); CHARLES FRIED, MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION: PERSONAL INTEGRITY A N D  SOCIAL 
POLICY (1974); Alvan R. Feinstein, Medical Ethics and the Architecture of Clinical Research. 15 CLINICAL 
PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 316 (1974); Hans Jonas, Philosophical Rflectiorn on Expm'mmting 
with Human Subjects, 98 DAEDALUS 219 (1969); LeRoy Walters, Some Ethical Issues in Research Involv- 
ing Human Subjects, 20 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. 193 (Winter 1977); see also PRESIDENT'S COMMIS- 
SION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS I N  MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL 
RESEARCH, IMPLEMENTING HUMAN RESEARCH REGULATIONS (1983); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR 
THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS I N MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL ND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, PRO- 
TECTING HUMAN SUBJECTS (1981). But see Robert J.  Levine, Appropriate Guidelines for the Selection of 
Human Subjects for Participation in Biomedical and Behavioral Research, in THE NATIONAL COMMISSION 
FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, THE BEL- 
MONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF 
RESEARCH, DHEW Pub. No. (0s) 78-0013, Appendix I (1978) [hereinafter, THE BELMONT RE- 
PORT APPENDIX I]; Robert J. Levine & Karen Lebacqz. Ethical Cornideralions in Clinical Trials, 25 
CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY AND THERAPEUTICS 728 (1979). Levine early on identified the potential 
benefit to subjects, not of the innovation on trial, but of the quality of care in the research 
environment. 
24 Probably universally recognized as the premier comprehensive treatment is LEVINE, ETH- 
ICS AND REGULATION, supra note 22. As noted above, Levine is one of the few ethicists to com- 
ment on this issue. although his discussion in this text is not extensive. See id. at 89-90. 
25 NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL N D  BE- 
HAVIORAL RESEARCH, DEP'T HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, PUB. NO. 78-0012, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES 
AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH (1978) [hereinafter BEL- 
MONT REPORT]. 
26 Id. at 18 (emphasis added). The  Bebnotit Report goes on to point out: 
Injustice may appear in the selection of subjects, even if individual subjects are se- 
lected fairly by investigators and treated fairly in the course of the research. This injus- 
tice arises from social, racial, sexual, and cultural biases institutionalized in society. 
Thus, even if individual researchers are treating their research subjects fairly, and even 
if IRBs are taking care to assure that subjects are selected fairly within a particular insti- 
tution. unjust social patterns may nevertheless appear in the overall distribution of the 
burdens and bmefih of research. Although individual institutions o r  investigators may 
not be able to resolve a problem that is pervasive in their social setting, they can con- 
sider distributive justice in selecting research subjects. 
Id. at 19 (emphasis added). It is fair to conclude that the authors of the Belmont Report may have 
meant by the emphasized phrase rnore the ultimate knowledge derived from the research than 
any immediate advantage from the experience of participation; nonetheless, the provocative, and 
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The concept of just allocation of access to research has not been devel- 
oped. It has taken the AIDS epidemic and the consequent seismic changes, 
both in the public's awareness of the conduct of clinical trials and the govern- 
ment's approach to them, to focus attention on the question of achieving "ac- 
- ~ 
cess" to experimental drugs or innovative therapies by serving as a research 
~ u b j e c t . ~ '  With the battlecry of "Trials are treatment," AIDS advocates have 
pretty much single-handedly made obsolete the sacrosanct assumptions of 
"null hypothesis" and "clinical equipoise"28 that had been the bedrock of 
research ethics. 
I would like to unpack, as the philosophers say, this rather facile-sound- 
ing slogan and suggest the extent to which it contains more truth than propa- 
ganda. There are at least three ways that clinical trials are treatment, although 
certainly there are many ways in which they are First, even in this era 
of "compassionate use," "Treatment INDs," "parallel track," and "buyer's 
clubs,"30 it is still the case that the average American can obtain genuinely 
still unusual, focus of the Belmont Report on the need to consider patterns of subject selection when 
evaluating the ethics of research design bears repetition and reflection today. 
27 See, e .g. ,  Harold Edgar & David J. Rothman, New Rules for New Drugs: The Challenge ofAIDS lo 
the Regulatory Process, in A DISEASE OF SocIEn:  CULTURAL AND INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES TO AIDS 
84, 94-98 (Dorothy Nelkin et al. eds., 1991); James J. Eigo, Expedited Drug Approval Procedures: 
Perspective from an AIDS Activist, 45 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 377 (1990). 
28 In clinical trials, one group of subjects receives the intervention on trial - a drug, proce- 
dure, or  device - while another similar group ("the control group") does not. The  health out- 
comes of both groups are analyzed to detect statistically significant differences - that is, 
differences that are highly unlikely to be the product of chance or  coincidence. Traditionally. 
clinical trials have been considered ethically permissible if and only if at the inception of a trial, 
no  one, especially the scientist-investigator, knows whether the intervention to be tested is better, 
worse, or  the same as whatever will be received by the control group (placebo, standard therapy, 
alternative experimental therapy, no intervention). In other words, the tested intervention must 
be in "clinical equipoise" with the placebo or  standard therapy or  alternative experimental ther- 
apy. Based on the information available at the outset, the control group should be as likely to 
benefit as the subjects receiving the innovative therapy. S P ~  Benjamin Freedman. Equipoise and The 
Ethics of Clinical Research, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 141 (1987). 
Likewise, the "null hypothesis" standard for clinical trials dictates that the hypothesis on trial 
- that a given drug will reduce blood pressure, for example - must be as likely to be false as it is 
true. See Eugene Passamani, Clinical Trials -Are They Ethical?, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1589, 1591 
(1991). In reality, of course, many investigators begin trials with a strong suspicion that the 
tested intervention will prove efficacious, whether or  not they feel comfortable saying so. Despite 
the ritual disclaimers ofinformed consent, few subjects, especially sick subjects, believe that their 
devoted physicians would subject them to experimentation unless the doctors "knew" it would 
help them. See Samuel Hellman & Deborah S. Hellman, Of Mice But Not Men: Problem of the Ran- 
domized Clinical Trial, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1585 (1991); Robert J. Levine, Clinical Trials and 
Physicianr as Double Agents, 65  YALE J. BIOLOGY & MED. 65  (1992). Here, as in the law, the lines 
between "hope," "intend," and "desire," on the one hand, and "believe" and "know," on the 
other, are often tenuous. 
29 Because of the uncertainty, presumed o r  real, about the safety o r  efficacy of an experimen- 
tal intervention, trials have typically been defined as non-beneficial and not intended to provide 
treatment; rather, they are pure vehicles of data-gathering and information acquisition. 
30 All these terms denote exceptions to the general rule that a drug not approved for market- 
ing in the United States cannot be provided to patients, other than those enrolled in a protocol. 
"Compassionate use" is an FDA-approved administration of a nonstandard therapy, whether or  
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new, unlicensed drugs only by serving as a research ~ u b j e c t . ~ '  Second, pa- 
tients are also interested in therapies that are licensed for one indication, but 
hoped to be useful for another. Trial participants can get these therapies 
free, while non-subjects have to pay for them, often without insurance or 
Medicaid reimbursement because of their "unlicensed" status.32 Patients are 
actually beginning to pay for the privilege of serving as research subjects - 
witness the Parkinson's patients who have paid $30,000 to be experimental 
fetal tissue transplant  recipient^.^^ 
For patients, getting drugs free is better than paying for them, and if for 
no other reason, participation in a trial is a benefit. Skeptics who find the null 
hypothesis still viable or even compelling may reject the would-be subject's 
perception as ignorant or illogical - especially if there is a placebo arm to the 
But there are other reasons to characterize trial participation as a val- 
uable treatment option. First, for a large segment of the American popula- 
tion, clinical trials are the best available source of quality health care.35 
not it is under investigation, to an individual patient, and requires agency review on a case-by- 
case basis. Treatment INDs ("Investigational New Drug") are~limited to drugs intended to treat 
an "immediately life-threatening" disease and which are already well along the drug develop- 
ment pipeline. See 21 C.F.R. 5 5  312.34(a) & 314.35 (1993). "Parallel track" is a means for peo- 
ple with life-threatening diseases who are unable to tolerate or  benefit from standard approved 
therapies, and who cannot, for reasons of exclusionary criteria o r  geographic inconvenience, en- 
~ ~- 
roll in protocol, to gain early access to promising, but non-approved, agents. See Expanded 
Availability of Investigational New Drugs Through a Parallel Track Mechanism for People with 
AIDS and other HIV-Related Diseases, 57 Fed. Reg. 13,250 (April 15, 1992); Expanded Availa- 
bility of Investigational New Drugs Through a Parallel Track Mechanism for People with AIDS 
and other HIV-Related Diseases, 55 Fed. Reg. 20,856 (April 2, 1990). Seegenerally Bret L. Lans- 
dale, Essay, A Procedural Due Process Attack on FDA Regulations: Getting Arew Drugs to People with AIDS, 
18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 417 (1991); Frank E. Young et al., The FDA? New Procedures for the 1Jse of 
Invesligalional Drugs in Treatment, 259 JAMA 2267 (1988). "Buyer's clubs" are organizations of 
patients, primarily people living with AIDS, who pool knowledge and resources to import 
pharmaceuticals approved elsewhere but not yet available in the United States, which is permit- 
ted so long as the imported substance is for personal use only. See Philip J .  Hilts, U.S.  Issues Rules 
on Medicine Clubs, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1993, at A18. While these mechanisms may permit earlier 
access to an unproven drug, they do not provide the care and other benefits associated with 
participation in a clinical trial. See infra part I.B. 
3 1  My comment with respect to the average American is even more apt for the average non- 
American. For a brief reference to this notion in the international context, see Laurence Gostin, 
Ethical Principles for the Conduct of Human Subjtscts Research: Population-Based Research and Ethics, 19 L., 
MED. & HEALTH CARE 19 1, 196 (Fall-Winter 1991). 
32 Pharmaceutical companies may charge "cost" for drugs used in Treatment INDs and par- 
allel track; it is not yet clear whether "cost" will be interpreted to include R & D, not just produc- 
tion. Public and private insurers generally d o  not cover "experimental" therapies, even if the 
drug is licensed for use for a different indication. See generalli Mary Griffin, AIDS, Drugs and the 
Pharmaceutical Industry: A Need for Rt$orm, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 363 (1991); Grace Powers Monaco & 
M. Gail Gottlieb, Treatment IhrDs: Research for Hire?, 258 JAMA 3296 (1987). 
33 Gina Kolata, Patients Paying lo Be Subjects in Brain Study, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1992, at I;  see 
also E. Haavi Morreim, Palient-Funded Research: Paying the Pzper or Protecting the Patient?, IRB: REV. 
HUM. SUBJECTS RES., May-June 1991. at 1. 
34 See discussion of "the therapeutic misconception" in Paul S. Appelbaum et al., False Hopes 
and Best Data: Consent lo Research and the Thernpeutic Misconceplion, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Apr. 
1987, at 20. 
35 For an example, see physician and ethicist Kathleen Nolan's comment with respect to 
HIV-infected children: 
AZT and other treatments should be widely available as "standard therapy." Unfortu- 
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Second, for women, exclusion from the clinical trials has meant less effica- 
cious health care even for those who can afford their choice of private 
p h y ~ i c i a n . ~ ~  
B. How TRIALS ARE TREATMENT 
As biologist Alvin Novick has observed: 
Many . . . subjects recognize that as trial participants they will be 
regularly examined and evaluated by a health care provider, in an 
organizational setting. Appointments will be made and subjects will 
be treated decently. Those are compelling benefits for many indi- 
gent and marginalized persons. . . . [Mlany of these persons will 
volunteer for clinical trials to receive basic health care.37 
Clinical investigators themselves realize that regardless of the outcome in 
terms of the value of the intervention on trial, there are many therapeutic 
aspects to being a subject. In the candid words of a standard text: 
The very nature of protocols, which require standardized and 
frequent observations to follow outcome, provides the patient with a 
better assessment of therapeutic result, more safety checks, more at- 
tention from the physician and staff, and more access to the medical 
system. The screening process provides an excellent overall health 
assessment. . . . The physicians undertaking the research, the con- 
sultants, and the laboratories are usually among the best in the com- 
munity and provide state-of-the-art diagnosis and advice. As a part 
of the process of encouraging continuation in the study, the attitudes 
of health providers shift from acting as though they are doing the 
patient a favor to seeking to please the patient who is doing them a 
favor. This shift is reflected in waiting time, friendliness, and overall 
efficiency in using the patient's time. . . . 
. . . .  
. . . In almost all situations, the study population does better 
than patients who are not under protocol study largely because they 
get more attention and close monitoring of the major a b n ~ r m a l i t y . ~ ~  
nately programs to care for children with AIDS remain poorly funded, and it is tragically 
true that only "participation in investigational treatment programs ensures that a child 
will receive state-of-the-art care for all symptoms and any complicating illness in addi- 
tion to HIV disease, thus reducing morbidity and improving quality of life." 
Kathleen Nolan, AIDS and Pediatric Research, 14 EVALUATION REV. 464, 477 (1990) (citing DEP'T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SECRETARY'S WORK GROUP ON PEDIATRIC HIV INFECTION A N D  DISEASE: 
FINAL REPORT 24 (1988)). 
36 See infra notes 39-77 and accompanying text. 
37 Alvin Novick, iVoncompliance in Clinical Trials: I. Subjects, 5 AIDS & PUB. POL'Y 94, 94 (1990); 
see also Barbara Brotman, Any Volunteers? Being a Human Guinea h g  Has Ils Risks and Its Rewarh,  CHI. 
TRIB., May 19, 1992, at C l  (most people become research subjects to obtain free medical care; in 
cancer medicine, clinical trials regarded as best care available). 
FRANK L. IBER ET AL., CONDUCTING CLINICAL TRIALS 1 10-1 1 1, 12 1 (1987). This text actu- 
ally has a table of "Advantages to the Subject in Research Participation:" 
Possible therapeutic advantage 
Better outcome of disease 
Closer monitoring than in routine practice 
Getting attention for other ailments 
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Without exploring why this quality of care is not routinely available outside 
protocols (even if the patient can afford expensive private physicians), o r  sug- 
gesting that it represents the norm within protocols, the basic point remains: 
exclusion from trials, regardless of whether the intervention on trial turns out 
to be efficacious or the subject receives nothing but placebo, is tantamount to 
denial of a special quality of care. 
A final sense in which trials are the equivalent of treatment (or at least, 
that exclusion from trials translates into exclusion from treatment) is that wo- 
men become guinea pigs once a new therapy hits the marketplace. As far as 
women are concerned, these therapies have not really been tested. Even wo- 
men who can pay for their health care lose out because their physicians can 
offer care with only limited knowledge about the operation of "standard" 
therapies in female bodies.!jg 
It is increasingly well-understood that both the pharmacokinetics40 and 
pharmacodynamics4' of drugs are frequently different in women than in 
men.42 That means that optimal doses arrived at through testing in male sub- 
jects may be ineffective or dangerous for women. It has been demonstrated 
repeatedly that both female menstrual cycles, and the exogenous estrogens 
used in contraceptives and hormone replacement therapy, can dramatically 
affect the utilization of a wide range of drugs, including diazepam, insulin, 
Better ~hvsical  and laboratorv health check 
. , 
Superior physicians, labs, and testing 
More contact with the providers 
Access to contacts for future health information 
Remuneration 
The  opportunity to make new friends 
Contributions to society 
Id. at Table 13. The  text goes on to describe "Techniques that Enhance Recruitment and Reten- 
tion of Patients," including, inter alia, training of all receptionists, technicians, and telephone 
personnel to provide "friendly, informed contacts that reflect the importance and uniqueness of the 
patient[!]"; locating and recruiting former research subjects to talk with and reassure potential 
new subjects; noting in the chart specific information about the subject (e.g., new grandchild, 
new job, gardening, cooking) so that the subject can be asked about them at the next visit, to 
"demonstrate to each patient his uniqueness"; and if anxiety is detected about an unrelated 
health problem, prompt evaluation of symptoms by the principal investigator. Id. at 120-21 (em- 
phasis added). How often d o  we expect such tender treatment from an ordinary health care 
provider? 
39 Gurwitz, supra note 5, at 1421; Nanette K. Wenger, Exclusion ofthe Elderly and Women From 
Coronary Trials - Is Their Quality of Care Compromised?, 268 JAMA 1460 (1992) (editorial). "For 
many if not most drugs on the market, no one really knows whether they behave any differently in 
women. Nobody really knows what their role is or  should be in pregnancy." Drug Testing on Men 
Only, WASH. POST, Dec. 8,  1992, at 214 (quoting Nancy Buc, former General Counsel at Food and 
Drug Administration). 
40 Pharmacokinetics refers to the concentration over time of an ingested substance in body 
tissues and blood, i.e. the "bioavailability" of the substance as it is absorbed, metabolized, and 
excreted. See Ruth B. Merkatz et al., Women in Clinical Trials ofNew Drugs: A Change in Food and Drug 
Administration Policy, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 292, 292 (1993). 
4 1  Pharmacodynamics means the body's response to a particular concentration of ingested 
substance. Id. at 293. 
42 Id. at 293 and references cited therein. 
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tetracycline, rifampin, and an t i con~u l san t s .~~  Even when women have been 
included in clinical studies, researchers have consistently failed to explore 
these issues or even to attempt to discover these effects. In 1988, the Food 
and Drug Administration adopted a policy calling specifically for such gender 
breakdowns and analyses of safety and effectiveness data in all applications 
submitted for marketing approval of a new An audit by the General 
Accounting Office and subsequent FDA self-study revealed that by the middle 
of 1992, these analyses were being performed between 50 and 60 percent of 
the time.45 But no application was turned down, or held up, as a result. The 
FDA now maintains that in the future it "may consider" deferring review of 
an application if the sex-specific analyses are lacking.46 
Women as a class also are harmed by the paucity of research about health 
problems that primarily afflict them, and because we know almost nothing 
about therapeutics for pregnant women. Almost twenty years ago Robert Le- 
vine succinctly laid out the dilemma that confronts women who need medical 
care: 
It is the custom in the United States to develop new drugs based 
upon testing of their safety and efficacy almost exclusively in adults 
who are incapable of becoming pregnant. . . . As a consequence, 
most drugs must contain on their . . . labels a statement to the effect 
that their safety and/or efficacy have not been established in children 
and/or pregnant women. In fact, it might be more appropriate to 
include in such statements that the safety and/or efficacy of the drug 
has not been established in women who are capable of becoming 
pregnant. . . . 
. . . . 
It is common practice in this country to administer drugs ap- 
proved for use in non-pregnant adults to pregnant women and chil- 
dren. Such administration is conducted according to the usual 
standards of medical practice without rigorous testing of safety and/ 
or efficacy. In this way we have a tendency to distribute the unknown 
risks of such activities not randomly but rather capriciously. In addi- 
tion, we have no assurance that, should the risks materialize as harm, 
they will be de te~ ted .~ '  
The irony of this is evident: because  researcher^^^ are so skittish about 
the risk of fetal harm,49 they bar women who might be pregnant - which to 
them includes every fertile female - from their research. But when it comes 
time to prescribe, market, and profit from drugs, drug companies do not bar 
43 Id. at 293. 
44 FDA, Guideline for the Format and Content of the Clinical and Statistical Sections of New 
Drug Applications, 53 Fed. Reg. 39,524 (1988). 
45 Merkatz. supra note 40, at 294. 
46 Id. This is not exactly a vigorous enforcement stance. On the disappointing lack of teeth 
in the proposed new FDA guideline, see infra notes 116-128 and accompanying text. 
47 THE BELMONT REPORT APPENDIX I, supra note 23, at 4-65 & 4-66 (emphasis added). 
4s Throughout this paper, I use the term "researcher" generically, to include both the inves- 
tigator scientist and the institutional/corporate sponsor. When it is useful to differentiate the 
two, I will. 
49 See infra notes 139-97 and accompanying text. 
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women, including women of child-bearing capacity. Researchers sidestep re- 
sponsibility by making the true statement that they have no information about 
the risk to the child of a pregnant woman who takes the drug. (They also 
generally have no information about the risk to children of women who took 
the drug before conception or  to children of men who either are taking o r  
have taken the drug prior to or  at the time that they impregnate someone.) 
As a result, women who are not pregnant (or not thought to be preg- 
nant), as well as some women who know that they are pregnant, may take 
drugs with no real basis for predicting their effects. O r  they may be unneces- 
sarily deterred from taking a drug they need for fear of those untested effects. 
This may have serious implications for their health or  the ultimate health of 
their children. Meanwhile, men take the same drug without realizing that it 
may have unknown, unstudied consequences for the children they father.50 
D. DISPARITY I N  RECOGNITION AND TREATMENT OF WOMEN'S HEALTH 
PROBLEMS 
Women d o  not receive the same quality of health care that men do. Phy- 
sicians respond to presenting symptoms in women with less aggressive diag- 
nostic procedures and more conservative treatment. Part of the problem is 
that the data to support aggressive intervention in women is absent.51 
Even the American Medical Association has recognized this disparity, and 
concluded that it could not be accounted for by pertinent biological differ- 
ences between women and men.52 The  AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial 
Affairs found that 
medical treatments for women are based on a male model, regard- 
less of the fact that women may react differently to treatments than 
men or  that some diseases manifest themselves differently in women 
than in men. The  results of medical research on men are genera- 
lized to women without sufficient evidence of applicability to 
women.53 
It went on to recommend that "[rlesearch on health problems that affect both 
sexes should include male and female subjects. Sound medical and scientific 
reasons should be required for excluding women from medical tests and stud- 
ies, such as that the proposed research does not or  would not affect the health 
of women."54 
For example, some of the strongest evidence yet that moderate drinking 
protects against heart disease was published in August 1991. Funded by the 
National Institutes of Health, a study of 51,529 American male doctors, den- 
50See infra notes 140-46 and accompanying text. 
5 1  Paul Cotton, Examples Abound oj Gaps in Medical Knowledge Because of Groups E.xcluded from 
ScientGc Study, 263 JAMA 1051, 1055 (1990); Marguerite Holloway & Philip Yam, Reflecting Dtfm- 
ences: Health Care Begtns to Address Needc of I,Vomen and Minorities, SCI. AM., Mar. 1992, at 13; Lau- 
rence Altman, Study Findc Heart Treatment D~Jirs for Men and IVomen, N.Y. TIMES, NOV. 13. 1991, at 
18: see also Toward Healthy CVomen, N.Y. TIMES,  Sept  9, 1991, at A14. 
52 Council on  Ethical and Judicial Affairs, AMA, Gender Disparities in Clinical Decision Making, 
266 JAMA 559, 559 (1991); see also Carl M. Kjellstrand, Age, Sex and Race Inequality in Renal Trans- 
plantation, 148 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1305 (1988).  
53 Council on  Ethical and Judicial Affairs, supra note 52, at 559. 
54 Id. at 562. 
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tists, pharmacists, and veterinary surgeons "provide[s] strong evidence for 
the hypothesis that alcohol intake is inversely associated with coronary artery 
disease."55 In response to this study, the cardiologist Arthur Klatsky ob- 
served "It would be fair to say if there was a procedure or medication as effec- 
tive as moderate drinking which was perceived as having no important risk, it 
would be a very, very major form of therapy for coronary disease."56 
But we know almost nothing about the effect of alcohol consumption on 
coronary disease in women. Nor do  we know whether women should be on 
the new anticholesterol drugs, or whether putting some women on the 
"stepped care" regimen for mil'd hypertension may actually kill them, as has 
been suggested in one article criticizing the Hypertension Detection and Fol- 
low-up 
Women are far more likely than men to experience adverse reactions to 
prescribed They are twice as likely to die from side effects as men, 
possibly because the dosage levels have been determined by testing in men.59 
Yet women are prescribed antidepressants much more often than men also 
suffering from d e p r e s ~ i o n . ~ ~  Although twice as many women as men suffer at 
least one episode of serious clinical depre~s ion ,~ '  Wellbutrin, and many other 
promising antidepressant agents, have been studied almost exclusively in 
men.62 Only in practice did physicians learn anecdotally that women have 
seizures on the drug, especially if they suffer from bulimia.63 Women use 
over ninety percent of "diet pills," but nearly all of the testing was done in 
55 Eric B. Rimm et al., Prospective Study of Alcohol Conrumption and Risk ofcoronary Disease in i k ,  
338 LANCET 464, 467 (1991). Harvard School of Public Health researchers found that men who 
have up to two drinks per day enjoy a 26% reduction in risk for heart disease compared with 
those who drink little o r  not at all. It may be that the risk is also reduced by about 40% in men 
who have two or  three drinks per day, but the sample at that level is too small to permit confi- 
dence. Id. at 465-68. 
56 Richard Saltus, Study A # m  Alcohol Curbs Heart Ilk, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 23, 1991, at 1, 16. 
57 Peter L. Schnall et al., An Analysis ofthe HDFP Trial: Evidence ofAduerse Effects ofAnfihyperten- 
sive Treatment on White Women with Moderate and Severe Hypertension, 84 N.Y. ST. J. MED. 299 (1984). 
The  article reported that this large study included women, but failed to analyze the data indicat- 
ing that 168% more of the European-American women aged thirty to sixty-nine with diastolic 
blood pressure > 105 died on treatment than on control. Interestingly, the critical article that 
performed this data analysis was turned down by the New England Journal of Medicine, the Journal of 
American Medical Association, and the Lancet, allegedly because it was too "hot," and was ultimately 
accepted by the New York State Journal of Medicine only after review by twice the usual number of 
readers. See Barbara Berney, In Research, M'omen Don't  matter. THE PROGRESSIVE, Oct. 1990, at 24. 
58 Jean Hamilton & Barbara Parry, Sex-Relaled Dtfferences in Clinical Drug Response: Implications 
for 1,i'omen's Health, 38 J. AM. MED. WOMEN'S ASS'N 126 (1983). 
59See Annette Kornblum, Are IVomen Being Ignored?, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Jan. 16, 1990, Discovery 
Section, at 5. 
60Sue V. Rosser, Is There Androcentric Bias in Psychiatric Diagnosis?, 17 J. MED. & PHIL. 223 
(1992). 
6' Andrew C. Leon et al., Continuing Female Predominance in Depressive Illness, 83  AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 754 (1993); THE WOMEN'S HEALTH DATA BOOK: A PROFILE OF WOMEN'S HEALTH IN THE 
UNITED STATES 63  (Jacqueline A. Horton ed., 1992). 
62 Patricia Anstett, Medical Groups and Congress Are Facing Elusive Issues, CHI. TRIB.. June 23, 
1991, at 12 (Interview with Margaret Jensvold, M.D., Director of the Institute for Research on 
Women's Health). 
6s Id. 
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male subjects.64 
When women are misdiagnosed because of deficiencies in research, the 
consequences may be more than physical. Until January 1, 1993, the pre- 
sumptive definition of AIDS used by the Centers for Disease Control and Pre- 
vention ("CDC") failed to include the different manifestations of the infection 
in women (pelvic inflammatory disease, cervical cancer, genital herpes, 
vulvovaginal candidiasis). This inaccurate definition in the primary surveil- 
lance tool for all public health purposes worked to women's disadvantage by 
skewing statistics and surveillance data used to allocate the distribution of 
AIDS resources and services and by making it appear that the low number of 
women participating in AIDS Clinical Trial Group studies (funded and ad- 
ministered by the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases) is less 
disproportionate than in fact it is.65 Moreover, since 1983 the Social Security 
Administration ("SSA") had treated CDC-defined AIDS as a "Listing" - a 
medical condition that presumptively entitled claimants to automatic disabil- 
ity benefits and related medical care coverage.66 But women who in reality 
were suffering from what ought to have been classified as AIDS did not qual- 
ify for theseservices. 
Finally, in response to legal ~hal lenge,~ '  the CDC proposed a new, more 
inclusive case definition in November 1991. The SSA promptly followed suit 
by proposing a new, more inclusive "HIV Infection L i ~ t i n g . " ~ ~  However, si- 
multaneously the SSA changed its rules so that now no one with HIV infec- 
tion, male or female, automatically qualifies for benefits.69 The new listing 
also fails to include pelvic inflammatory disease, chronic genital ulcers, Stage 
I cervical cancer, or recurrent herpes. Its divergence from the CDC definition 
will be confusing for the physicians asked to verify their patients' 
symptomology and diagnoses. 
Ironically, given the close correlation between the health of the pregnant 
woman and that of her child, research on the health needs of pregnant wo- 
Jeannette R. Ickovics & Elissa S. Epel, Women k Health Research: Policy and Practice, IRB: REV. 
HUM. SUBJECTS RES., July-Aug. 1993, at 1, 3. 
65 For a careful analysis of this claim, see Carol Levine & Gary L. Stein, What j In A Name? The 
Policy Implications of the CDC Definition of AIDS, 19 L., MED. & HEALTH CARE 278, 280-82 (Fall- 
Winter 1991); see also OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, PUB. NO. OTA-BP-H-89, THE CDC's 
DEFINITION OF AIDS: IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROPOSED REVISIONS (1992). As of September 1991, 
only 6.9% of the 15.563 patients enrolled in AIDS Clinical Trial Group protocols were adult 
women. By comparison, almost 20% of the enrollees in the Community Programs for Clinical 
Research on AIDS protocols were women - indicating that it is hardly impossible to recruit and 
retain female subjects in AIDS protocols. As of February 1992, women constituted 11% of the 
AIDS cases in the United States, even diagnosed under the male-based definition. See CENTERS 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL. HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE 12 (Feb. 1992). Eighty-five per cent of women 
with AIDS are diagnosed during childbearing years (age 15-44 years). Tedd V. Ellerbrock et al., 
Epidemiology of Women with AIDS in the United Slates, 1981 lhrough 1 9 9 0 ,  265 JAMA 2971 (1991). 
6656 Fed. Reg. 65.702. 65,703 (1991). 
67See S.P. v. Sullivan, No. 90 Civ. 6294 MJC (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 1, 1990) (class action 
brought by MFY Legal Services and the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund). 
See 56 Fed. Reg. 65,702 (1991). 
69 See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 65, at 4-5. 31-48. 
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men has been virtually prohibited. Again, the HIV-infection epidemic pro- 
vides stark examples of an attitude that prioritizes protection of a fetus from 
uncertain risk over even probable benefit to the pregnant woman. There was 
the recommendation of the Centers for Disease Control that rejected as "in- 
advisable" the use of aerosol pentamidine as prophylaxis for the potentially 
fatal opportunistic infection Pneumo'cystis cannii pneumonia in HIV-infected 
pregnant women,70 although "[c]learly, women with AIDS, especially preg- 
nant women with AIDS, have a more fulminant course than men."71 There 
was the reported decision not to offer the same prophylactic AZT repmen to 
pregnant or breast-feeding health-care providers who have been 'exposed to 
HIV infection that is routinely offered to male and nonpregnant female 
health-care p r 0 ~ i d e r - s . ~ ~  There was Ortho Pharmaceutical's exclusion of 
pregnant women from its protocols and treatment IND for erythropoietin, a 
genetically engineered hormone analogue with few side effects, now ap- 
proved for treatment of AZT-induced anemia.73 Conscientious physicians 
treating pregnant patients with AIDS feel compelled to struggle with the "fa- 
miliar yet unique dilemma" posed by the absence of good information about 
the consequences of treatment and non-treatment options both for potential 
mother and potential 
Despite the absence of adequate studies of the safety and efficacy of pre- 
scription drugs for pregnant women, physicians prescribe, and pregnant wo- 
men take, a surprisingly large number of There is good reason to 
believe that the efficacy of these drugs is affected by the patient's pregnancy, 
but very little data about how, how much, or Without systematic re- 
70 Centers for Disease Control, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Serv.. Guidelines for Prophyl& 
Against Pneumocystic Carinii Pneumonia for Persons Infected with Human Immunodejcimcy V i m .  MORTAL- 
ITY & MoRBlDln REP.: RECOMMENDATIONS & REP. (NO. S-5). June 16, 1989, at 1, 6. 
7 1  Machelle Harris Allen, Pn'maty Care of Women Injcted with the Human Immunodejciency V i y ,  
17 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY CLINICS N. AM. 557, 558 (1990). 
'2 The  director of infection control for the University Hospital at Stony-Brook in New York, 
Dr. William Greene, was quoted as recommending this exclusion at a conference on HIV-infected 
health care providers. See Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.. 4 AIDS UPDATE 25  
(1991). In a conversation with me on May 28, 1992, Dr. Greene indicated that his reluctance was 
generated in part by uncertainty about the efficacy of AZT for post-exposure prophylaxis in the 
general population (by which I gather he meant men and infertile women), as well as by some 
concern about potential liability to offspring. However, it was based primarily on the absence of 
safety and efficacy data for pregnant women. Now that several hundred HIV-positive women 
have used AZT (in the perinatal transmission trial) without evidence of gross anatomical anoma- 
lies in their children, Dr. Greene suggested that he would be substantially more comfortable with 
the participation of pregnant women in a prophylaxis protocol. 
'5Carol Levine, Women and HIV/AIDS Research. 14 EVALUATION REV. 447. 448 (1990). Er- 
ythropoietin is on the market with the usual warning for drugs never tested in pregnant women: 
"There are no adequate and well-controlled studies in pregnant women. [~ r~ th ropb i e t i n ]  should 
be used during pregnancy only if potential benefit justifies the potential risk to the fetus." PHYSI- 
CIANS' DESK REFERENCE 593 (3d ed. 1992). 
74 Howard L. Minkoff & Jonathan D. Moreno, Drug Prophylaxic for Human Immunodejcimcy Vi- 
m-infected Pregnant Women: Ethical Considerations, 163 AM. J .  OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 11 11, 
11 13 (1990). Fortunately, some physicians like Dr. Minkoff recognize "the mother's rightful pri- 
macy both as fetal champion and as the focus of her physician's concern." Id. at 11 13. 
75 See Levine, supra note 73, at 457. 
76 See, e.g., Leon D. Sabath et al., Ethics and the Use o f h g s  During Pregnancy, 202 SCIENCE 540, 
540 (1978) (pregnant physician who was prescribed ampicillin for her bronchitis, with no result- 
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search on the effects of the drugs in pregnant women, physicians and their 
pregnant patients engage in a kind of Russian roulette, courting the "random 
disaster . . . of inadequately investigated The patient risks the un- 
known health consequences of the drug, not just to her offspring but to her 
body, and the physician risks legal consequences if the adequacy of warnings 
to the patient come into question. 
Women are struggling to escape their secondary status, a status in no 
small part attributable to the constant identification of women as those who 
bear and rear children.78 Men are almost never defined primarily by their 
parental role or their procreative potential. Biomedical researchers, in partic- 
ular, seem nearly obsessed with the possibility of pregnancy among female 
subjects, yet oblivious to the reproductive status or activities of their male 
subjects. The exclusionary criteria in research protocols not only reflect, but 
reinforce, a stereotype that is in itself a distinct harm to the interests and 
progress of women.79 
ing therapeutic effect, measured her blood level of the drug and found it lower than the predicted 
level; when she later conducted a small study, in pregnant women who were planning elective 
abortions, of the absorption of erythromycin and clindamycin by measuring levels in recovered 
fetal tissue, she was indicted under an 1814 Massachusetts grave-robbing statute). 
At a presentation on treatment of pregnant women suffering from hypertension, a very 
knowledgeable expert reviewed the broad spectrum of drugs available to treat this serious condi- 
tion: peripheral alpha-one blockers, beta blockers, calcium channel blockers, hydralazine. 
labetalol, and the drugs of choice for hypertension-associated heart failure, sodium nitroprusside 
and diazoxide. Again and again the expert had to say that she could find no data on the safety 
and efficacy of these drugs in pregnant women, although they necessarily are used in that popula- 
tion. Patricia A. Howard, Pharm. D., Pharmacotherapy of Hypertension in Pregnancy. Presenta- 
tion at St. Louis University School of Medicine, (Oct. 13, 1993) (distributed materials on file with 
the author). Dr. Howard also described the horrible experience with ACE-inhibitors (angioten- 
sin-converting-enzyme inhibitors), which a vigilant practitioner had found produced fatal neona- 
tal renal malfunction ajler the FDA had approved the drugs for marketing and they had been 
widely used by, among others, pregnant wonlen. Id.; see also Merkatz, supra note 40, at 295. 
77 Bernard L. Mirkin, Drug Thwapy and the Developing Human: IVho Cares?, 23 CLINICAL RES. 
106, 110 (1975); see also Bernard L. Mirkin, Impact of Public Pohcy on the Development of  Drugs for 
Pregnant IVomen and Children, 23 CLINICAL RES. 233 (1975). On  the paucity of information about 
the activity of approved drugs in pregnant women, see Kinney, supra note 5, at 495, 496. 
78 The historical "protection" of women by the law, which has meant upholding the legality 
of their exclusion from occupations and legal functions such as estate administration, and their 
loss of jobs, seniority, and vital benefits because of pregnancy and forced maternity leave, has 
always been justified by the "unique" status and role of childbearer. See, e .g. ,  Muller v. Oregon. 
208 U.S. 4 12 (1908) (citing reproductive health concerns in allowing women to work a maximum 
of 10 hours per day): Bradwell v. Illinois. 83 U.S. 130. 141 (1873) ("The natural and proper 
timidity and delicacy which belongs to the fernale sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupa- 
tions of civil life."). 
79 For expanded discussion, see Vanessa Merton, Ethical Obstacles to the Participation of IVomen 
in Biomedical Research, in FEMINISM AND BIOETHICS: BEYOND REPRODUCTION (Susan Wolfed., 1994) 
[hereinafter Merton, Ethical Obstacles]. 
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11. WHY ARE WOMEN EXCLUDED FROM CLINICAL TRIALS? 
Through my participation on two Institutional Review Boardsso for eight 
years and my continuing research on various aspects of human subject experi- 
mentation since 1980, I have developed a reasonably clear understanding of 
the rationales invoked to justify the exclusion of women from clinical re- 
search.81 The formulation that follows is intended to present these argu- 
ments in their most positive and persuasive light. Let me emphasize that the 
difficulty of this issue is that these are by no means specious arguments. In 
fact, from a male-centered perspective, they make a fair degree of sense. 
From a woman-centered perspective, however, their limitations and fallacies 
are apparent and compelling. It is that analysis that I seek to present here.82 
One central concept is at work in producing all these rationales. The 
researchers who espouse them do not consciously prevaricate, but they do 
not realize how connected each and every one is to what I will call the funda- 
mental misconception (the oblique pun is unintended): All women are always 
pregnable and therefore (through the magical operation of the mind characteristic 
of unconscious sexism) always pregnant.83 
a0 For a discussion of the function of Institutional Review Boards, see infra notes 255-62 and 
accompanying text. 
8' Parallel arguments were identified by a planning panel of the Institute of Medicine of the 
National Academy of Sciences. See National Academy of Sciences, Planning Panel of the Institute 
of Medicine, Division of Health Sciences Policy, Issues in the Inclusion of Women in Clinical 
Trials 4 (1991) (on file with author). 
82 Some readers may ask why 1 do  not aspire instead to an "objective" or  "human" perspec- 
tive. The  short answer is that I do  not believe it possible, for me or  for anyone else in this so 
heavily engendered society, to analyze problems that have different impact on women and men 
"objectively" - if by that is meant an absolute, determinable reality independent of the multi- 
tude of forces that shape and qualify human perception. For a useful discussion of the "objectiv- 
ist illusion," see Evelyn Fox Keller, Feminism and Science, in SEX AND SCI. INQUIRY 233, 233-46 
(Sandra Harding &Jean O'Barr eds., 1987). Keller includes an excerpt from Jean Piaget's The 
Child's Conception of the IVorld that offers a different definition of objectivity: 
Objectivity consists in so fully realizing the countless intrusions of the self in everyday 
thought and the countless illusions which result - illusions of sense, language, point of 
view, value, etc. - that the preliminary step to every judgement is the effort to exclude 
the intrusive self. Realism, on the contrary, consists in ignoring the existence of self and 
thence regarding one's own perspective as immediately objective and absolute. Realism 
is thus anthropocentric [and, I would add in this context, androcentric] illusion, finality 
- in short, all those illusions which'teem in the history of science. 
Keller, supra, at 238 (quotingJE~N PIACET, THE CHILD'S CONCEFTION OF THE WORLD 1972). Or,  
as biologist Ruth Hubbard put it: 
After all, facts aren't just out there. Every fact has a factor, a maker. The  interesting 
question is: as people move through the world. how do  we sort those aspects of it that 
we permit to become facts from those that we relegate to being fiction - untrue, 
imagined, imaginary, or  figments of the imagination - and from those that, worse yet, 
we do  not even notice and that therefore do  not become fact, fiction, or  figment? In 
other words, what criteria and mechanisms of selection do  scientists use in the making of 
facts? 
Hubbard, supra note 2 at 119. 
89 1 find some corroboration in the medical adage cited and commented on by British physi- 
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I know that this sounds outlandish; even to suggest it makes researchers 
angry and defensive, and insist that their exclusionary justifications in no way 
rely on such an absurd premise. I have no desire to provoke that reaction, 
and I concede immediately that my hypothesis is not capable of independent 
verification. I can say only that I have been left with this distinct impression 
from probably close to two hundred dialogues with investigators and spon- 
sors and study coordinators and academics who study the conduct of research 
- at conferences and meetings, in negotiations over the IRB approval of pro- 
tocols, in correspondence and in idle conversation. The undertone, the motif 
that keeps cropping up, is always: but what if the women are pregnant? Treat 
this observation as data, not fact. It has, however, some explanatory power 
with respect to the behavior of researchers.S4 If its enunciation here serves 
no other purpose than to make the possibility of such subtle influence salient, 
and perhaps inspire a modicum of self-examination, I am content. In addi- 
tion, it frames the parameters of my analysis; because I believe that every 
issue about the exclusion of women from research eventually collapses back 
into the question of pregnant women, I believe also. that until and unless that 
question is resolved, the seemingly larger issue will remain open. Thus a sub- 
stantial part of my analysis of the ethics of exclusion of women from research 
depends on recognition of a basic principle: that women have the right - the 
same right as men - to decide for themselves (and therefore, implicitly, for 
their potential offspring), whether it is prudent and morally right for them to 
participate in a given protocol, and that women do not lose that right when 
they become pregnant.85 
Three principal justifications are offered for barring women from clinical 
biomedical studies. The first two are essentially assertions of principle and 
value: that a researcher's commitment to quality science and/or reverence for 
fetal life requires women's, or at least pregnant women's, exclusion. While I 
summarize these arguments briefly below, in another paperS6 I discuss the 
fatal flaws of these rationales in much greater detail. 
The third reason for exclusion of women purports to be grounded not in 
researchers' own inherent values but rather in the dictates of the law. Re- 
searchers are not able to include women in their protocols because of either 
government regulation, or risk of liability to the offspring of female subjects, 
or both. This article addresses this contention and demonstrates that re- 
cian Sue Roberts. See Sue Roberts, All Women Are Pregnant Until Proved Othmuise, LANCET, July 8,  
1978, at 89 (physicians' tendency to focus on female biological roles both of women colleagues 
and women patients; role-conflict of inadequate helpmate/sexual object and competent doctor 
and decision-maker). 
84 Not to mention the behavior of, for example, employers whose policies exclude all non- 
sterile females aged 5 [sic] to 63  from certain jobs in the name of "fetal protection." See Wright 
v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1182 (4th Cir. 1982); discussion infra note 248. 
85The ethical underpinnings of this asserted right are discussed at some length in Merton, 
Ethical Obstacles, supra note 79. See infra notes 249-50 and accompanying text and part 1I.B. 1; Uriel 
Halbreich & Stanley Carson, Drug Studies in Women of Child Bearing Age: Ethical and Methodological 
Considerations, 9 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOLOPHARMACOLOGY 328, 331 (1989); see ako supra pp. 39-40. 
86 Merton, Ethical Obstacles, supra note 79. 
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searchers have much more to fear, legally speaking, from their failure to in- 
clude women in prot0cols.8~ 
1. Scientific rigor and the researcher's duty to protect fetal life 
T o  condense what might be called the researcher's utilitarian and deon- 
tological arguments: the first contention is that women and men are so physi- 
ologically and biochemically different, it is slower and more expensive, if not 
impossible, to get "clean" data from gender-integrated trials. In the long 
run, everyone is better off with the "more efficient" single-gender approach, 
because therapies will become available sooner and cost less.88 
This argument refutes itselfi89 if the information generated from a mixed 
population of subjects is so different from that generated by studying only 
men, then how can the results of the latter be generalized to a real world of 
women and men? If the activity of the drug is different enough in women to 
skew the results, then from a female point of view, the data from a male-only 
trial is neither "cleaner" nor more efficiently obtained; it is largely irrelevant. 
Similarly, for a pregnant woman, the data from a non-pregnant-person trial is 
of scant use. Moreover, if researchers wish to continue insisting that data 
from subjects of one gender is scientifically preferable, then the question 
arises, why has that gender historically been the male? 
Finally, the quest for "purity" in data seems to be extremely limited in 
focus. Researchers are rarely so meticulous about eliminating a multitude of 
other potentially conflating variables - prior individual and family health his- 
tory, body weight and proportion of body fat, health-related behaviors and 
attitudes, access to health care outside the trial, and so on. Typically, these 
factors are controlled for through the devices of sample size and randomiza- 
tion - that is, the random assignment of a sufficient number of subjects to 
the study groups being compared to ensure a random distribution of these 
attributes throughout both control and treatment groups of subjects. T o  se- 
lect gender as one of the very few exclusionary criteria for a protocol cannot 
lopcally be defended unless other, equally significant parameters are 
screened for and screened 
The second ethical argument is that some researchers believe that it is 
their moral duty to avoid the infliction of fetal harm, regardless of whether 
legal responsibility would ever be imposed, and that inclusion of women of 
child-bearing potential presents too great a risk of causing such harm. My 
response to this is twofold. First, on the legalistic level: technically, as a mat- 
ter of federal law, researchers are privileged to refuse to conduct any research 
87See infra notes 203-32 and accompanying text. 
88 For an interesting recent exposition of  this argument, see Benjamin Wittes &Janet Wittes, 
Croup Therapy, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 5,  1993, at 15. 
89 For a more extensive discussion of  this argument, see Merton, Ethical Obstacles, supra note 
79. 
A particularly potent confounder is the usage of  other medication by subjects, especially 
the use of  the medication on trial by members of  the control or comparison group. This phe- 
nomenon has been acknowledged as rampant in the field of  AIDS research. See, e.g., PETER S. 
ARNO & KARYN L. FEIDEN, AGAINST HE ODDS: THE STORY OF AIDS DRUG DEVELOPMENT, POLI- 
TICS, AND PROFITS (1992); Jay A. Gold. Is There A Right to Experimental Treatment? 5 BIOETHICS BULL. 
1 .  3 (1992). However, there is no basis for believing that it occurs only in that context. 
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to which that researcher conscientiously objects, and may not be fired or  dis- 
ciplined as a result.g1 More important, however, researchers do  not have the 
right to arrogate to themselves the determination of when participation in a 
protocol may create a greater risk of harm to the fetus than chance of benefit. 
I do not say that this calculation should not be made; the issue is, who should 
make i t?  My answer is, this is a judgment to be made by the pregnant or  
potentially pregnant woman. Unless and until comparable restrictions are 
placed on the judgments of men who engage in reproductive activity, in reck- 
less disregard of the unknown, but possible, risks to their offspring, to hold 
otherwise is to inappropriately invalidate the competence and the freedom of 
women to make such decisions. 
But what about the legal arguments? Their analysis follows. 
2. The legal constraints on inclusion of women in research 
a. Federal regulations 
Biomedical research has been the province of extensive federal regula- 
tion for over thirty years, first from the FDAg2 and then from the Department 
of Health and Human Services ("HHS").93 FDA regulates research intended 
to obtain approval for commercial distribution of a new drug or device (or of 
an approved drug/device for a new indication). Since the mid-seventies, 
HHS has regulated the vast majority of other research with human subjects, 
including all research funded by that department's many arms. In 1991, a 
new "Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects" replaced the HHS 
"Basic Policy for Protection of Human Research  subject^."^^ Fifteen other 
federal agencies and departments have also subscribed to the new policy, 
which applies to research conducted, funded, or in any way sponsored by 
these agencies. However, Subpart B of the original HHS regulations, a sec- 
tion that specifically governs research with .pregnant women, has not been 
replaced by the new Researchers frequently point to the federal reg- 
ulations as the basis for their exclusion of women from protocols. Unques- 
tionably, these regulations have contributed to the problem, but a close 
reading of their text reveals that they provide plenty of latitude to conduct 
research with female subjects. In July 1993, in response to growing political 
pressure and a Citizen P e t i t i ~ n , " ~  the FDA proposed to substantially revise 
one of its  regulation^.^' This revision, if adopted, will make the "regulatory 
9'See 42 U.S.C. 5 300a-7(d) (1992). Again, this point is elaborated in Merton, Elhical Obsta- 
cles, supra note 79. 
92 See Louis Lasagna, Congress, the FDA, and ~\'ew Drug Developmenl: Before and Afler 1962, 32 
PERSPECTIVES IN BIOLOGY & MED. 322, 322-23 (1989). 
9 3 4 5  C.F.R. 4 6  (1974). 
g4 56 Fed. Reg. 28,002 (1991); see also Joan Porter, The Federal Policy for the Protection of Human 
Subjects, IRB: REV. HUM. SUBJECTS RES., Sept.-Oct. 1991, at 8 .  
95 Technically, this section applies only to research conducted or supported in whole or in 
part with HHS funds. Most nongovernmental researchers, however, generally adhere to HHS 
rules even when they are not applicable. 
96 See infru note 269. 
97 See Notice of  Proposed Guidelines for the Study and Evaluation of  Gender Differences in 
the Clinical Evaluation of  Drugs, 5 8  Fed. Reg. 39.406 (July 22, 1993) [hereinafter Proposed FDA 
Guideline]. 
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excuse" even more difficult to assert, although it fails to address the exclusion 
of pregnant women. But even in their original form, FDA rules were not the 
barrier to inclusion of women subjects that researchers claimed them to be. 
Below, I discuss first the original regulations - which continue in effect until 
the revised rules are formally adopted - and then the proposed revision. 
(1) Current FDA regulations 
The exclusionary criterion most often found in protocols prohibits the 
participation of "pregnant and lactating women and women of child-bearing 
potential." This formulation appears to be derived from the FDA's Guide- 
lines for researchers, adopted in 1977  guideline^).^^ While the Guidelines are 
not legally binding, research conducted in accordance with the Guidelines qual- 
ifies for FDA consideration in a New Drug A p p l i c a t i ~ n , ~ ~  and most investiga- 
tors take the Guidelines seriously.100 Certainly no prudent attorney would 
recommend their cavalier disregard, since they might well be deemed a "stan- 
dard of care" for the research community.101 
The Guidelines state that women of child-bearing potential should be 
barred from large-scale (Phase 111) clinical trials until all three segments of 
the FDA Animal Reproduction Studieslo2 have been completed, and that wo- 
men may be included in Phase I1 (controlled trials in several hundred sub- 
jects) studies only if "segment I1 and the female part of segment I of the FDA 
98 FDA, PUB. No. 77-3040, GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE CLINICAL EVALUATION OF 
DRUGS (1977) [hereinafter FDA GUIDELINES]. 
99 21 C.F.R. 5 10.90(b) (1993) (research conducted in good faith pursuant to Guidelines will 
be accepted by FDA for review). "A person may rely upon a guideline with assurance that it is 
acceptable to FDA." td .  at 8 10.90(b)(l)(i); see also 2 1 C.F.R. 8 312.145 (1993). 
loo Obviouslv the entire discussion in this section bears onlv on research intended to obtain 
approval for a new drug o r  a new indication for an approved drug. 
lo1 Knowing its visceral impact, I prefer to avoid using the word "malpractice" in a paper 
that I hope will be read by health professionals, but this reference should be explained for those 
unfamiliar with the phrase "standard of care": a patient or  a client in a professional relationship 
who seeks to hold the professional responsible for a bad outcome must prove, among other 
things, that the harm would not have occurred had the professional not breached a professional 
"standard of care"; that is, did not provide care within the broad range of choices that a compe- 
tent professional might reasonably consider under the circumstances. Protocols and standards 
issued by professional organizations and governmental agencies sometimes are utilized as 
sources of the "standard of care." See, e.g., STEVEN E. PEGALIS & HARVEY F. WACHSMAN, AMERI- 
CAN LAW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 5 3: 1 - 5 3: 13 (2d ed. 1992). 
In this paper 1 have not taken on the question whether the "trials as treatment" theory ex- 
pounded above has any implications for professional liability, in the sense of transforming the 
duties of researcher to subject into something more analogous to those of a physician for a pa- 
tient - an interesting issue, but one not different for male and female subjects, and thus not 
germane. See discussion supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text. 
lo2 The  FDA has never published a protocol for the Animal Reproduction Studies referenced 
in the Guidelines, but after several telephone calls to FDA sources, I was sent a copy of a document 
identified as the pertinent standard. See William D'Aguanno, Guidelines for Reproduction Stud- 
ies for Safety Evaluation of Drugs for Human Use (undated) (on file with the author). Segment I 
covers gonadal function, effects of estrous cycles/mating behavior, and early gestation; segment 
11, teratogenesis; and segment 111, the drug's effect on late fetal development, labor and delivery, 
lactation, and newborn health. In a switch from the typical toxicology studies, conducted primar- 
ily in male animals, here most of the testing, and all of it pertaining to intergenerational effects, is 
done exclusively in females. The  interest in male animals is confined to the impact on their 
fertility. 
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Animal Reproduction Guidelines have been completed."log Remarkably, the 
Guidelines are silent on the question of how the resulk of the Animal Reproduc- 
tion Studies ought to affect inclusion or  exclusion of women. Probably in 
1977 it never occurred to the authors that researchers might offer women a 
chance to participate even if adverse reproductive effects were indicated. 
The catch is that there is no mandate to perform any of the Animal Re- 
production Studies ever, and certainly not prior to the conduct of Phase I1 or  
I11 trials.lo4 The regulation that describes what applications for new drug 
approval must contain says only that the application should include nonclini- 
cal "studies, as appropriate, of the effects of the drug on reproduction and on 
the developing fetus."l05 Whether under this standard the FDA could ever 
approve a New Drug Application without animal testing for reproductive ef- 
fect has never been determined by a court, but the FDA does not appear ever 
to have required such studies to precede Phase I11 trials.'06 There is no prac- 
tical way to research this, but I would bet that the FDA has never interpreted 
"as appropriate" to require animal studies that would elicit adverse reproduc- 
tive effects mediated through the male animal.lo7 
What this boils down to is that pharmaceutical companies can choose to 
market drugs with no information about their reproductive impact, so long as 
the label makes this clear.Io8 Further, the animal studies which the FDA 
I o 3  FDA, 1977 GUIDELINES, supra note 98, at 10. For a good description of the Phase I-Phase 
11-Phase 111 categories, see David Kessler, The Regulation of Investigational Drugs, 320 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 281. 282-83 (1989). Phase I, the first set of clinical studies, is supposed to use fewer than 
100 healthy volunteers to detect gross safety problems and establish the parameters for proper 
dosages to be tested. Phase 11, typically done in a couple of hundred patients, begins to evaluate 
efficacy and identify side effects, if any. Phase 111 studies may be conducted in thousands of 
patients and should be designed to elaborate on therapeutic value and elicit longer-term adverse 
effects. It is important to note that since Phase I is when dosage parameters are set, and safety 
issues are defined, the data generated in Phase 1 is critical to the design - the doses to be tested 
and the variables to be monitored - in Phase I1 and Phase 111. See 21 C.F.R. 8 312.21 (1993) 
("During Phase I sufficient information about the drug's pharmacokinetics and pharmacological 
effects should be obtained to permit the design of well-controlled, scientifically valid Phase I1 
studies."). 
lo4 Some texts and treatises seem to assume that this testing is necessary for a New Drug 
Application. See, e.g.. DONALD E .  VINSON & ALEXANDER H. SLAUGHTER, PRODUCTS LIABILITY: 
PHARMACEUTICAL DRUG CASES 8 5.04 (1988 & Supp. 1991). However, nothing in the language of 
the regulations or  the FDA Guidelines is couched in mandatory rather than precatory terms. 
1°5 21 C.F.R. 8 3 14.50(d)(2)(iii) (1991) (emphasis added). 
I o 6  Dr. Robert Temple, Director of the Office on Drug Evaluation of the Food and Drug 
Administration, has stated that no one at the FDA is responsible for determining whether animal 
reproduction studies are actually conducted. Response to question at Institute of Medicine semi- 
nar on inclusion of women in clinical trials, June 23, 1992. 
lo7 The Guidelines do suggest that when testicular or  spermatogenetic abnormalities have 
been observed in animals (which is not to say animal studies to evoke these responses must be 
done), or  when chromosomal abnormalities are anticipated, the inclusion of males in all three 
Phases of trials depends on a constellation of factors: the nature of the abnormalities, the "impor- 
tance" of the drug, etc. Compare this textured, case-by-case, only-if-reason-for-concern-has- 
been-demonstrated, approach to the categorical language of the rule about women of child-bear- 
ing potential. There is also no mention of a need to discuss contraception with male subjects in 
these circumstances. See infra notes 267-68 and accompanying text. 
21 C.F.R. 8 201.57 (1991). which governs labeling of human prescription drugs, requires 
a statement of critical information, qknown,  but does not create any independent duty to acquire 
the information. For example, under subsection (f)(5), the label must specify whether "adequate 
Heinonline - -  19 Am. J.L. and Med. 392 1993 
EXCLUSION OF WOMEN FROM BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH 393 
defines as a necessary precursor to large-scale clinical trials with female sub- 
jects may never be conducted at all or may be done only in parallel with, not 
in advance of, clinical testing. 
T o  compound this, the FDA, and thus clinical investigators, define the 
Guidelines' key phrase "of childbearing potential" in a way that envisions all 
women as "constantly poised for reproductive activity."log "A woman of 
childbearing potential is defined as a premenopausal female capable of be- 
coming pregnant. This includes women on oral, injectable, or mechanical 
contraception; women who are single; women whose husbands h;we been 
vasectomized or  whose husbands have received or are utilizing mechanical 
contraceptive devices." lo  
The breadth of this definition of child-bearing potential makes it tanta- 
mount to "all fertile women." In an echo of the fundamental misconcep- 
tion,"' the FDA limits the universe of women subjects right up through 
Phase I11 trials to 
women who have been surgically sterilized, women who are postme- 
nopausal, and women who are infertile . . . provided they [infertile 
women] are willing to use an effective form of contraception during 
the study, or have been evaluated by a fertility expert and have been 
found to be infertile, and have been so for greater than five years 
to quote one research manual's interpretation."* 
The FDA Guidelines do, however, expressly recognize an exception that 
offers researchers some substantial latitude: the use of the drug as a life-sav- 
ing or life-prolonging measure.l13 "Life-prolonging" seems a quite elastic 
phrase that could cover many situations of clinical research. So long as the 
lack of reproduction studies is pointed out during the informed consent pro- 
cess, and the woman of child-bearing potential is tested for pregnancy and 
advised of contraceptive measures, she may participate in such studies. Even 
the nursing mother is specifically mentioned as a potential subject, with analy- 
sis of the excretion of the drug or its metabolites in the milk to be determined 
"when feasible."'14 And the one reference to pregnant women in the Guide- 
lines (probably in 1977 it never occurred to anyone to explicitly state that 
and well-controlled studies in pregnant women" have or  have not demonstrated a risk to the 
fetus, and describe the results of animal reproduction studies, if available. But it is perfectly 
acceptable to label a drug Pregnancy Category C, in the event that there are no animal reproduc- 
tion studies and no studies in humans, and state that "It is also not known whether (name of drug) 
can cause fetal harm when administered to a pregnant woman or  can affect reproduction capac- 
ity. (Name of drug) should be given to a pregnant woman only if clearly needed." Even under the 
category of nonteratogenic effects, there is no requirement to provide either information, or  a 
warning of the absence of information, about the drug's reproductive impact in men. Compare 
subsection (f)(7), which requires a clear statement of the absence of data about effects on child- 
birth, and subsection (f)(8), which requires a clear statement if it is not known whether a particu- 
lar drug is contained in the milk of nursing mothers. 
log Vanessa Merton, Community-Based AIDS Research, 14 EVALUATION REV. 502, 519 (1990) 
[hereinafter Merton, Community-Based]. 
' l o  FDA, 1977 GUIDELINES, supra note 98. 
111 See discussion supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text. 
IBER ET AL.. supra note 38. at 179. 
1'5 FDA, 1977 GUIDELINES, supra note 98, at 10. 
114 Id. at I I. 
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pregnant women were not allowed to be subjects) merely states that fetal fol- 
low-up should be carried out if a subject becomes pregnant while on the pro- 
toc01;"~ it does not say anything about immediately terminating the woman 
from the protocol, a provision frequently found in research design. 
(2) Proposed new guidelines 
The head of the FDA's Office on Drug Evaluation, Dr. Robert Temple, 
maintains that the Guidelines should never have been interpreted by research- 
ers to require the exclusion of women from  protocol^.'^^ This observation is 
a welcome one, but apparently it was neither widely disseminated nor widely 
shared.'17 As is acknowledged in FDA's proposed revision of the Guidelines, 
Although the 1977 guideline has not resulted in a failure to in- 
clude adequate numbers of women in the later phases of clinical tri- 
als, it has restricted the early accumulation of information about 
response to drugs in women that could be utilized in designing 
phase 2 and 3 trials, and has perhaps delayed appreciation of gen- 
der-related variation in drug effects. . . . 
The agency is, therefore, withdrawing the restriction on the par- 
ticipation of women of childbearing potential in early clinical trials 
. . . . 
1 1 8  
Regrettably, the Proposed Guideline merely removes what has always been, 
in theory, a highly permeable barrier to the inclusion of women in clinical 
trials. It does nothing affirmative.llg It appears, in spots, to hover on the 
verge of demanding actual change in the conduct of biomedical research, but 
always it draws back to precatory language of recommendation and encour- 
agement and vague notions of "reasonable representativeness" in subject 
 population^.'^^ Its straightforward acknowledgement of the phenomenon of 
women's exclusion from trials, and the impact of that phenomenon, is help- 
1 15 Id. 
I l 6  Diane Rehm, Is There Gender Bias in Drug Testing?, FDA CONSUMER, Apr. 1991, at 8 (Inter- 
view with Robert Temple and Margaret Jensvold); see also Levine, supra note 73, at 455. 
In a confidential 1991 survey of 33 major pharmaceutical houses, conducted by the Phar- 
maceutical Manufacturers Association, 79% reported that FDA reviewers had required them to 
exclude women of child-bearing potential from their protocols. Lionel D. Edwards, Design and 
Conduct of Research in Women: T o  Include or  Exclude: A Pharmaceutical Industry Physician's 
Perspective 17 (Feb. 1992) (unpublished manuscript on file with author). 
I l 8  Proposed FDA Guideline, supra note 97, at 39,408. 
1'9 It also, of course, has no effect whatsoever on the substantial body of research, behavioral 
and otherwise, that is not governed or  influenced by FDA standards. But this limitation of any 
FDA action is inescapable. 
The  Proposed Guideline "urges" that "reasonable numbers" (not defined precisely) of WO- 
men be included in studies of new drugs. It expresses the agency's "expectation" that women 
will be included in numbers sufficient to allow for differential data analysis. It "stresses the im- 
portance" of assessing potential pharmacokinetic differences. In light of its recognition that the 
failure to include women in early (phase I and Phase 11) trials may negatively affect the design and 
dose selection of "the pivotal controlled trials [Phase III]", see 21 C.F.R. 5 312.2l(a)(l) (1993). 
the FDA "encourages" the inclusion of women of all ages in early trials. Merkatz, supra note 40, 
at 294; Proposed FDA Guideline, supra note 97, passim. 
While admitting that "in some cases, there may be a basis for requiring participation of 
women in early studies," and that "under these circumstances, clinical protocols should not place 
unwarranted restrictions on the participation of women," Proposed FDA Guideline, supra note 
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fu1.121 Some of the rhetoric about a woman's right to make her own decisions 
in this area is positively progressive. Reading the Proposed Guideline, one keeps 
waiting for the punch line. It never comes. In the end it amounts to a "pretty 
please" to the pharmaceutical houses, with a gratuitous abandonmer~t of reg- 
ulatory authority122 that is both unwarranted as a matter of law and not too 
smart as a matter of strategy. 
What should the FDA's Proposed Guideline have done? Well, to begin with, 
it might have better been issued as a regulation, with clear legal status, rather 
than in the ambiguous nether world of "guideline." Second, it entirely fails 
to deal with the anomaly of an agency intensely preoccupied with preventing 
fetal exposure to drugs and adverse reproductive outcomes, but which does 
not require basic animal reproductive studies prior to testing drugs in humans 
(not only women, but the males whose offspring can be just as damaged.)'25 
Third, it could have utilized its existing regulations far more effectively 
to address this problem. The FDA could, pursuant to 21 C.F.R. 
4 3 12.23(a)(3)(iv) (e), and/or (a)(6)(i), require a statement of the n ~ ~ m b e r  of 
women and men in every trial, and a statement of the reasons for any non- 
gender-neutral exclusion, pursuant to 4 312.23(6)(c). It could have refused 
to agree that a researcher has adequately determined the proper dosages to 
be administered to women, as is required under 2 1 C.F.R. § 312.23(6)(iii)(e), 
in the absence of pharmacokinetic and pharmacodynamic data in women. 
Sections 312.23(5)(ii)lZ4 and (8)125 of 21 C.F.R. could easily be inter- 
preted to require reproductive toxicology studies; how can the FDA say that 
toxicology work-up of impact on the liver, the kidneys, the central nervous 
system, every organ in fact, can be required, but not for the reproductive sys- 
tem? In section 312.23(8)(ii), the FDA purports to require a description of 
97, at 39,409, the Proposed Guideline never translates these observations into an unambiguous con: 
dition for FDA approval. 
121 Id. at 39,408. 
I z 2  The agency recognizes that this change in FDA's policy will not, by itself, cause drug 
companies o r  IRB's to alter restrictions that they might impose on the participation of 
women of childbearing potential. We do  not at this time perceive a regulatory b:isis for 
requiring routinely that women of childbearing potential be included in particular trials. 
Proposed FDA Guideline, supra note 97, at 39,408. 
The  FDA has previously demonstrated the "regulatory authority" to prescribe in fulsome 
detail every jot and tittle of protocols to be submitted for its approval. Its statuttwy duty to 
ensure "adequate and well-controlled investigations . . . on the basis of which it could . . . be 
concluded . . . that the drug will have the effect it purports . . . to have" prior to drug approval 
offers plenty of room to define "adequate" to include testing in women when women will be 
consumers of the drug. 21 C.F.R. 5 314.126 (1988); see 21 U.S.C. 5 355 (1972 & Sl~pp.  1993). 
The  FDA's inability to "perceive" its own power when it comes to protecting the rights and 
interests of women suggests that it may be more of a captive agency than some of us had thought 
and most of us had hoped. 
123 See discussion inzra notes 140-46 and accompanying text. 
124 Sponsors are required to provide clinical investigators with brochures that describe, inter 
alia, "the pharmacological and toxicological effects of the drug in animals . . . ." 21 C.F.R. 
1 312.23(5)(ii) (1993). 
'25 A New Drug Application must contain "adequate information about pharmacological and 
toxicological studies of the drug involving laboratory animals . . . ." Id. at 8 312.23(8). Depend- 
ing on  the nature of the drug and the phase of the investigation, the description is to include the 
"results of . . . tests of the drug's effects on reproduction and the developing fe~us." Id. at 
8 312.23(8)(ii). 
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"tests of the drug's effects on reproduction and the developing fetus." That 
should mean reproductive consequences for both male and female consumers 
of the drug.126 Without such data, what is the value of all the emphasis in the 
Proposed Guideline on advising would-be subjects about reproductive risk prior 
to their enrollment?127 
Unfortunately, once again, the FDA has defined reproductive risk exclu- 
sively in terms of fetal toxicity and possibly reduced fertility. Contraception 
or  abstinence from reproductive behavior is identified as an issue only for 
female subjects. Animal studies that address fetal toxicity and unknown fetal 
risks are to be relayed to the subjects; nothing at all is said about male-medi- 
ated reproductive outcomes. The result is predictable; women, who may well 
be more concerned about such questions than men are to begin with, will be 
more reluctant to participate, and the difficulties in recruitment and retention 
of women subjects that researchers often refer to as an obstacle to their inclu- 
sion will be exacerbated, in a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
The FDA's proposal essentially leaves women where they have been: pre- 
sumed to be constant reproducers, while men never reproduce at all; the vic- 
tims of bad science that does not generate knowledge of use to women, 
especially pregnant women; objects of random, meaningless, post-marketing 
"experimentation" from drugs that should have been fully and properly 
tested under the FDA's statutory mandate. Restrictions on women's partici- 
pation in clinical trials continues to substitute for adequate preclinical studies 
that could provide the basis for a genuinely informed decision on the part of 
potential subjects, male and female, about the risk to future offspring. The 
FDA, in sum, has punted.128 
126See also 21 C.F.R. 1 312.32(a) (defining adverse experiences that must be reported to the 
FDA to include "any experience suggesting a significant risk for human [not only female] sub- 
jects, including any finding of mutagenicity, teratogenicity, or  carcinogenicity."). 
l Z 7  See Proposed FDA Guideline, supra note 97, at 39.41 1. Note that this concern appears to 
be limited to fetal toxicity and women subjects. 
Iz8 For a more detailed analysis of the shortcomings of the Proposed Guideline, see HIV Law 
Project & NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, Memorandum on the FDA's Proposed 
Guideline for the Study and Evaluation of Gender Differences in the Clinical Evaluation of Drugs 
(Oct. 18, 1993) (on file with author) [hereinafter Memorandum on FDA's Proposed Guideline]. 
Another troubling example of recognizing the problem but doing nothing to rectify it is the 
recently completed International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects of 
the Council of International Organizations of Medical Sciences and the World Health Organiza- 
tion (on file with the author). Guideline 11 acknowledges that: 
Women in most iocieties have been discriminated against with regard to their in- 
volvement in research. Women who are biologically capable of becoming pregnant have 
been customarily excluded from formal clinical trials . . . owing to concern about unde- 
termined risks to the fetus. Consequently, relatively little is known about the safety and 
efficacy of most drugs, vaccines, o r  devices for such women, and this lack of knowledge 
can be dangerous. . . . 
A general policy of excluding from such clinical trials women biologically capable of 
becoming pregnant is unjust in that it deprives women as a class of persons of the bene- 
fits of the new knowledge derived from the trials. Further, it is an affront to their right 
of self-determination. . . . 
Premenopausal women have also been excluded from participation in many re- 
search activities . . . in case the physiological data associated with various phases of the 
menstrual cycle would complicate interpretation of research data. Consequently, much 
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(3) HHS limitations on research with pregnant women 
The FDA guidelines, then, especially after their revision, can be parsed to 
have relatively little impact on women's participation in research, unless the 
researcher wants them to. The relevant HHS regulations, on the other hand, 
appear to be a far greater constraint. However, they deal exclusively with the 
pregnant, rather than merely pregnable, woman. (But let us remain mindful 
of how easily those categories conflate.) 
Subpart B of Part 46 of Title 45 of the Code of Federal Regulations is 
entitled "Additional Protections Pertaining to Research, Developnlent, and 
Related Activities Involving Fetuses, Pregnant Women, and Human In Vitro 
Fertilization." Promulgated in the mid-seventies, Subpart B prohibits re- 
search "involving" pregnant women unless: 1) "appropriate" studits on ani- 
mals and nonpregnant individuals have been completed;129 2) the purpose of 
the research is "to meet the health needs" of the woman; and 3) the fetus will 
be placed at minimal risk or at risk to the minimum extent necessary to meet 
the woman's health needs.lsO 
A further provision tries to require that the "father" of the fetus (to use 
the loaded language of the section)lS1 give his informed consent to the preg- 
nant woman's participation in the research. Presumably unintentionally, 
however, the drafters rendered this provision meaningless. The various ex- 
ceptions to the progenitor-consent requirement are stated in the disjunctive; 
that is, any one of them permits departure from the rule. One exception is 
identical to a previously defined precondition for the pregnant woman's par- 
ticipation in any research that may pose more than a minimal risk to the fetus: 
that the purpose of the research be to meet the pregnant woman's health 
needs. Since any research that poses more than minimal risk is permissible 
only if its purpose is to meet the pregnant woman's health needs regardless of 
progenitor consent, this exception will almost always subsume the apparent 
requirement of such consent.I32 Progenitor consent is actually necessary 
less is known of women's than of men's normal physiological processes. This, too, is 
unjust in that it deprives women as a class of persons of the benefits of such knowledge. 
Id. at 33-34. Despite its recognition of these injustices, Guideline 11 categorically exc:ludes preg- 
nant or nursing women from protocols, unless the research carries no more than minimal risk for 
the fetus or infant, its objective is new knowledge about pregnancy or lactation, and women who 
are not pregnant or nursing would not be suitable subjects. It utterly ignores the right of women 
to make their own risk-benefit calculus. The International Ethical Guidelines impose no such restric- 
tions on fertile and reproductively active male subjects. 
12945 C.F.R. 5 46.206(a)(l) (1975). Other conditions, intended to ensure that no induce- 
ments or pressures to terminate the pregnancy are part of the research design, are also enumer- 
ated in this section. 
Is0 45 C.F.R. 5 46.207(a) (1992). Section 46.205 imposes various special obligations, mostly 
pertaining to informed consent, on IRBs that review protocols involving pregnant women and 
fetuses. All these provisions may be waived or modified by the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services on request of a researcher, 45 C.F.R. 5 46.21 1, but virtually no requests have been 
made, possibly because since 1980 an indispensable participant in the waiver process, an Ethical 
Advisory Board within HHS, has not been funded or appointed. See LEVINE, THICS AND REGULA- 
TION, supra note 22, at 319-20. 
'3' See 45 C.F.R. 5 46.207(b). A pregnant woman is not yet a mother, and her impregnator is 
not yet a father. See Renee Solomon, Note, Future Fear: Prenatal Duties Imposed by Private Parties, 17 
AM. J . L .  & MED. 411. 417 n.37 (1991). 
Is2 Given the recent Supreme Court decision in Planned Parenthood of Southe;rstern Pa. et 
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only when: 1) the risk to the fetus is minimal (or less); and 2) the research can 
in no way be characterized as directed toward the woman's health needs. 
So how significant a barrier for the pregnant woman are these regula- 
tions? T o  begin, let us consider the first requirement: completion of "appro- 
priate" studies in animals and nonpregnant people (presumably, under 
current FDA Guidelines, not studies in women of childbearing potential). "Ap- 
propriate" is what lawyers call a weasel word, a word that gives the decision- 
maker in a situation great d i ~ c r e t i o n . ' ~ ~  Perhaps this is a reference to ter- 
atogenicity studies? General clinical pharmacology studies for toxicity? Or  
perhaps the sort of in vitro work or  uncontrolled case reports that one would 
ordinarily expect to foreshadow clinical research? It is hard to imagine the 
government's succeeding in imposing sanctions on a researcher for violating 
this amorphous provision unless absolutely no work had been done on the 
intervention on trial at all before the pregnant woman was permitted to 
participate. 
More troubling is the requirement that the research be intended to 
"meet the health needs of the mother [sic]." I will not try to improve on 
Robert Levine's trenchant exposition of the conceptual murkiness of the 
terms "therapeutic research" and "nontherapeutic research" and their espe- 
cially problematic usage in this ~ 0 n t e x t . l ~ ~  Suffice it to say, this is another 
phrase that gives the researcher considerable scope. I have reviewed above 
the many ways and situations in which participation in research in and of itself 
may serve a subject's health needs.lS5 I will add only that from the stand- 
point of psychic health, it takes a severe toll for a pregnant woman (or for any 
woman) to be told that after having been fully informed of the risks to her 
potential offspring, she cannot be trusted to decide whether to participate in a 
protocol, while no restrictions of any kind are placed on the decisions of her 
male counterpart, whose offspring may be at equal risk. 
As for the requirement that the risk to the fetus must be "minimal," again 
we find an ill-defined and comparative term.136 And who should be making 
al. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992), it is hard to see how this paternal consent condition, if ever 
applied, could be upheld against constitutional challenge. The  only one of the set of anti-choice 
state restrictions struck down in Casey was the husband notification provision, because "[ilt is an 
inescapable biological fact that state regulation with respect to the child a woman is carrying will 
have a far greater impact on the mother's liberty than on the father's." Id. at 2830. If paternal 
notification cannot be required for an abortion that will kill the fetus, the constitutionality of re- 
quiring paternal consent for a much lesser risk to the fetus is dubious. 
The  other exceptions to this requirement also might be applicable to many pregnant re- 
search subjects: when the father cannot be identified or  found, or  the pregnancy resulted from 
rape. 
Is3 See discussion infra notes 278-80 and accompanying text. 
Is4 LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION, supra note 22, at 8-10, 298. 
I35 See discussion supra notes 27-79 and accompanying text. . 
Is6 See John C. Fletcher &Joseph D. Schulman, Fetal Research: The State of the Question, HAS- 
T I N G ~  CENTER REP., Apr. 1985, at 6 and Karen Lebacqz, Fetal Research: A Commissioner's Rejection, 
IRB: REV. HUM. SUBJECTS RES., May 1979, at 7, for varied approaches to assessing risk in this 
context. "Minimal risk" is defined elsewhere in the regulations to mean that the danger antici- 
pated from the research is not greater, considering both probability and magnitude, than the 
danger of ordinary daily life or  routine physical or  psychological tests. 58 Fed. Reg. 28,002, 
28,013-14 (June 18. 1981). For a fetus. isn't an amniocentesis, with its half-percent chance of 
miscarriage, now a routine test? What about chorionic villi sampling? Ultrasound? Wouldn't the 
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this assessment? Always the assumption seems to be that the researcher, or 
perhaps the IRB member, or perhaps a federal bureaucrat is the best choice 
to judge the net of harm and benefit, risk and advantage, that would result 
from a pregnant woman's participation in a protocol. Always the assumption 
is of maternal-fetal conflict, a male perspective that ignores the inextricable 
link between pregnant woman and conceptus at any stage of its development, 
and denies the woman's inherent responsibility for the fate of that part of her 
body that may be born a child.13' AS the HHS regulations require, the wo- 
man must and should be fully informed about the risks, known and unknown, 
to her fetus. But nowhere do the regulations say, and no fair and rational 
reading can impute, that the judgment as to the requisite level of risk, and its 
proper w°eight in light of the woman's health needs, should be mad,:. by any- 
one other than her.lS8 
risk of ordinary daily life include the risk of a mother o r  father who smokes o r  who works where 
smoking is permitted? Drinks socially? Eats food containing additives? Disregards the prenatal 
care provider's advice? See Kentucky v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280, 283 (Ky. 1993) ("What if a 
pregnant woman drives over the speed limit, or  . . . does not wear the prescription lenses she 
knows she needs to see the dangers of the road?"). 
O n  the latter point, see Barbara K. Rothman, When a Pregnant Woman Endangers Her Fetus, 
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb. 1986, at 25, describing what a typical "fetal abuse" case of twenty- 
five years ago might have sounded like: 
[The pregnant woman], a diabetic, refused her DES treatment, prescribed as especially 
important in the prevention of miscarriage among diabetics. Further, although she was 
eleven pounds overweight at the time of conception, she refused to limit her weight gain 
over the course of the pregnancy to under thirteen pounds. She compounded thc: prob- 
lem by not taking the diuretics prescribed, and twice refused to show up for scheduled 
X-rays, citing a distrust of medications and radiation. Her irrational refusal to (.:omply 
with her doctor's advice, plus her unwillingness or  inability to limit her weight gain, 
indicate fetal abuse. 
See Merton, Ethical Obstacles, supra note 79. 
Is' The subject of "maternal-fetal conflict," and the fallacious and invidious premises packed 
into that term, are ably dissected in Dawn Johnsen, Shared Interests: Promoting Healthy Birth without 
Sactiicing Women's Liberty, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 569 (1992). Surprisingly, the American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists (hardly a radical feminist outfit), while buying into the "conflict" 
paradigm, has recognized that "Obstetricians should refrain from performing procedures that 
are unwanted by a pregnant woman. The  use ofjudicial authority to implement treatment regi- 
mens in order to protect the fetus violates the pregnant woman's autonomy." 0pinic:)n from the 
Committee on  ~ t h i c s ,  American College of obstetricians and Gynecologists, opinion No. 55, 
"Patient Choice: Maternal-Fetal Conflict" (1987); see also AMA Board of Trustees Report, Legal 
Interuentiom During Pregnancy, 264 JAMA 2663 (1990). 
lS8 See NAT'L COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDI(.:AL AND BE- 
HAVIORAL RESEARCH, DEP'T HEALTH EDUCATION AND WELFARE, PUB. NO. (0s) 76-127, RESEARCH 
ON THE FETUS 65 (1975): 
Therapeutic research directed toward the pregnant woman may expose the fetus to risk 
for the benefit of another subject and thus is at first glance more problematic. Recogniz- 
ing the woman's priority regarding her own health care, however, the Commission con- 
cludes that such research is ethically acceptable provided that the woman has been fully 
informed of the possible impact on the fetus and that other general requirements have 
been met. Protection for the fetus is further provided by requiring that research put the 
fetus at minimum risk consistent with the provision of health care for the woman. More- 
over, therapeutic research directed toward the pregnant woman frequently benefits the 
fetus, though it need not necessarily do  so. In view of the woman's right to privacy 
regarding her own health care, the Commission concludes that the informed consent of 
the woman is both necessary and sufficient. 
In general, the Commission concludes that therapeutic research directed toward the , 
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The absence of either administrative orjudicial review of this question, as 
well as of the other questions raised by the HHS regulations, underscores my 
conclusion that it is not federal regulations that are trammeling researchers 
who in their eagerness to recruit and accept women subjects have been test- 
ing the boundaries of the law. 
b. The real explanation: tort phobia 
The central preoccupation of researchers asked to consider the inclusion 
of women in clinical trials is the risk of liability to their offspring. Any innova- 
tive therapy may affect some aspect of the development of the patient's off- 
spring, whether because of damage to the germ cells prior to conCeption or  
because of mutagenic or  teratogenic effects. The fear is that if it can be 
demonstrated that the therapy on trial injured the child of a subject, the re- 
searcher will be sued and have to pay damages.lS9 
The assumption of researchers seems to be that this chain of events can 
only occur with regard to female subjects. But this assumption flies in the 
face of rapidly developing scientific understanding of the impact of the male 
germ cell on the physical and psychological development of offspring.140 Re- 
search in this area reached sufficient critical mass to precipitate a full-scale 
Conference on Male-Mediated Developmental Toxicity in September 1992 at 
the School of Public Health of the University of Pittsburgh.141 One of the 
health condition of either the fetus or the pregnant woman is, in principle, ethical. Such 
research benefits not only the individual woman or fetus but also women and fetuses as 
a class, and should therefore be encouraged actively. 
Id. 
IS9 The usually unstated but logically necessary final step of the argument is that such ac- 
countability and responsibility would be wrong and unjust. For a discussion of the thesis that it 
may be precisely the just outcome, see infra notes 198-202 and accompanying text. 
140 One of the most frequently cited compilations on this subject is Lester F. Soyka &Justin 
M. Joffee, Male Mediated h u g  Effects on Oflspring, in DRUG AND CHEMICAL RISKS TO THE FETUS AND 
NEWBORN 49 (Richard Schwartz & Sumner Yaffe eds., 1980). Literature reviews have focused on 
occupational exposures. See, e.g., Joanna Haas & David Schottenfeld, Risks to the Offspringfrom 
Parental Occupational Exposures, 21 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 607 (1979) (chromosomal aberrations in 
men exposed to vinyl chloride and benzene); David Savitz &Joanna Chen, Parental Occupation and 
Childhood Cancer: Review of Epidemiologic Studies, 88 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 325 (1990) (in review of 
24 case-control studies, no-specific parental occupational exposure established as cause of child- 
hood cancer, but several paternal occupations associated with childhood leukemias and nervous 
system tumors); see also Children's Cancer Tied to British A-Plant Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1990, 
at 27, reporting six-fold elevated risk of leukemia in offspring of male workers at nuclear plant. 
"The main finding was of a raised risk for those children whose fathers worked at Sellafield, in 
particular fathers with the highest recorded exposures to external ionizing radiation before their 
child's conception." Id. (emphasis added); see also MJ. Gardner et al., Results of Case-control Study of 
Leukaernia and Lymphoma Among Young People Near Sellafield Nuclear Plant in West Cumbria, 300 BRIT. 
MED. J. 423 (1990). 
Male toxic exposures ranging from lead and other heavy metals to dibromochloropropane 
(DBCP) and chlordecone (Kepone) also have been demonstrated to affect the likelihood both of 
conception and of spontaneous abortion. See Michael Castleman, Toxics and Male Infmtility, SIERRA 
CLUB BULL., Mar.-Apr. 1985, at 49; Kari Hemminki et al., Spontaneous Abortions in an Industrialized 
Community in Finland, 73 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 32 (1983); M. Donald Whorton, Adverse Reproductive 
Outcomes: The Occupational Health Issue of the 1980's, 73 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 15 (1988) (editorial). 
' 4 1  See the announcement in The Nationk Health, May-June, 1992, at 17; Bulletin of the Con- 
ference on Male-Mediated Developmental Toxicity (Sept. 1992) (on file with the author). 
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first large-scale record reviews, a case-control study of over 14,000 birth de- 
fects, conducted with careful procedures to a;oid the methodological 
problems of some earlier studies, demonstrates numerous associations be- 
tween various paternal occupations and specific anomalies, including in- 
creased incidence of spina bifida in the children of male logging workers, 
painters, and gas-station attendants; of heart defects in the children of male 
firefighters, metalworkers, and janitors; and of cleft palate in the children of 
male painters, miners, foundry workers, and mechanics.142 Many other stud- 
ies link paternal exposures toserious problems in offspring.143 -~atct:rnal use 
of tobacco and alcohol has repeatedly been found to affect a wide range of 
functional abilities, low birth-weight, and neonatal survival in the offspring 
both of male rats and of male humans.144 
The potential role of male-mediated risk factors has not been exten- 
sively investigated, probably largely because of the prevailing view 
that male-mediated effects are unlikely. . . . [Llittle is known of the 
epidemiology and biology of male-mediated birth defects 
and this has hindered the development of a definitive model or 
142 Andrew Olshan et al., Paternal Occupation and Congenital Anomalies in Offspring, 20 AM. J. 
INDUS. MED. 447 (1991). 
143 An earlier study from the same group, controlling for maternal age, found elevated rela- 
tive risk of Down syndrome in the offspring of fathers employed as janitors, mecha~:~ics, metal- 
workers, and sawmill workers. Andrew 0lshan et al., Paternal Occupational Exposures and the Risk of 
Down Syndrome, 44 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 646, 649 (1989). The children of male anestl-iesiologists 
also experience increased congenital abnormalities. Alastair A. Spence et al., Occupational Hazards 
for Operating Room-based Physicians: Analysis of Data From the United States and United Kingdom, 238 
JAMA 955 (1977). Carbon disulfide and ionizing radiation have repeatedly been linlted to mal- 
formations in the children of exposed men. See Joan Bertin, Reproductive Hazards in the Workplace, 
in REPRODUCTIVE LAWS FOR THE 1990's 277-305 (Sherrill Cohen & Nadine Taub eds., 1989); 
ELAINE DRAPER, ISKY BUSINESS 69 (1991). Dr. Ellen Silbergeld, a toxicologist at tht: University 
of Maryland, found defects in the brain development of the offspring of male rats exposed to lead 
at levels equivalent to those experienced by many factory workers. One form of retinoblastoma, 
Wilm's tumor, and Prader Willi syndrome all have been associated with paternal exposure or 
spermal mutation. Sandra Blakeslee, Research on Birth Defects Shvts to Flaws in Sperm, 1rl.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 1, 1991, at Al, C36. "Researchers have found several childhood cancers that primarily arise 
from new mutations traced to sperm, never to eggs." Id. at 36. Reduced body weight, delayed 
maturation, and learning and behavioral problems have been observed through four generations 
of paternal exposure of rodents to opioids and nitrous oxide. Gladys Friedler, Behavioral Effects in 
Offspring of Male Mice Injected with Opioids Pnor to Mating, 1 1 PHARMACOLOGY & BIOCHEMICAL BEHAV. 
23 (1979); Gladys Friedler, Effect of Limited Paternal Exposure to Xenobiotic Agenh on the D~velopment of 
Progeny, 7 NEUROBEHAVIORAL TOXICOLOGY & TERATOLOGY 739 (1985). 
144 See Susan Katz Miller, Warning: Smoking May Damage Your Sperm, 136 NEW SCIENTIST 13 
(1992) (even sperm with gross abnormalities may have same chance as healthy sperm of reaching 
and penetrating ovum; men should be encouraged to abstain from alcohol and tobacco and avoid 
other chemical exposures prior to reproduction); Anne Merewood, Sperm Under Siege: More Than 
We Ever Guessed, Having a Healthy Baby May Depend on Dad, 23 HEALTH 53 (1991) (children of 
fathers who smoke close to time of conception 20% more likely to develop brain cancer, lym- 
phoma, and leukemia); Jane E. Brody, Possible Links Between Babies' Health and Fathers' Habits and 
Working Conditions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1991, at 64; Devra L. Davis, Fathers and Fetuses, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 1, 1991, at A27; see also Perry M. Adams et al., Male-transmitted Deve1t:pmental and 
Neurobehavioral Deficits, 4 TERATOGENESIS CARCINOCENESIS MUTAGENESIS 149 (1984); Ruth E. Lit- 
tle & Charles F. Sing, Association of Father's Drinking and Infant 's Birth Weight, 314 NEW ING. J. MED. 
1644 (1986) (association between paternal preconceptual alcohol consumption and birth- 
weight); J. Makin et al., A Comparison of Active and Passive Smoking During Pregnancy: Long-term Effects, 
NEUROTOXICOLOGY & TERATOLOGY, Jan. 1991, at 5. 
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mechanism. However, recent work is beginning to suggest possible 
pathways that might explain associations between paternal expo- 
sures and congenital anomalies in offspring. These include direct 
effects on sperm DNA, producing mutation or chromosomal abnor- 
malities, indirect effects by transmission of agents to the mother via 
the seminal fluid, and maternal exposure to agents brought home by 
the father.145 
Until very recently, scientists and policy-makers have simply been unwill- 
ing to acknowledge the connection between paternal exposures or  behavior 
and the well-being of offspring. Accordingly, the legal risk has been denied. 
As the evidence of paternal transmission accumulates,146 one would expect to 
see ready accommodation to this new reality in the form of stringent restric- 
tions on the participation of fertile men in research. Yet, for example, the 
proposed FDA policy revision discussed above makes no mention whatsoever 
of this issue.14' 
(1) How real is the risk of liability to researchers if women are included in 
trials? 
Given existing and foreseeable legal authority, what is the chance that 
researchers will be held liable for harm to their female subjects' children? 
It is hard to exaggerate the complexity of the legal analysis required to 
determine whether there is a realistic basis for the liability fears of the re- 
search sponsors who exclude women who are or may become pregnant from 
their trials. Because the analysis is so complex, it is easy to understand that 
the legal advisors to research sponsors - by and large, in-house counsel to 
pharmaceutical companies and major medical centers -- have contented 
themselves with concluding that there is ample room for possible liability in 
145 Olshan, supra note 142, at 448. Cocaine and methadone have been found in semen; see 
Ricardo A. Yazigi et al., Demonstration ofSpecific Binding of Cocaine to Human Spennatozoa, 266 JAMA 
1956 (1991). 
146 See Devra Davis et al., Male-mediated Teratogenesis and Other Reproductive Effects: Biologtc and 
Epidemiologtc Findings and A Plea for Clinical Research, 6 REPRODUCTIVE TOXICOLOGY 289 (1992) 
(more than 60 different compounds identified as increasing risk to offspring from male-mediated 
exposures; lack of extensive human evidence a deficiency in research, not absence of effect); Bar- 
bara Hales et a]., Increased Postimplantation Loss and Ma~ormations among the F2 Progeny of Male Rats 
Chronically Treated With Cyclophosphamide, 45 TERATOLOGY 671 (1992) (edema, syndactyly, gigan- 
tism and dwarfism observed in second-generation offspring of exposed male rats); Susan Katz 
Miller, Can Children Be Damaged by Fathers' Cancer Therapy?, 135 NEW SCIENTIST 5 (1992) (male 
cancer patients advised against using semen collected after start of chemotherapy because of 
"potentially drastic mutagenic effect"); Researchers Find Pre-Development of Cancer Could Start Before 
Birth, CANCER WKLY, July 20, 1992, at 10 (National Cancer Institute study confirms that exposure 
of sperm to carcinogens can make offspring more susceptible to cancers); see also Sins of the Fathers, 
318 ECONOMIST 87 (1991); Sandra Blakeslee, Father Figures: the Male Link to Birth Dejects, 10 AM. 
HEALTH 54 (1991). See generally Gladys Friedler, Developmental Toxicology: Male-mediated Effects, in 
OCCUPATIONAL ND ENVIRONMENTAL REPROI)UCTIVE HAZARDS: A GUIDE FOR C L I N ~ C ~ A N S  52-59 
(Maureen Paul ed., 1993). 
'47 There is one oblique reference to the need for special study if animal data indicates a risk 
of decreased sperm production, and a general reference to risk-benefit calculation when people 
(presumably meaning men) of reproductive age participate in a study of a drug that has demon- 
strated reproductive toxicity, but the emphasis remains on harm to offspring of female, not male, 
subjects. Proposed FDA Guideline, supra note 97, at 39,4 1 1. 
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this area, that their clients and bosses cannot be advised that liability is impos- 
sible, and that since their professional responsibility is to minimize.: the risk 
not only of liability but of litigation, the most prudent course is to recom- 
mend that researchers stay away from women.148 
Why, then, do  I bother to engage, and seek to engage the reader, in this 
analysis? It is not possible for me to demonstrate conclusively that liability 
could never be found. Nor can I categorically state that optimistic litigators 
will always find the state of the law so inhospitable that bringing a claim will 
seem prohibitively expensive or  ripe for sanction, and so conclude that no 
claim would be worth the potential of a nuisance settlement. As lawyers al- 
ways find themselves saying when asked by non-lawyers, "Could I be sued?" I 
have to say "Yes, anyone can sue anyone else for anything." The mo~re useful 
questions are how likely and how provable are such claims; what kind of dam- 
ages would they entail; and what kind of defenses are available for the re- 
searcher? That is what I explore in the next section. 
But first let me return to a baseline issue: Why should researchers incur 
even a small legal risk, if they can avoid it by not including women? Because, 
for three reasons, they cannot avoid legal risk, and their continued exclusion 
of women will actually exacerbate rather than reduce that risk: 
1. In fact, even were researchers able to continue excluding all 
pregnable women, unless they confine their subject populations to 
irreversibly sterilized men, they will have to grapple with preconcep- 
tual liability. Slowly and painfully over the next decades, the causal 
connection between male exposure to gametotoxins and harm to' off- 
spring will continue to be demonstrated and recognized. The pirter- 
nal-exposure preconceptual injury case will someday succeed. 
2. Researchers are going to face legal responsibility for injury flow- 
ing from their refusals to include pregnant and pregnable women in 
their clinical trials based on the developing "duty to test." Courts 
will hold drug researchers accountable for failing to investigate in 
women side-effects and efficacy problems that should have been 
caught prior to marketing the drug. Even if the FDA approved the 
drug, that will not, in and of itself, immunize the researcher. 
3. As the purpose and function of clinical trials, especially large- 
scale Phase 111 and Phase 11-111 trials, increasingly become defined as 
a means of providing health care - not just innovative therapies, but 
basic health care - public-sector researchers will confront sex dis- 
crimination claims by excluded women. 
In the following section I will explain how through each of these three 
148 A similar dynamic led to the "fetal protection" policies barring non-sterile women from 
lucrative though possibly fetotoxic jobs in many industries. See Valerie Mark, The Flip Side ofFetal 
Protection Policies: Compensating Children Injured through Parental Exposure to Reproductive Hazards in the 
Workplace, 22 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 673,674-75 (1992). It is noteworthy that the one reported 
decision on employer liability to employee offspring for toxic workplace exposure involved the 
developmentally disabled son of  a man exposed to mercury on the job. See Skelly v. Firestone 
Tire & Rubber Co., 20 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 1040 (1990). But see Widera v. Ettco Wire and Cable 
Corp., 1994 WL 167738 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (no common law or OSHA cause of  action against 
father's employer for infant prenatally injured by father's toxic exposure on the job). 
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impending developments in the law, researchers are exposed to liability at 
least as significant as what they now seek to avoid by the exclusion of women. 
(a) Liability for prenatal and preconceptual injury 
American law did not recognize any legal duties to an unborn child until 
relatively recently. Killing a fetus in utero was not a crime; abortion only be- 
came widely illegal by about 1900. Now, eighteen states have "feticide" stat- 
u t e ~ , ' ~ ~  and it is the rule in every state that negligent or  intentional injury to a 
fetus may, under certain circumstances, give rise to an action in tort by or on 
behalf of the child, after its live birth.150 Some jurisdictions still purport to 
require proof that the fetus was viable at the time of the injury, but that re- 
quirement has been soundly criticized and largely abandoned in practice.15' 
Although liability founded on preconceptual tortious conduct and injury to 
the subsequently born child has generally been precluded as a matter of 
"public policy,"'5* that is not universal. A few courts have entertained such 
actions.153 Review of this handful of'decisions and the larger number that 
149 Solomon. supra note 131. at 4 13 & 11.6. 
I5OSee Roland F .  Chase, Annotation, Liability for Prenatal Injuries, 40 A.L.R.3d 1222 (1971); 
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.. PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 8 55, at 367 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988). 
Almost a half-century ago the District of Columbia became the first jurisdiction to recognize a 
civil right of action for prenatal injury. Bonbrest v. Kotz,.65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946). 
15' Horace B. Robertson, Jr., Toward Rational Boundaries of Tort Liability for Injury to the Unborn: 
Prenatal Injuries, Preconception Injuries, and Wrongjiul Life, I978 DUKE L.J. 1401, 1412 (1978). 
1 5 2  E.g., in New York the leading decisions of New York's highest court in Enright v. Eli Lilly 
& Co., 570 N.E.2d 198 (N.Y.), cert. denied 112 S. Ct. 197 (1991) (no cause of action for "third 
generation" DES effects, i.e. cerebral palsy attributable to premature birth caused by mother's 
DES-caused defective reproductive organs); Albala v. City of New York. 429 N.E.2d 786 (N.Y. 
1981) (no cause of action for child's injury due to negligently perforated uterus prior to concep- 
tion); Cathenvood v. American Sterilizer Co., 498 N.Y.S.2d 703 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (no cause of 
action for child's Down's syndrome attributed to maternal preconceptual exposure on the job to 
ethylene oxide), affd,  51 1 N.Y.S.2d 807 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 515 N.E.2d 908 (N.Y. 1987); 
see alro Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 814 (N.Y. 1978). ounruling Park v. Chessin, 387 
N.Y.S.2d 204 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (negligent advice to mother of child with polycystic kidneys that 
congenital defect would not recur led her to become pregnant and bear second polycystic child 
who died). 
Other decisions that have rejected preconceptual tort liability include Sorrells v. Eli Lilly & 
Co., 737 F. Supp. 678 (D.D.C. 1990) (applying Maryland law)(dismissal of third-generation DES 
claim); Hegyes v. Unjian Enterprises, Inc., 286 Cal. Rptr. 8 5  (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (dismissal of 
claim for premature delivery necessitated by mother's lumbo-peritoneal shunt, resulting from 
automobile collision caused by defendant), rehgdenied, No. B047481, 1991 Cal. App. LEXIS 1220 
(Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 1991), review denied, No. S023723, 1992 Cal. LEXIS 264 (Cal. Jan. 16, 
1992); McAuley v. Wills, 303 S.E.2d 258 (Ga. 1983) (dismissal of claim for child's postpartum 
death caused by mother's paraplegia, resulting from automobile collision caused by defendant); 
McNulty v. McDowell, 613 N.E.2d 904, 907 (Ma. 1993) (summary judgment for defendant 
granted because "mere fact that most women of child-bearing age are . . . capable of becoming 
pregnant does not impose duty of care on their physicians to any later-conceived children"); 
Loerch v. Abbott Labs., 445 N.W.2d 560 (Minn. 1989)(en banc) (upholding lower-court dismissal 
of third-generation DES claim by split vote); Grover v. Eli Lilly and Co., 591 N.E.2d 696 (Ohio 
1992) (dismissal of third-generation DES claim). 
153 It is unquestionably possible for a child or  its parents to recover for injuries to the child, 
once born alive, resulting from pre-conceptual negligent or  intentional conduct. See, e.g., Berg- 
stresser v. Mitchell, 577 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1978) (applying Missouri law) (action permitted on  
claim that uterine rupture caused by negligent prior Caesarean section resulted in premature 
birth and hypoxia to second child); Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Laboratories. Inc.. 483 F.2d 237 
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have rejected such claims indicates great hesitation to recognize preconcep- 
(10th Cir. 1973) (applying Oklahoma law) (strict liability action permitted on claim that pre- 
conception use of oral contraceptives caused chromosomal damage resulting in birth of Down's 
Syndrome twins); Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (Ill. 1977) (actiol~ permitted 
on claim for child's permanent injury resulting from negligent pre-conceptual transfusion of Rh- 
negative blood into Rh-positive mother); Monusko v. Postle, 437 N.W.2d 367 (Mich. App.). lu. 
a @ .  dmied, 433 Mich. 869 (1989) (action permitted on claim for failure to test rubella status of 
mother and immunize her prior to conception of injured child); Lazevnick v. General Hospital of 
Monroe Country, 499 F. Supp. 146 (M.D. Pa. 1980) (applying Pennsylvania law) (action permit- 
ted for error in blood test record during first pregnancy that resulted in paralysis and brain dam- 
age of second child), apparently ouenuling Morgan v. U.S., 143 F. Supp. 580 (D.C.N.J. 1956) 
(applying Pennsylviania law) (dismissing claim that transfusion to woman two years prior to birth 
of child caused harm to child); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983) (action 
permitted on claim for pre-conceptual failure to inform mother of risks of taking Dilantin during 
pregnancy). 
One lower Philadelphia court, in an unreported decision, permitted a "third generation" 
DES case to proceed, but will require the plaintiff to prove that defendant manufacturers knew of 
the risk of the injury to the reproductive systems of the second generation, in order to establish 
the foreseeability of harm to the third generation - a formidable burden. Rorie Sh~:rman, New 
DES Front, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 12, 1990, at 1, 27. See alfo Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 530 So. 2d 
1151 (La. 1988) (no liability to child for negligent tuba1 ligation resulting in child's birth with 
congenital albinism, but dictum left open possibility of child's pre-conceptual claim c)n showing 
of foreseeability of specific defect). 
Note that Bergstresser and Renslow both represent the speculation of the federal courts as to 
how state courts would construe their law. Renslow and Bergstresser also have been roundly criti- 
cized for their reliance on prenatal precedent, in particular the overruled New York decision 'in 
Park v. Chessin, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204 (Sup. Ct. 1976), to support their recognition of pre-,conceptual 
liability. See supra note 152; Hegyes v. Unjian Enterprises, Inc., 286 Cal. Rptr. 85, 94 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1991), review h i e d ,  Jan. 16, 1992. 
Not considered here are the so-called "wronglful pregnancy" or "wrongful conception" 
cases where parents seek compensation for the birth of a healthy child after a negligently per- 
formed sterilization. Seegenerally Russell G. Donddson, Annotation, Recoverability of C O . ; ~  o f ~ a h i n ~  
Normal, Healthy Child Born as Result of Physician's Negligence or Breach of Contract or M'arranly, 89 
A.L.R.4th 632 (1991). Although obviously the harm alleged is the result of pre-conc:eptual tor- 
tious conduct, a failed sterilization is in no way analogous to the conduct of biomedic;:~l research- 
ers. 
Two other distinct categories of claim have given rise to pre-conceptual tort liability, but are 
hardly instructive as to the potential of such liability for researchers. One group, the Rh-factor 
cases, all arise from a physician's failure to detect or treat the Rh-negative status of a woman 
during her care for one pregnancy, with the result that children born subsequently are severly 
damaged or die because of the "sensitization" of the mother and her production of antibodies 
lethal to the fetus. These decisions emphasize the extraordinary factors tilting toward liability in 
Rh-negative cases: not just the routine nature of the blood-typing procedure, but the fact that 
failure to treat an Rh-negative woman is malpractice per se, and that the resulting helnolytic dis- 
ease and death of the child is "overwhelmingly preventable." Graham v. Keuchel, 847 P.2d 342, 
364 (Okla. 1993). 
As the courts determining these claims reiterate, the whole focus of the information or treat- 
ment not provided is protection of "those who, although unconceived at the time of [the wo- 
man's] treatment, are anticipated and foreseeable." Id. at 365. "The same duty is owed both the 
mother and her unconceived child - i.e., the duty to prevent the mother's sensitization . . . ." Id. 
at 365 n.130. See alfo Yeager v. Bloomington Obstetrics and Gynecology, Inc., 585 N.E.2d 696 
(Ind. App.), aff'd, 604 N.E.2d 598 (Ind. 1992); Walker v. Rinck, 604 N.E.2d 59 (Ind. 1992) (in 
both cases, action permitted on claim for failure to determine Rh-negative status of mother dur- 
ing prior pregnancy); accord, Empire Casualty Co. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co., 764 
P.2d 1191 (Colo. 1988); Lough v. Rolla Women's Clinic, Inc., 866 S.W.2d 851 (Mo. 1993). 
The second distinctive category of pre-conceptual injury are claims resulting from negligent 
genetic investigation and counseling following the birth of a child with serious anomalies. In 
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tual liability. One'reason for this judicial reluctance clearly is the difficulty of 
establishing the causal link between a child's health problem and the defend- 
ant's preconceptual conduct. The courts also express lingering unease with 
the notion that conduct which inflicts no injury and violates no duty at the 
time it is undertaken - because the person it will eventually harm does not 
exist in any sense - later can be judged negligent, or in the case of strict 
liability claims, injurious. 
(b) Causation in the preconceptual injury decisions 
It is not possible, in a few sentences, to cogently decipher the required 
element of causation in a tort ~ 1 a i m . l ~ ~  A plaintiff must prove not only literal 
causation, sometimes called "causation-in-fact" - that the defendant's con- 
duct (meaning both acts and omissions to act) was a substantial factor in 
bringing about the result complained of - but also must establish that it was 
the "proximate cause" or "legal cause" of the harm. The latter concept is 
used to limit the otherwise infinitely-regressive chain of preceding, overlap- 
ping, contributing, necessary but not sufficient, or sufficient but not necessary 
events and conditions that could be subsumed under the rubric of "cause." 
T o  oversimplify crudely, when a court thinks that imposing responsibility on a 
particular defendant would go just too far, seem too unfair and too impracti- 
cal, often the court resorts to finding no proximate cause,155 or along the 
lines that I suggest below, to finding that something the parent did relieves 
the defendant of responsibility. 
The Georgia Supreme Court's analysis in McAuley v. for exam- 
ple, turned heavily on causation. A child conceived after a mother's paralysis 
in a car accident died shortly after birth, allegedly because of a problematic 
these cases, physicians reassured the parents that they had no genetic defects and could safely 
conceive other children, only to discover after the birth of a similarly damaged sibling that their 
reassurances were wrong, and negligently so. Again, the courts have permitted these preconcep- 
tual claims to stand, but the defendants in these cases bear no resemblance to medical research- 
ers, unless the latter provide their subjects with undue reassurances. E.g., Gallegher v. Duke 
University, 852 F.2d 773 (4th Cir. 1988) (applying North Carolina law); Lininger v. Eisenbaum. 
764 P.2d 1202 (Colo. 1988); Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So.2d 415 (Fla. 1993). But see Bruggeman v. 
Schimke, 718 P.2d 635 (Kan. 1986) (although court found that physician provided negligent ge- 
netic counseling, and that a physician consulted about the possible hereditary defects owes duty 
of care not only to parents, but to unconceived children, child's "wrongful life" claim rejected as 
a matter of law). 
154 Speaking of the causation issue, and citing more than a score of lengthy law review arti- 
cles on the subject. Prosser says: "There is perhaps nothing in the entire field of law which has 
called forth more disagreement, or  upon which the opinions are in such a welter of confusion." 
KEETON ET AL., supra note 150, at 5 4 1. 
' 5 5  T o  achieve the same outcome, courts also use the terms "duty." "foreseeability," and 
"negligence," all of which turn out to be inextricably intertwined with the analysis of proximate 
cause. 
"Proximate cause," in short, has been an extraordinarily changeable concept. "Having 
no integrated meaning of its own, its chameleon quality permits it to be substituted for 
any one of the elements of a negligence case when decision on that element becomes 
difficult. . . . No other formula . . . so nearly does the work of Aladdin's lamp." 
KEETON ET AL.,  supra note 150, at 5 42, quoting, Leon Green, Proximate C a v e  in Texas Negligence Law, 
28 TEX. L. REV. 47 1 (1950). 
156 303 S.E.2d 258 (Ga. 1983). 
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delivery caused by the mother's paraplegia. Dismissing the case against the 
driver on the pleadings, prior to trial, the Georgia court found that the par- 
ent's decision to proceed with a pregnancy, having been warned of the risks, 
constituted an intervening act that broke the causal link between the original 
car accident and the child's death.15' This break in the link of causation was 
critical. As a later court found, building on the McAuley analysis, "if the doc- 
tor did warn [the woman] of the risks associated with becoming pregnant, and 
[the woman] nonetheless decided to proceed with pregnancy, her voluntary 
and knowing act was an intervening intentional act, breaking the chai.n of cau- 
sation."15* Similarly, a researcher's lawyer could argue, the decision of the 
fully-informed subject to proceed on a protocol, once advised that there are 
known and unknown risks to future offspring, severs the causal chain. 
(c) Duty and foreseeability 
Even when the causal linkage is quite clear and strong, courts find it hard 
to impose liability on someone for harm to a person not yet conceived at the 
time of the defendant's action. Often the question becomes defined as one of 
"duty": was there a relationship between the actor and the plaintiff that cre- 
ated a legal obligation "for the benefit of" the plaintiff? That, in turn, is 
partially a function of foreseeability - whether it is foreseeable that the ac- 
tor's conduct may create a risk of harm to the ~ 1 a i n t i f f . I ~ ~  When a plaintiff 
did not exist in any sense, even in utero, at the time of the defendant's conduct, 
injury to her could not have been foreseen. Absent foreseeability of harm, 
there can be no responsibility to avoid the harm. "[Pllaintiff at the time of the 
conduct was in no sense a separate entity to whom the traditional duty of care 
could be owed." 160 
While foreseeability may be necessary, it alone will not suffict:. "[Tlhe 
creation of a legal duty requires more than a mere possibility of occurrence 
since, through hindsight, everything is fore~eeable ." '~~ In the decisions that 
reject preconceptual injury claims, frequently the courts detern~ine that 
although the plaintiff's injury might have been foreseeable (in the sense that 
157 Id. at 260. 
158  Hegyes, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 99. But see Walker v. Rinck, 604 N.E.2d 59 (Ind. 1992). In a 3-2 
decision, Walker reversed an intermediate appellate court's determination that a parent's decision 
to conceive more children, after having been informed that her physician had negligently failed 
to ascertain and appropriately medicate her Rh-negative condition, was an intervening cause of 
the harm to her subsequently born children. Id. at 596. The majority ruled that the later 
pregnancies were "totally foreseeable" and that the very purpose of the physician's care had been 
"to protect future fetuses." Id. at 595. The court was at pains, however, to avoid recognizing "a 
duty. . . [that] might lead physicians to forego treatment that might benefit the mother but pose a 
risk to later children," thus placing them "in a direct conflict between their moral duty to patients 
and the proposed legal duty to . . . hypothetical future generations." Id. at 595 (quoting Albala v. 
City of New York, 429 N.E.2d 786 (N.Y. 1981)). It found that administration of the proper medi- 
cation for Rh-negative blood "neither benefits nor harms the mother; It is given only to protect 
potential fetuses not yet conceived." Id. In the research context, the court's analysis of causation, 
which was strongly criticized by its to dissenters, id. at 598, has limited utility. 
159See, e.g., Monusko v. Postle, 437 N.W.2d 367, 369 (Mich. App.), lv. app. denied, 433 Mich. 
869 (1989). 
160 Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1254 (Ill. 1977)(child injured by precon- 
ception transfusions to mother). 
16' Hegyes, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 103. 
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the defendant could have anticipated the chance that a child would later be 
conceived, injured, and born), as a matter of public policy they would not 
recognize "a duty to the u n c ~ n c e i v e d . " ~ ~ ~  
The major exception to this principle occurs when it is clear that the birth 
of the afflicted child is not merely theoretically foreseeable, but actually fore- 
seen - for example, contemplated and desired as the sole objective of a phy- 
sician's intervention. In the so-called "wrongful life" cases, where birth with 
injurious genetic defects has followed negligent preconceptual testing and 
counseling by a physician, liability for this preconception tort is based on the 
"special relationship" between the physician and the parental patient.163 In 
Monusko u, P o ~ t l e , ' ~ ~  for example, the rubella test and immunization that the 
defendant physician ought to have done would have prevented precisely the 
harm that the plaintiff suffered (rubella syndrome), and the court carefully 
confined its recognition of preconceptual liability to that unique 
circumstance. 
In Hegyes u. Unjian Enter;brises, Inc. ,I65 a California court dismissed the 
claim as legally insufficient because no such relationship was involved. The 
plaintiff's mother had a lumbo-peritoneal shunt as a result of a car accident. 
The shunt became compressed by the fetus during her pregnancy, and to pro- 
tect the mother the fetus had to be delivered prematurely. Plaintiff, the child, 
was suing for injuries resulting from the premature delivery, based on the 
preconceptual car accident that had led to implantation of the shunt.166 
In its persuasive opinion, the Hegyes court emphasized the distinct, sui 
generis nature of situations in which the whole goal and function of a pre- 
existing relationship between the plaintiff's parent and the defendant was the 
birth of a healthy child, and the culpability of the physician in negligently 
depriving the parent of the opportunity to choose not to conceive a child.16' 
It categorically refused to enlarge responsibility for preconceptual harm be- 
yond the realm of professional negligence or products liability - the latter 
not because of any "special relationship," but because liability for a defective 
product by definition extends to all persons affected by the product, regard- 
less of privity, foreseeability or due care.168 
The very first preconceptual injury decision, Renslow v. Mennonite Hospi- 
- 
'62 Catherwood v. American Sterilizer Co., 498 N.Y.S.2d 703, 706 (Sup. Ct. 1986). affd, 51 1 
N.Y.S.2d 805 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 515 N.E.2d 908 (1987). 
163 See, e.g., Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982) (negligent failure to diagnose sib- 
ling's hereditary defect); Curlender v. Bio-Science Labs., 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) 
(negligent testing for gene for Tay-Sachs disease). But see Smith v. Cote. 513 A.2d 341. 351-55 
(N.H. 1986) (refusing to recognize "wrongfi~l life" claim of child prenatally injured by negligent 
failure to test mother for rubella) and cases discussed therein. 
437 N.W.2d 367 (Mich. App.), lv. a m  denied, 433 Mich. 869 (1989). 
165 286 Cal. Rptr. 85 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). 
166 Id. at 86-87. 
167 "A duty is easily recognized where. . . the parents consulted the physician for the express 
purpose of determining whether to conceive a child or to terminate an existing pregnancy . . . 
[when] a medical professional's conduct. . . is directly and intentionally related to whether a child 
is conceived or born." Id. at 100-01. 
168 Id. at 89 n.4; see discussion of strict liability law, infra notes 178-88, 204-34 and accompa- 
nying text. 
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remains one of the more fertile for analysis, in part because of its sev- 
eral opinions and dissents. A bare majority of the Illinois Supreme Court 
refused to conclude as a matter of law that the defendant could not have fore- 
seen the harm to plaintiff, a child born with hyperbilirubinemia because of the 
negligent sensitization of her mother's Rh-negative blood, given the state of 
medical knowledge about the effects of Rh-factor incompatibility at the time 
of her mother's transfusion in 1965. The precise form of the harxn, or the 
exact identity of the person harmed, need not be foreseeable; it is "[tlhe like- 
lihood of harm in some form to a class of persons . . . ."170 that generates a 
duty to exercise care to prevent the harm. In any event, as the concurring 
opinion found, it was easily foreseeable that the adolescent girl transfused 
"would grow up, marry and become pregnant."171 
Rmlow goes on to posit "a right to be born free from prenatal injuries 
foreseeably caused by a breach of duty to the child's mother."172 Although the 
conduct was preconceptual, the injury was prenatal, and because the conduct 
was negligent with respect to the plaintiff's mother, the court invoked the 
concept of "transferred negligence" to support its conclusion that the wrong 
to the mother was also a violation of duty to the child. However, the Rmlow 
court was careful to limit its holding to one generation, noting that the dam- 
age here was not self-perpet~ating, '~~ not the sort of "hereditary defect" or 
"genetic injury" that the dissenters feared would extend traditional tort liabil- 
ity to the "freakish and the fantastic."174 And once again, this was x~ot a case 
in which the mother had been fully informed of risks and proceeded despite 
warning; a duty to her had been breached, and it was this breach, not her 
independent decision, that c a w e d  the harm to her child - hence, the physi- 
cian's liability. ' 75 
What does this analysis of the current state of the law tell us about the 
likelihood of researcher liability to the unconceived child of a subject? Unlike 
in Hegyes and McCauley, there is a relationship, and perhaps one that could be 
characterized as professional, between the researcher and the subject-parent. 
But the purpose of that relationship is not the prevention of impairment of 
169 367 N.E.2d 1250 (Ill. 1977). 
I7O Id. at 1258. 
'71 Id. 
'72 Id. at 1255 (emphasis added). 
173 Id. 
174 Id. at 1262 (Ryan, J., dissenting) (quoting William L. Prosser, Pahgraf Revisiti.d, 52 MICH. 
L. REV. 1, 27 (1953)). 
Cf: Graham v. Keuchel, 847 P.2d 342 (Okla. 1993). One of the negligent Rh-negative 
senitization cases, Gmham reversed a verdict because the court did not direct the j ~ ~ r y  to find a 
defense of supervening cause only if the mother's conception of the injured child had been inten- 
tional or in reckless disregard of her awarenewss of the risk to the child. Id,  at 354, n.55. How- 
ever, it also determined that if a woman knew of her Rh-sensitive status, had beer) adequately 
warned of the dangers of conception in that condition, and completely understood the medical 
risk, then the "forces set in motion by the doctors' failure to give her [the treatment] may be said 
to have become passive . . . . If she undertook unreasonable risks by becoming pregnant in her 
sensitized condition, the harm . . . is not attributable to the doctors, but to the normal risks of 
pregnancy for a woman who has been sensitized." Id. at 352-53. "The doctors . . . would not be 
held accountable for foreseeing that an adult female patient, who is sui juris, would cvillfully con- 
ceive in the face of substantial risk of known and appeciated danger of severe disability or death 
to the child." Id. at 351. 
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the subject's offspring, or assisting the subject in producing healthy future 
progeny, as in Monusko or  the wrongful life cases. Nor will a researcher, sim- 
ply by including a subject in a protocol, breach any independent duty of care 
to the subject-parent, as did the negligent transfusing doctor in Rensl~w."~ 
The logical appeal of the limited "special relationship" exception, the inter- 
vening causation of the subject's decision to proceed, and the context of out- 
right rejection of preconceptual liability for lack of legal duty convince me 
that the chances of researcher liability on a negligence theory are 
minuscule.'77 
(d) Strict liability preconceptual claims 
Of the preconceptual injury decisions extant, Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson 
Labs., Inc. is perhaps the closest on its facts to the scenario feared by re- 
searchers contemplating the inclusion of fertile women in their trials. Alone 
among the decisions upholding a preconceptual claim, Jorgensen was pleaded 
in strict liability and express warranty; the court did not need to reach issues 
of duty or foreseeability. The plaintiffs were twin girls born with Down's syn- 
drome, one of whom died at the age of three and the other who was severely 
impaired. Their condition was attributed to chromosomal damage sustained 
by their mother's taking birth control pills just prior to becoming pregnant. 
Without accepting as proven the alleged causal link between the pills and the 
child's condition, the court held that if such a connection could be proven, 
the fact that the defendant's conduct - the manufacture and sale of the pills 
- occurred prior to conception, in and of itself, would not defeat the 
action. 
The appellate court emphasized that "[wle are persuaded that the 
Oklahoma courts would treat the problem of the injuries alleged here as one 
of causation and proximate cause, to be determined b y  competent medical 
proof."I8O In other words, the trial court erred in ruling out preconceptual 
injury claims per se; it should have focused on the element of causation, in 
both its factual and legal senses, to decide whether defendant was responsi- 
ble. The appellate court did not dictate what the lower court should do, and 
as with so many of these cases, it seems to have been settled post-appeal, so 
we do not know what the trial court would have concluded on that issue. 
But we do know that far from having been advised or warned of any risk 
of chromosomal damage from the contraceptive, Alta Jorgensen was told that 
the pills were safe and fit and received no warning of any potential harm from 
If a researcher does breach a duty to a subject, either by concealing information or mis- 
reading tests or departing from the protocol, and harm ensues to the subject's children - 
whether they are unconceived, conceived, born, or grown-up - all bets are off. The researcher 
may be responsible for that harm - as, I would hope, everyone would agree is only fair. That. 
however, has no bearing on the quite different question whether the researcher's inclusion of  a 
subject, without any negligence, could in and of itself subject the researcher to liability to the 
subject's future offspring for unavoidable harm. 
'77 For a very similar conclusion with respect to employer liability for harm to workers' off- 
spring, based on an intervening causation analysis, see Mark, supra note 148, at 695-97. 
178483  F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973). 
179 Id. at 238, 240. 
180 Id. at 240. 
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their use (or so says her complaint, which the court had to accept as true for 
purposes of this ruling). Whether she could have. proved this warranty and 
lack of warning, and then proven that the pills caused an alteration in her 
chromosomes, is not at all clear. No researchers, however, will guarantee a 
subject the "fitness" of an intervention on trial; quite the contrary, the rea- 
sonable researcher will warn that there may be substantial risk both to the 
subject and the subject's children. Researchers, in fact, could choose to rou- 
tinely inform all subjects that chromosomal damage might result from a 
protocol. 
The law has not yet developed in this area, but it seems clear that such 
warnings would extinguish the strict liability claims of both subjects and their 
childi-en, for either prenatal or preconceptual harm. Unlike the purveyor of 
goods who is held to a standard of strict liability, the research sponsor gener- 
ally is not selling a product. Extensive warnings of known and unknown risks 
are provided, and the subjects expressly assume those risks. It is often said 
that contributory negligence and assumption of the risk are not defenses to 
strict liability.18' In the field of products liability, a special subset of strict 
liability, 
virtually all courts have seemingly agreed that the conduct or mis- 
conduct of another, including an intermediate seller, the claimant, or 
anyone else, may be of such nature or kind as to constitute a super- 
seding cause. . . . 
. . . . 
[For example], voluntary and unreasonable (negligent) use with 
knowledge of the defective condition and appreciation of its 
danger. la* 
So let us return to the causation theme that pervades the jurisprudence of 
preconceptual and prenatal tort: who really caused the harm to the cl.~ild? Is it 
the researcher who allows the competent, fully informed, adult1s5 parent-to- 
be to participate? I would argue, no; it is the subject whose voluntary, delib- 
erate, intervening actions have superseded and eclipsed any responsibility the 
researcher might otherwise have had. 
In none of the instances described above did a court face a tortfeasor 
who had been honest with a woman about potential risks to her offspring 
which she then chose to assume for reasons of her own. The i s s ~ ~ e  should 
properly be viewed not as a question of waiver but rather of superseding cau- 
181 There is also definitely some question as to whether a subject's assumption of the risk (or 
in some circumstances, contributory negligence) in proceeding with the protocol would be im- 
puted to and binding on the as-yet-unborn or unconceived child. This issue is disc-ussed more 
extensively below under the question of waiver of liability. See infra note 302. 
182 KEETON ET AL., supra note 150, $ 102 (emphasis added). 
183 Different issues arise when the subject is a minor limited in capacity to consent to any- 
thing, including medical treatment. This topic deserves its own monograph and cannot be ad- 
dressed here. However, it should be noted that those whom the law calls "mature minors" or 
"emancipated minors" - because of their actual independence from their parents, through em- 
ployment, marriage, or parenthood - do not fall into this category, because they can generally 
consent both to medical treatment and to research participation.  JA JAMES M. MORR.ISSEY T AL., 
CONSENT AND CONF~DENT~ALITY I N  THE HEALTH CARE OF CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 90-92 
(1986). 
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sation. The harm, if it occurs, to a subject's subsequently-born child has been 
caused not by the researcher, but by the parent's decision to engage in certain 
conduct, knowing that it might harm potential 0ffspring.18~ In this era of 
onrushing abrogation of parental tort immunity,ls5 the child might seek rec- 
ompense from the parent,186 but the researcher is likely to be shielded by the 
parent's interception of liability.187 Too, it is important to remember the 
184 Compare Solomon, supra note 131, at 427: 
The first problem is fear of medical malpractice liability, should the fetus develop into a 
damaged baby. Since few physicians have a clear understanding of malpractice law, this 
concern is very real to them. Nevertheless, there is a simple response. The doctrine of 
informed consent, based on the constitutional right to refuse medical treatment, re- 
quires that the physician disclose the risks and benefits of any medical procedure to the 
patient for her decision. Far from forcing or coercing the patient to act in accordance 
with the physician's orders, the law requires the patient to have the final say. The wo- 
man, not the fetus, selects and employs her doctor. Therefore, the physician discharges 
his legal duty by providing the woman with the required information. 
Ia5 KEETON ET AL., supra note 150, at $ 122. 
186 In 1980, in a plain effort to permit recovery against the mother's insurer, Michigan be- 
came the first state to sustain a claim against a child's mother for injuries resulting from her 
negligent conduct during the pregnancy. Grodin v. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d 869, 871 (Mich. 1980) 
(action permitted against mother for damage to son's teeth caused by use of tetracycline during 
pregnancy; must establish whether choice was "reasonable exercise of parental discretion"); see 
also Bonte v. Bonte, 616 A.2d 464 (N.H. 1992). One other state court considered such a claim 
and rejected it, at least with respect to unintentional harm, to avoid "State scrutiny [of] all the 
decisions a mother must make in attempting to carry a pregnancy to term" and the creation of an 
adversarial relationship between the pregnant woman and fetus from the moment of conception 
until birth. Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355, 355, 360 (Ill. 1988) (child born with intesti- 
nal injuries, apparently resulting from automobile collision while mother was five months preg- 
nant). However, one writer believes that at least thirty U.S. jurisdictions have demonstrated 
their receptiveness to recognition of a woman's duty to her embryo-fetus. See Ron Beal, "Can I 
Sue Mommy ? "  An Analysis of a Woman k Tort Liability for Prenatal Injuries to Her Child Born Alive, 2 1 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 325, 357 (1984). See generally Thomas M. Fleming, Right of Child to Action Against 
Mother for Infiction of Prenatal Injuries, 78 A.L.R.4th 1082, 1088 (1990) (suggesting that "recogni- 
tion . . . of a mother's liability for injuring her unborn child might involve a duty on her part to 
properly care for her own body th;oughout her fertile years, regardless of pregnancy or her 
knowledge thereof, and render admissible evidence of such self-injurious conduct before concep- 
tion as heavy drinking or drug use"). 
Many commentators enthusiastically support the notion of maternal prenatal civil liability. 
See Joseph S. Badger, Note, Stallman v. Youngquist: 'No, You Can't Sue Mommy In Illinois;' The 
Illinois Supreme Court Rejects Maternal Prenatal Civil Liability, 11 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 409, 433 n.169 
(1991). One even suggests that women should be held liable for perinatal transmission of the 
human immunodeficiency virus - a concept that stands out, even among academic law reviews, 
for its stunning remoteness from the real world as well as for its condemnatory attitude toward 
people living with AIDS. Martha M. Curley, Note, Establishing Relieffor the Most Innocent ofA11 AIDS 
Victim: Liabilityfor Pm'natal Transmission ofAIDS, 28 J. FAM. L. 271 (1990). No one on this long list 
of commentators, however, seems to have considered the possibility ofpaternal liability to a child 
for prenatal or preconceptual injury. 
187The only contrary analysis that I have found is a footnote in a student note, David S. 
Steefel, Note, Preconception Tor.%: Foreseeing the Unconceived, 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 621, 636 n.81 
(1977). The author relies on the black-letter language of Section 89 of the RESTATEMENT (SEC- 
OND) OF TORTS (and other rules) that "normal" and "foreseeable" intervening causes do not 
supersede a defendant's liability. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 150, at $ 44. He errs, in my 
judgment, by focusing on the conception of offspring as the superseding "event;" my argument 
is, rather, that it is the informed consent of the male or female subject which supersedes the 
defendant's duty. As Prosser says, 
Sometimes the defendant will be free to assume that when a third person becomes aware 
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strength of current "public policy" considerations, such as the interest in fos- 
tering drug deve10prnent.l~~ At present, there is still no precedent for impo- 
sition of liability for harm to a subject's children on a researcher who 
obtained properly informed consent from the s ~ b j e c t . l 8 ~  
In sum, the possibility of liability for prenatal or preconceptual harm to a 
subject's offspring cannot be negated, but it is hardly inevitable or of colossal 
proportions. A few researchers may be subject to a prima facie clairn, under 
theories either of negligence or strict liability,lgO if the child of a subject is 
prenatally or preconceptually injured, and it can be convincingly demon- 
strated that the harm is attributable to the research intervention. For that 
matter, a researcher could face a loss of consortium1g1 claim from an already 
existing child whose parent was injured by participating in the research. But 
how many researchers inquire into whether their subjects, male or female, 
have children who might make such a claim? Again, the issue is not merely, 
could such an action in theory be brought, but how serious a threat to the 
researcher would such a lawsuit be, relative to all other sources of liability 
inherent in the research enterprise. 
By far the most likely scenario for a researcher's liability is failure to ade- 
quately inform the parent-subject about some aspect of the experimental pro- 
cedure: its risks, the non-experimental alternatives available if the subject did 
not participate in the protocol, the unknown potential for later harm to off- 
spring, and all the other information required by current federal regulations 
and the general law of informed consent.lg2 Researchers are subjecting 
of the danger, and is in a position to deal with it, the third person will act reasoni~bly. It 
is only where misconduct is to be anticipated, and taking the risk of it was unreas~:)nable, 
that liability will be imposed for consequences to which such intervening acts 
contributed. 
Id. Without more, the choice to participate in a protocol should not be characterized as 
"misconduct." 
lS8 See Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 570 N.E.2d 198 (1991) (no cause of action for "l.hird gener- 
ation" DES effects, in part because of "dangers of overdeterrence - the possibility that research 
will be discouraged or that beneficial drugs will be withheld from the market"). 
189The only tort claims against a researcher for damage to subject's offspring ever brought 
have been the intentional tort - not negligence - claims against the University of <.:hicago and 
Eli Lilly & Co. for their conduct of the DES trial in which female subjects were deliberately mis- 
informed and misled. See Wetherill v. University of Chicago, 570 F. Supp. 1124 (N.D. Ill. 1983); 
Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Ill. 1978). 
- - 
'go If the subject was not paying to participate in the protocol or for the drug administered, 
quoere whether strict liability for non-negligent conduct, which is limited to those engaged in the 
business of selling a product, would be applicable. If the research subject is analogized to a 
"professional tester," it would appear that transfer of products that are still in a testing stage and 
have not yet "entered the stream of commerce" will not be held to the strict liability standard. See 
MARSHALL SHAPO, THE LAW OF PRODUCTS L I A B I L I ~  5 12-34 & 5 12-35 (1987). It is quite clear 
that physicians and other providers of health care are not strictly liable for defects in products 
that they dispense or prescribe. See, e .g . ,  Magrine v. Spector, 241 A.2d 637 (N.J. 1968). affd 250 
A.2d 129 (N.J. 1969). 
Ig1  "Loss of consortium" is the legal term for the harm of losing the "society and affection" 
or in the case of a child, the "society, guidance, attention and care" of a family member who is 
injured or killed. It is an item of damages separate from physical injury, medical expenses, pain 
and suffering, or financial loss. In the last decade, children have been permitted to sue for loss of 
parental consortium in several states. KEETON ET AL., supra note 150, at $ 125. 
Ig2 See, e .g . ,  LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION, supra note 22, at 95-153. 
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themselves now to incalculable potential liability because they almost never 
advise male subjects of any possible risk to their children, and never recom- 
- . - 
mend precautionary measures such as avoiding conception while on proto- 
~ o l . ' ~ ~  IRBs who approve these deficient protocols are complicit in this 
failure and may also be held legally responsible.lg4 This practice has far 
greater potential for devastating liability than the inclusion of women. 
As for the extent of any liability, if the circumstances of a particular re- 
searcher-subject relationship were analogous to an employer-employee rela- 
tionship,lg5 the researcher's maximum liability would be the relatively 
circumscribed recovery of workers' compensation. Through the peculiar op- 
eration of that system, which remains the sole legal remedy for any work- 
related injury to an employee even if in fact no benefits are available for the 
specific injury claimed, this theoretical liability may often amount to nothing. 
For example, a California court recently decided that serious injury to an un- 
born child, caused by an employee health clinic's failure to diagnose a rup- 
tured uterus, was a work-related injury that would be compensated only by 
workers' compensation. However, because the California workers' compen- 
sation scheme does not cover an employee's child, the child's medical and 
other expenses were, in the end, paid by no one.lg6 The decision rested in 
large part on the court's apprehension that otherwise, employers would be 
tempted to resort to exclusion of pregnant workers from the workplace; simi- 
lar concern about the impact of barring pregnant or pregnable women from 
research protocols might animate a court to bar civil liability on policy 
I g 3  In light of developing knowledge of the male contribution to birth defects, such risks are 
no longer "unforeseeable" and therefore exempt from the product manufacturer's duty to warn. 
See discussion supra notes 140-46 and accompanying text. 
I g 4  See injra notes 255-65 and accompanying text. 
I95 For example, if the subject were paid. The  vast majority of Phase I subjects - the "nor- 
mal healthy volunteers" - are paid. Although often characterized as independent contractors, 
researchers certainly could choose instead to establish an employee-employer relationship. It is 
noteworthy that the greatest resistance to female subject inclusion seems to focus on  Phase I, and 
the dire risks associated with utterly untried interventions, often when animal data is still quite 
incomplete. Yet, as Robert Levine recounts, when years ago insurance companies were solicited 
to give estimates for workers' compensation coverage of a large Phase I testing facility, their per 
capita cost estimates for insuring the Phase I subjects was about the same as for insuring the 
facility's secretaries: very low. Workshop on Research Involving Human Subjects, Annual Meet- 
ing of the American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics. October 23, 1993. Study of Phase I 
subjects in prison found 58 adverse medical events (using a very broad definition) and no deaths 
o r  permanent disability in the course of almost I 8  billion subject-days of Phase I exposure. LE- 
VINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION, supra note 22, at 39-40. 
I96 Bell v. Macy's California, 261 Cal. Rptr. 447 (Ct. App. 1989), review h i e d ,  1989 Cal. 
LEXIS 4637 (Cal. Nov. 16, 1989); see also Witty v. American Cen. Capital Distribs., Inc., 697 
S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985). affd in part, rev'd in part on othergrounh, 727 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. 
1987) (both wrongful death and emotional distress claims of employee whose fetus was killed in 
work accident barred by workers' compensation). But in the jurisdiction of Louisiana, where the 
fetus has been statutorily declared a juridical human being with all the rights of any child, the 
employer may be liable in a civil tort &ion, not merely in workers' compensation, for negligence 
that causes the death of an employee's fetus. Adams v. Denny's Inc., 464 So. 2d 876 (La. Ct. 
App.), cert. denied, 467 So. 2d 530 (La. 1985); see also Namislo v. Akzo Chemicals, Inc., 620 So. 2d 
573 (Ala. 1999); Dillon v. S.S. Kresge Co., 192 N.W. 2d 661 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971). Seegenerally, 
Jean M. Eggen, Toxic Reproductive and Genetic Ifazarh in the Workplace: Challenging the Myth  oJthe Tort 
and Workers' Compensation S y s t m ,  60 FORDHAM L. REV. 843, 879-84 (1992); Mark, supra note 148. 
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grounds. '9' 
(2) If there is a real risk to sponsors from inclusion of women, is it an 
unjust risk? 
Let us assume that liability is possible. The question then shifts to 
whether the possibility of liability justifies the exclusion of all women on the 
chance that their unanticipated, undesired, or undisclosed pregnancy might 
eventually lead to claims against the research sponsor. Let us assume that 
real harm is done to children and that the sponsors have to pay. Is that neces- 
sarily an unjust result? 
The closest analogy already developing in the law is fetal protection pol- 
icy in the w o r k p l a ~ e . ' ~ ~  The Supreme Court has recently refused to counte- 
nance a similar justification for the required sterilization of employees 
exposed to lead, in no small part because of the company's abysm;~l record 
with respect to protecting or acknowledging the risk to male workers' chil- 
dren from the men's comparably dangerous, or worse, exposures.199 The 
potential for tort liability was the major defense for the discriminatory policy 
raised by the employer, Johnson Controls, and it was soundly rejected in light 
of other social costs, including the cost in women's autonomy.200 
- 
As was the case with Johnson Controls' lack of concern about the expo- 
sure of their male workers, the utter disinterest evidenced by most research- 
ers in the possibility of harm to the offspring of male subjects is a telltale sign 
that their inclusion/exclusion criteria are more about the exclusion of women 
than about the prevention of harm to unborn children. In fact, it does not 
seem at all unjust for those who profit from the conduct of research - not 
only the sponsors, but the investigators who may reap rewards of prestige and 
professional reputation, with concomitant access to further grants and con- 
tracts, salary increases, offers to edit journals or teach - to be held responsi- 
I g 7  Contra, Jarvis v. Providence Hosp., 444 N.W.2d 236 (M~ch. Ct. App. 1989). But note that 
in Jarurc, not only did the employer hospital omit to give gamma globulin to the pregnant lab 
technician exposed to hepatitis, the supervising physician affirmatively misled the wonlan by tell- 
ing her that the sample to which she had been exposed had tested negative for hepatilis and that 
there was no need for concern. Id. at 238. Also, for whatever reason, the employer's attorney 
failed to raise the defense of eiclusivity of remedy with respect to the woman's survivors' action. 
Id. at 242 n.5. The  court in fact engaged in the kind of "causal intervention" analysis that I 
predict courts will, and found that the woman's intervening conduct - failure to report the expo- 
sure for two days and to seek health care elsewhere - did not constitute a proximate cause of the 
fetal death. 
198 Some will argue that the analogy to workplace fetal protection policies falls apart in the 
face of the differences between employment and participation in research. Getting and keeping a 
job is seen as an unalloyed benefit, while serving as a subject is if anything a sacrifice. This 
perspective, grounded in the traditional notions of "the null hypothesis" and "clinical equi- 
poise," and the much-touted distinction between research and treatment, is at best ~~ar t ia l .  See 
supra note 28. Employment has its burdens too, and, as the prior discussion reveals, research can 
offer distinct benefits to its subjects. See discussion supra notes 29-79 and accompanying text. 
'99 Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers of Am., UAW, V. 
Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991). See discussion supra notes 140-46 and accompany- 
ing text. 
200 "It is no more appropriate for the courts than it is for individual employers, to decide 
whether a woman's reproductive role is more important to herself and her family than her eco- 
nomic role. Congress has left this choice to the woman as hers to make." Id. at 21 1. 
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ble for the actual costs to human beings that research entails. Why should 
research sponsors and investigators be permitted to externalize those costs, if 
in fact they arise, to subjects and their children? Perhaps if research were 
truly cooperative and subjects participated in eventual profit or other reward, 
I might see the question differently, but as the California cell-line case makes 
clear, researchers resist giving their lay subjects any stake in their success.201 
The issue here is not fault, in the sense of negligently failing to avoid 
harm that was preventable. I return to the principle underlying the legal con- 
cept of strict liability: even when harm occurs totally without fault, if the 
choice of who shall absorb that harm is between those who profit from the 
conduct that caused it, and those who do not,202 the right choice is the 
former. 
(3) What is the risk of liability if women are not included in trials? 
In addition to the risk of liability to the children of male subjects,203 re- 
searchers and the IRBs that approve their research face a different set of legal 
risks if they continue to exclude women from their research. The prudent 
researcher should be interested in learning about these legal hazards and 
comparing them with the risks of inclusion. 
(a) The most likely source of liability for research sponsors: failure to 
conduct adequate pre-marketing testing with women and pregnant 
subjects 
i. The duty to provide "safe" products 
Under strict liability, a seller of any product "in a defective condition 
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer" is subject to liability for 
physical harm to the user if the seller is engaged in the business of selling the 
product and the product reached the user without substantial change in its 
condition when sold.204 Liability may attach even if the seller exercises "all 
possible care" in preparation of the product and despite the absence of any 
contractual connection between the user and the seller.205 The focus is not 
20' See Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990), cert. h i e d ,  499 U.S. 936 
(1991) (researchers refuse to share with patient profit from "immortal" cell line cultured from his 
spleen without his knowledge or  consent). By "success" I do  not necessarily mean an exciting 
breakthrough on a particular protocol or  development of a particular drug; as with other enter- 
prises, over time those engaged in research have to expect to absorb costs associated with experi- 
ments that don't work. And, of course, the trial that fails to disprove a null hypothesis may well 
be publishable or  otherwise translatable into tangible benefit for the researcher. 
202 Some may turn around the arguments advanced above about the benefits of being a re- 
search subject, and say that those benefits transform the subject into a true joint venturer who, 
having made a conscious decision to proceed despite (let us assume) awareness of possible if 
unquantifiable risks to offspring, should bear sole and absolute responsibility for whatever en- 
sues. Rarely, I think, will the incidental advantages of being a subject approach the overall gain 
of the researcher from the research. 
20s See discussion supra notes 140-46 and accompanying text. 
204 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 402A (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. A "Re- 
statement" is an authoritative source of general legal rules and principles, not tied to the law of 
any particular state. In the field of products liability, each state also has its own body ofjudicial 
precedent and statutes controlling commercial transactions. 
205 It has occasionally been suggested that strict liability would not apply to providers of 
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on whether the manufacturer or the seller of the product was at fault, but on 
whether the product itself was flawed, either in the manufacture of one item 
or in the design of the whole product line. One rationale for holding manu- 
facturers and sellers of defective products strictly liable, without regard to 
p r i ~ i t y , ~ O ~  foreseeability, or due care, is that they are able to distribute the 
cost of harm to innocent victims among all who benefit from the product by 
passing it along to customers. 
. . 
11. The duty to warn 
Liability may attach if the manufacturer does not take "available and rea- 
sonable steps to lessen or  eliminate the danger of even a significantly useful 
and desirable When the risk is not apparent, product users must 
be adequately and understandably warned of concealed dangers. In the case 
of pharmaceutical products, the manufacturer's duty to warn may be dis- 
charged by warnings to the physician, not the patient.208 Failure to warn of 
known dangers may be considered either negligence or a kind of defect in the 
product marketed. If the injured party can make a further showing that the 
failure to warn caused the injury - that proper warnings would have pre- 
vented the injury - damages may be recoverable from the seller of the 
Unlike most other products, such as an uncrashworthy car with an im- 
properly installed brake, drugs are often dangerous not because of a flaw in 
their design or careless manufacture, but because of their inherent toxicity for 
some people. Individuals react differently to drugs, and in some cases those 
reactions may be idiosyncratic, allergic, or  statistically so rare that no pre- 
marketing clinical trial of reasonable size or duration could discover the prob- 
lem. The occurrence of such injuries from a drug that otherwise performs its 
function does not make the drug ''unreasonably dangerous" in the language of 
the Restatement. Very often courts classify drugs as "Comment k" products, 
referring back to'a section of the Restatement that limits liability to true man- 
investigational drugs because usually the drugs are not "sold," i.e., transferred for value, to the 
consumer-subjects. At least one court rejected this contention summarily, pointing out that the 
manufacturer testing the drug was "in the business of selling drugs," and that its ultimate goal 
was the commercially profitable sale of the drug. Gaston v. Hunter, 588 P.2d 326, 338-39 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1978). This defense is particularly problematic because claims of strict liability sound in 
tort, not contract, and may be maintained by family members, employees, guests, or do~nees of an 
original purchaser. See infra note 206. The only other avenue would be statutory or common-law 
definition of the provision of investigational drugs as a "medical service," rather than distribu- 
tion of a product, as occurred with respect to processors and providers of blood and blood 
components. See, e.g., Doe v. Travenol Labs., Inc., 698 F. Supp. 780 (D. Minn. 1988) and authori- 
ties reviewed therein. 
206 "Privity" is a relationship between two legal actors that gives rise to legal con:iequences, 
such as seller-buyer. The concept originally limited the reach of strict liability to those consum- 
ers or users who had actually purchased the defective goods, as opposed to their friends or rela- 
tives. With some infrequent exceptions, it no longer is significant in the law of strict lii~bility. See 
RESTATEMENT 5 402A, cmt. I; William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 
(1966). 
207 Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 655 (1st Cir. 1981). 
208 E.g. Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 426 (2d Cir. 1969); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. 
Cornish, 370 F.2d 82,85 (8th Cir. 1966); Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89,97 (Utah 1991). 
209 See, e.g., Ezagui v. Dow Chem. Co., 598 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1979). 
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ufacturing flaws (such as impurities) and to a negligent failure to warn of 
those risks that were foreseeable at the time the product was distributed.210 
Under Comment k, if proper warnings are provided, no liability will at- 
tach to the seller if the product is "unavoidably unsafe." 
[Slome products . . . in the present state of human knowledge are 
quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary 
use. These are especially common in the field of drugs . . . . [This is] 
true in particular of many new or experimental drugs as to which, 
because of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical experi- 
ence, there can be no assurance of safety . . . . 
So, for example, if a child contracts polio from oral Sabin vaccine, the manu- 
facturer of that vaccine will be protected from liability if physicians received 
adequate warnings of that risk, because the legitimate public interest in the 
vaccine's availability outweighs the potential harmful effects of the 
product.21 
How does one judge the adequacy of a necessary warning? Like the 
analogous question of the adequacy of the information required to secure 
valid informed consent to a medical procedure,212 this question is intensely 
fact-dependent, but certain general principles apply. The warnings must be 
accurate in content and conveyed through an appropriate means and style of 
communication.213 The seller's duty to warn is limited to those risks which 
were reasonably foreseeable at the time that the drug was prescribed and 
used. There is no duty to warn of unknown, unforeseeable, or "possible" 
risks.214 However, if the seller realizes that its knowledge of potential adverse 
effects is limited, it should at least warn the consumer that the product is 
experimental and may present unknown hazards.215 
It has been argued that compliance with the FDA minimum requirements 
with respect to labelling ought to preclude claims that the warnings provided 
by a drug manufacturer are That concept has largely been 
2 1 0  Some courts have deemed all prescription drugs, by definition, in this category. See, e.g., 
Brown v. Superior Court San Francisco County, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988). Other courts believe 
that this assessment should be made on a case-by-case basis, considering the real value of and 
need for marketing of the drug. See, e.g., Hill v. Searle Labs., 884 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1989); 
Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 695 F. Supp. 432 (D. Minn. 1988); Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 342 
N.W.2d 37, 52 (Wis.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984). 
2 1 1  See, e.g., Givens v. Lederle, 556 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1977) (strict liability imposed for 
failure to warn pediatrician of risk of vaccine-induced polio); Niemiera v. Schneider, 555 A.2d 
11 12 (NJ. 1989) (sufficient to warn physician of risk of convulsions from DPT vaccine). Compare 
Davis v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968) (necessary to warn consumers of risk 
because drug administered in a mass vaccination program without the "learned intermediary" of 
the physician); accord Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.), cerl. h i e d ,  419 U.S. 
1096 (1974). 
2 1 2  See, e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972). 
2 1 3  See, e.g., Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1969) (unreasonable to fail 
to instruct "detail men" (sales representatives) who regularly saw prescribing physicians to warn 
them about drug risks). 
2 1 4  See, e.g., Doe v. Miles Labs., Inc., 927 F.2d 187, 194-95 (4th Cir. 1991); O'Hare v. Merck 
& Co., 381 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1967). 
2 1 5  Singer v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 461 F.2d 288 (7th Cir.), cerf. denied, 409 U.S. 878 (1972). 
216See, e.g., Chambers v. G.D. Searle & Co., 441 F. Supp. 377, 383 (D. Md. 1975), affd ,  567 
F.2d 269 (4th Cir. 1977) (per curiam). 
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rejected with respect to drug manufacturer liability, as it has been with re- 
spect to other tort claims based on conduct that met federal regulatory stan- 
dards, but which a community jury found unreasonably dangerous or 
negligent.2' 
iii. The duty to test 
Could a woman try to establish liability on the part of pharmaceutical 
manufacturers for their failure to research the specific effects on women of 
their products? 
The law offers two sources of responsibility for adequate testing of phar- 
maceutical products. First, federal law and Food and Drug Administration 
regulations require that a New Drug Application demonstrate "adequate, and 
well-controlled investigations, including clinical investigations . . . . "218 ,d 
"data demonstrating substantial evidence of effectiveness for the claimed in- 
d i c a t i o n ~ . " ~ ' ~  Second, it has long been recognized that the obligation to ade- 
quately test drugs before beginning to profit from their marketing can be 
grounded not only in the FDA's regulations, but in basic tort law principles. 
Beginning with the debacle of MER/29, the Richardson-Merrell anticholes- 
terol product that blinded many people because the company failed to pursue 
ocular abnormalities in animals,220 courts have penalized companies that do 
not conduct reasonable testing to determine the potential adverse reactions 
of their products, even if the testing involved was not required by the FDA.221 
The most stark cases, of course, have involved deliberate disregard of 
suggestive data, such as reports from clinicians or  in the medical' literature.222 
But even less compelling information, such as indications of a disparate oc- 
currence of an adverse effect in one particular subpopulation of foreseeable 
users, has been held sufficient to trigger an obligation to conduct further re- 
search "reasonably necessary to render the product safe for its users."223 
217 See, e.g., Salmon v. Parke, Davis & Co., 520 F.2d 1359, 1362, 1364 (4th Cir. 1975); Mazur 
v. Merck & Co., Inc., 742 F. Supp. 239 (E.D. Pa. 1990); In re Tetracycline Cases, 747 F. Supp 543, 
550 (W.D. Mo. 1989); Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189, 1197-98 (Alaska 1992); see also 
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S.Ct. 2608 (1992) (not all failure-to-warn and design defect 
claims against tobacco manufacturers preempted by federal statutes regulating cigaretteadvertis- 
ing and promotion); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.. 464 U.S. 238. 251 (1984) (federal nuclear 
safety regulations d o  not preempt state punitive damage awards). 
21e 21 U.S.C. 8 355(b)(l)(A) (1988). 
219 21 C.F.R. 8 314.50(d)(5)(v) (1993). 
220 Toole v. Richardson-Merrell. Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (Ct. App. 1967); 
221 Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832 (Utah 1984) (manufacturer negligent in 
not testing for teratogenic effects of injected progestational hormone); see also West v.Johnson & 
Johnson Prods., Inc., 220 Cal. Rptr. 437, 448 (Ct. App. 1985) (failure of tampon manufacturer to 
study the basic microbiology of the human vagina, to test for vaginal infections, and - of particu- 
lar interest - to include women with a history of vaginitis in the human studies), cert. h i e d .  479 
U.S. 824 (1986). 
222 See, e.g., Wooderson v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 681 P.2d 1038, 1063-64 (Kan. 1984), 
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 965 (1984) (sustaining award of punitive damages to victim of hemolytic 
uremic syndrome from oral contraceptive because of Ortho's failure to do  further animal re- 
search after independent researcher reported finding lesions in vessel walls of autopsied women 
'taking oral contraceptives). 
22sTaylor v. Wyeth Labs., 362 N.W.2d 293, 296-97 (Mich. App. 1984) (even itbsent any 
study, prudent manufacturer would have explored relationship between blood type and blood- 
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"Testing procedures should simulate as closely as possible the anticipated 
conditions of marketing and use of the If a product is intended 
for long-term use, for example, testing it in trials that are short-term and 
therefore fail to detect a side effect like retinal damage may well subject the 
manufacturer to liability.225 Courts have engaged in quite close scrutiny of 
the research design of clinical trials and criticized them not only for unreliable 
technique and sloppy data handling, but for their lack of relevance to actual 
market conditions.226 The FDA's own regulations, too, specifically state that 
"evidence is also required to support the dosage and administration section 
of the labeling, and modifications for specific subgroups (for example, pediat- 
rics, geriatrics, patients with renal and "if evidence is available to 
support the safety and effectiveness of the drug only in selected subgroups of 
the larger population with the disease . . . , the labeling shall describe the 
available evidence and state the limitations of the usefulness of the 
Thus it would seem that the conscious choice of drug companies to con- 
fine their pre-marketing clinical trials to a population quite unrepresentative 
of their ultimate consumers may invite even more litigation from women (or 
the elderly, or people of color) injured because of the research not done than 
could be expected from the decision to include women in trials and any con- 
sequential harm to their 0ffspring.2~~ 
This is a day of synthetic living, when to an ever-increasing extent 
our population is dependent upon mass producers for its food and 
drink, its cures and complexions, its apparel and gadgets. These no 
longer are natural or simple products but complex ones whose com- 
position and qualities are often secret: Such a dependent society 
must exact greater care than in more simple days and must require 
from manufacturers or  producers increased integrity and caution as 
the only protection of its safety and well-being. Purchasers cannot 
try out drugs to determine whether they kill or cure. . . . Where 
experiment or research is necessary to determine the presence or the 
degree of danger, the product must not be tried out on the public, 
nor must the public be expected to possess the facilities or the tech- 
clotting r iskin women taking oral contraceptives, once aware that women with type A blood 
experience disproportionate number of pulmonary embolisms). 
224 2 MARDEN G .  DIXON & FRANK C. WOODSIDE 111, DRUG PRODUCT LIABILITY 14-68 (1991). 
225 Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132, 140-41 (3d Cir. 1973). 
226See, e.g. ,  Tinnerholm v. Parke, Davis & Co., 285 F. Supp. 432, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). modi- 
fied on other grounds. 4 11 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1969) (upholding negligence claim of child catastrophi- 
cally injured by Quadrigen vaccine [subsequently withdrawn by the manufacturer] because 
vaccine "rushed to commercialization" without testing under market conditions). 
227 21 C.F.R. 5 314.50(5)(v) (1993). 
228 21 C.F.R. 5 201.57(c)(3)(i) (1993). 
229 I was pleased to find that Ellen Flannery, partner in Covington and Burling in Washing- 
ton, D.C., and a leader of the private pharmaceutical and medical device bar, concurs in this 
assessment of possible liability risk. "Drug manufacturers will likely find it increasingly difficult 
to prove that all-male studies of many drug products constitute state-of-the-art testing. There is 
growing recognition that the physiological differences between men and women make it scientifi- 
cally inadequate in many instances to conduct clinical tests o r  epidemiological studies using only 
male subjects." Ellen Flannery & Sanford N. Greenberg. Liability Exposure for Exclusion and 
Inclusion of Women as Subjects in Clinical Studies 9 (Mar. 11, 1993) (unpublished paper on file 
with author). 
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nical knowledge to learn for itself of inherent but latent 
In Jones v. Ortho Pharmaceutical CO$.,*~' Cinderella Jones attempted to 
hold the defendant manufacturer liable for its failure to conduct clinical trials 
that could have established whether its combination sequential birth control 
pill, Ortho Novum S Q  (since ordered off the market by the FDA), may have 
contributed to her development of cervical carcinoma in situ. Plaintiff relied 
on the theory that 21 C.F.R. $ 314.l(c)(12)(c) required Ortho to provide "ad- 
equate information" consisting of reports "of an adequate number of sub- 
jects, designed to record observations and permit evaluation of any and all 
discernable effects attributable to the drug . . . ." Essentially, her argument 
was that the company's failure to investigate this potential risk made it impos- 
sible for her to establish the causal link that would sustain her underlying 
claim for the cancer, and that therefore the burden to demonstrate the causal 
connection between the drug and her cancer should be considered presump- 
tively met, subject to rebuttal from the company.232 
The California intermediate appellate court dismissed Jones' ingenious 
strategy in short order, but it does have a certain logic. It is not realistic for 
injured individuals to undertake the kind of epidemiological or clinical re- 
search that is required to meet the heavy burden of proving the element, nec- 
essary to any recovery, of causation-in-fact: that it is more probable than not 
that the defendant's product was a substantial factor in the plaintiti's injury. 
Generally, drug manufacturers will be in a far better position to research the 
issue, at least in the negative sense of proving that few or no adverse experi- 
ence reports attributing a similar problem to the drug have been 
submitted.2s3 
Of the relatively few tort complaints that have attempted to hold drug 
companies responsible for harm on a theory of insufficient research, most fo- 
cus their pleadings on the manufacturer's failure to warn of risks that it would 
have known about, had proper clinical research been conducted, rather than 
on the failure to test per se. That is, the manufacturer lacks inform;+tion that 
could and should have been transmitted to the consumer (who in the case of 
prescription drugs is considered to be the prescribing physician) because it 
failed to conduct the research that would have developed that information. 
Regardless of the legal rubric, however, the point is that occasionally 
230Dalehite v. United states; 346 U.S. 15, 51-52 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
231 209 Cal. Rptr. 456 (Ct. App. 1985). 
232This concept was derived from an accepted principle of tort law, enunciated in Haft v. 
Lone Palm Hotel, 478 P.2d 465 (Cal. App. 1970): when there is a substantial probability that a 
defendant's negligence caused plaintiffs injury, and when that negligence makes it impossible as 
a practical matter for the plaintiff to prove causation (in Haft, it was the hotel's failur~.: to provide 
a lifeguard at its pool, which meant there were no witnesses to the plaintiffs decedent's drown- 
ing), it is appropriate to shift the burden of proof from the plaintiff to establish causation to the 
defendant to disprove it. 
233 Once a product is on the market and being prescribed, all testing can stop. To detect 
statistically rare outcomes, we rely entirely on the voluntary submission of Adverse Drug Experi- 
ence Reports from physicians. Unfortunately, clinicians have nothing to gain but altruistic satis- 
faction from submitting these reports. They have to lose, at minimum, the time spent shuffling 
paper. At worst, they, as well as the pharmaceutical houses, may be implicated in a medical 
negligence action. The post-marketing surveillance program has been notoriously lax and 
spotty. 
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drug companies face liability for not doing research. There is no obvious rea- 
son why this principle cannot be extended and applied to their failure to con- 
duct research in women, including pregnant women, that would have 
revealed the specific risks which ultimately appeared in the female population 
when the drug was approved and became generally available. 
The catch-22 of this element of the analysis is that it is only even theoreti- 
cally applicable to those rampant harms that will become visible despite a lack 
of well-organized data collection. Less common adverse outcomes due to the 
inadequately researched drug may well occur, but their increased incidence 
may not be detectable against background levels without the rigorous data 
collection and biostatistical analysis characteristic of a well-run clinical trial. 
And even if highly persuasive evidence of adverse outcomes does emerge, it 
will still be difficult to establish the kind of causal link between the drug and 
the event necessary for legal action. As Cinderella Jones tried to argue, no 
one but the company itself has the resources and the interest to conduct post- 
marketing research on an approved product, and the company is hardly likely 
to invest in epidemiological or  controlled studies that may reveal a genuine 
systematic problem, if instead it can dismiss whatever evidence has emerged 
as "anecdotal," "meaningless coincidental clusters," and the like. 
The next hurdle would be to demonstrate that had the research been 
done and the information developed, this particular plaintiff (or plaintiff's 
physician) would have decided not to use the drug, and thereby been spared 
the harm. Obviously, if people had received the information about a risk, but 
still would have used the medication, the cause of their injury is not the com- 
pany's failure to test or  to warn. 
Convincing a court to impose liability for failure to test drugs in pregna- 
ble and pregnant women will be a challenge and will be rare. My point here is 
to open up discussion of alternative sources of liability that research sponsors 
seem disinclined to consider. 
(b) Another basis for researcher liability: gender discrimination 
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution 
require that governmental actors refrain from denying "equal protection of 
the laws" to individuals because of their membership in what has been 
dubbed a "protected class" -usually an unchosen and immutable status that 
is legally irrelevant, such as race, ethnicity, or gender.*34 In addition, gender 
discrimination in the private sector (with some overlap in the public sector) is 
234 The Supreme Court did not establish this proposition with respect to gender until 1971. 
See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Five years later, it formulated the test for legitimate gov- 
ernment differentiation on the basis of gender: "[C]lassifications by gender must serve important 
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of those objec- 
tives." Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). More recently, the test was reformulated to 
require "exceedingly persuasive justification" for the differentiation. Mississippi Univ. for Wo- 
men v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982). But see Personnel Admin. Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 
(1979) (if government action gender-neutral on its face, despite discriminatory results of its ap- 
plication, must demonstrate that discrimination is intentional to find Constitutional violation). 
Many state constitutions also include Equal Protection provisions that may be interpreted 
more broadly than the federal clause. See, e.g., People v. Davis, 537 N.Y.S.2d 430, 434 (Sup. Ct. 
1988). 
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prohibited, or perhaps more accurately put, regulated by federal, state, and 
local enactments such as Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 
U.S.C. 5 2000e. In addition, under the federal statute, "women affected by 
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same 
for all employment-related purposes . . . as other persons not so afi.:cted but 
similar in their ability or inability to work . . . ."235 
Could the refusal to include women and/or pregnant women in a proto- 
col be considered illegal discrimination? In the rare circumstance that sub- 
jects are paid and their participation in research can be fairly characterized as 
a form of employment,236 it almost certainly could, and that protection would 
extend to pregnant women.237 
With respect to protocols sponsored and conducted by governmental en- 
tities, the answer is probably also yes, both under the federal Equal Protection 
Clause and under most state antidiscrimination statutes which typic;.llly apply 
to discrimination not only in employment but in "places of public accommo- 
dation" - settings where goods or services are generally provided to the 
public on a first-come, first-served basis.238 Not only clinics and hospitals, 
but private doctors and dentists, have been so categorized and found guilty of 
discrimination for denying health care to patients on the basis of a protected 
status.23g While federal funding or federal regulation do not always suffice to 
235 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e(k) (1978). Outside the realm of Title VII, however, some courts have 
found that differential treatment of women because of their capacity to become pregnant is not an 
impermissible gender-based classification. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 
(1981) (upholding statutory rape statute applicable only to males because of state interest in 
limiting illegitimate pregnancies); Toomey v. Clark, 876 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1989) (no violation 
of Equal Protection by state juvenile court's consideration of defendant's pregnancy in decision 
to waive jurisdiction and permit prosecution as an adult); United States v. Flores, 540 F.2d 432, 
438 (9th Cir. 1976) (court may consider pregnancy in sentencing). It may be worthy of note that 
all these decisions involve criminal law and prosecution. 
If we are talking about a nonpublic entity not subject to Constitutional standards, then 
only "employers" according to the statutory definition -employing more than a certain number 
of people, for example - would be covered. 
237 Pregnancy discrimination in employment may also be covered by state anti-discrimina- 
tion statutes. See, e.g., New York City Transit Auth. v. State Div. of Human Rights. 577 N.E.2d 40 
(N.Y. 1991). Outside the employment context, discrimination based on pregnancy may not be 
deemed gender discrimination that violates the Equal Protection clause. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 
U.S. 484, 497 n.20 (1974) (permitting insurance system to distinguish between pregliant women 
and "nonpregnant persons"). Within the employment arena, courts must accept as defenses that 
may defeat discrimination claims, "bona fide occupational qualification" and "business neces- 
sity." Without elaborating on these complex legal doctrines, both permit differential treatment 
of men and women in the workplace upon a convincing argument that it is "necessary." E.g., 
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977). 
238 E.g. ,  N.Y. EXEC. LAW 5 296(2)(a) (McKinney 1993): 
It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, 
proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accom- 
modation . . . because of the . . . sex . . . of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, 
withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, fitcilities. 
or privileges thereof. . . . 
Remarkably, the public accommodations provision of the federal civil rights law, 42 U.S.C. 
5 2000a. does not apply to discrimination on the basis of gender. Seidenberg v. McSorley's Old 
Ale House, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 1253 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). 
239 The most common recent context of these decisions has been the refusal of some health- 
care providers to treat people with HIV infection. See, e.g., Doe v.Jamaica Hosp.. N.Y.L.J., May 6, 
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convert a private entity into a "state actor" for equal protection purposes,240 
or to subject a state or local agency to federal anti-discrimination statutes,241 
a substantial share of the health science research dollar is derived directly 
from taxpayer and thus legal (as well as moral) prohibitions on gen- 
der discrimination ought to apply. Research supported by NIH and 
ADAMHA contracts should have to adhere to Constitutional and statutory 
standards.243 But even in trials conducted in the private sector, in settings 
that clearly are neither places of public accommodation nor employment, 
where the choice of excluding potentially pregnable women is the result of 
the FDA and DHHS restrictions on conducting research with women of child- 
bearing potential and/or pregnant women, arguably both those policies and 
the resulting . 
- 
exclusion from trial may be subject to an Equal Protection clause 
attack. 
In that situation, even were it conceded that governmental policy may 
validly seek to protect the reproductive capacity of research subjects and/or 
the welfare of their potential offspring, exclusion only of women would fail 
the Craig v. Boren test244 of substantial relationship between means and ends. 
Women and men are similarly situated, in the language of the law, with re- 
spect to their genetic contribution to their offspring. As for pregnant women 
in a trial that may be teratogenic or fetotoxic, unless the research sponsor or 
the government can show that male subjects and their offspring are immune 
to any adverse effects of equal gravity of the intervention on trial - which 
hardly seems possible with the limited data now available - the equal protec- 
1991, at 27 (alleged exclusion of HIV-infected pregnant woman from'hospita19s high-risk prena- 
tal care unit could violate public accommodation section of New York Human Rights Law); Estate 
of Campanella v. Hurwitz, New York City Comm'n on Hum. Rights, July 31, 1991 (private den- 
tist's office a place of public accommodation under New York City Human Rights Law). But see In 
re Sattler, 580 N.Y.S.2d 35 (App. Div.), appeal denied, 610 N.E.2d 388 (N.Y. 1992) ("one-chair" 
dental practice not a place of public accommodation under New York City Human Rights Law). 
The  clear definition of public accommodation in the Americans with Disabilities Act, may, ironi- 
cally, support a less expansive interpretation of the less clear provisions of some gender discrimi- 
nation laws. 42 U.S.C. 5 12181(7)(F) (Supp. I11 1991). 
While a few state statutes d o  expressly state that places of public accommodation may serve 
only men or  only women if the place "is in its nature reasonably restricted exclusively to individu- 
als of one sex." e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 5 10:5-12(f) (West 1992). it is hard to see how research 
protocols could meet that standard. The  controversy over gender discrimination in private clubs 
has also spawned the concept of =place of apparent public accommodation that is deemed "dis- 
tinctly private" and therefore exempt from the statute. See, e.g., United States Power Squadrons 
v. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 452 N.E.2d 1192, 1204 (N.Y. 1983). But few settings that 
would be conducting a research protocol would qualify as anything like a private club. 
240 See, e.g., Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840-42 (1982); Stanturf v. Sipes, 224 F. 
Supp. 883, 890 (W.D. Mo. 1963). affd, 335 F.2d 224 (8th Cir. 1964). cert. denied, 379 U.S. 977 
(1965). 
241 Note that the federal statute, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, does not prohibit gender 
discrimination in programs and activities receiving federal financial assistance. 42 U.S.C. 
5 2000d (1988). 
242 Of the almost $10 billion devoted to health sciences research and development in the 
U.S. in fiscal year 1991, 78% was dispensed by the federal agencies NIH and ADAMHA (Alcohol, 
Drug Abuse, and Mental Health ~dministrat ion) .  TWO-thirds of that sum was contracted out to 
private academic institutions. FUNDING HEALTH SCIENCES RESEARCH, supra note 15 at 35, 77, 79. 
243 Compare West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988) (prison doctors acting under contract to care 
for inmates are state actors). 
244 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); see supra note'234 for a description of the test. 
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tion claim must stand.245 
As I will discuss later with respect to the limitations of the current NIH 
antidiscrimination policy now codified in the NIH Revitalization there 
is a significant risk that a male-dominated judicial system will accept too un- 
skeptically the "scientific" rationale for exclusion of women from research, 
especially in view of judges' characteristic deference to the "professional 
judgment" of physicians and scientists.247 It will be more difficult, however, 
to support research subject discrimination (especially when subjects may be 
considered employees) on the "fear of liability" rationale in light of the 
Supreme Court's almost wholesale rejection of that rationale in the 1991 John- 
son Controls decision.248 
245 It should also be noted that many state courts have interpreted their own constitutions to 
offer greater protection of individual liberty than the United States Constitution offers in view of 
the present federal bench. See, e.g., Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 
799 (Cal. 1981) (California Constitution prohibits Medi-Cal exclusion of reimbursement for 
abortions); In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1192-93 (Fla. 1989) (Florida Constitution prohibits re- 
quirement of parental consent to minor's abortion); Doe v. Director of Dep't of Social Sews., 468 
N.W.2d 862, 869 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (Michigan Constitution prohibits Medicaid exclusion of 
coverage for abortions not necessary to save mother's life), rev'd, 487 N.W.2d 166 (1992). 
246 National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C.A. 8 201 (West Supp. 
1993); see tnfra text accompanying note 276. 
247 See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982) (decisions about adequacy of 
care of developmentally disabled in state institutions "presumptively valid if made by a profes- 
sional"); Parham u. J. R. ,  442 U.S. 584 (1979) (no need for due process protections for children 
committed to mental hospitals by their parents or by the State, since admission decision made by 
team of mental health professionals). 
Z48 Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers of Am., v. Johnson 
Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 207 (1991). Because of its significance in this area, and because the 
issuance of this decision from this Supreme Court was frankly amazing to most opponents of 
gender bias, Johnson Controls merits some extended discussion. 
The management policy challenged was quite typical of the fetal protection policies adopted 
by dozens of major American corporate employers. See ELAINE DRAPER, ISKY BUSINESS 200 n.13 
(1991) (study of 198 large chemical and electronic companies in Massachusetts found nearly one 
in five - 37 companies - restricted women's work options on the ground of potential fetal risk, 
while ignoring male reproductive hazards). Johnson Controls had never hired women on its 
line before the Civil Rights Act of-1964 outlawed patent sex discrimination. Initially, 
its policy was to inform women workers about the known risks of lead exposure during pregnancy 
and to tell parents (of both genders) that they were responsible for the health of their unborn 
children. In 1982, it revamped its policy to mandate exclusion of all fertile females from jobs that 
would expose them to certain levels of lead. As a result, at least one female worker was sterilized. 
She, along with a 50 year-old divorced female employee who had been involuntarily transferred 
to a lower-paying job, and a male employee who was denied an unpaid leave of absence prior to 
becoming a father, charged that Johnson Controls had violated Title VII. 499 U.S. at 192. 
The Supreme Court found this policy biased against women. Id. at 199-00. To justify "fa- 
cial" discrimination - a policy that on its face treats women differently from similarly situated 
men - an employer must show a "bona fide occupational qualification, reasonably necessary to 
the normal operation of the business or enterprise (BFOQ)." Id. at 200-03. While injury to a 
potential fetus is a "deep social concern," the safety of an employee's offspring is not an essential 
component of that employee's ability to do the job: pregnant women have the s h e  skills and 
aptitudes for the Johnson Controls jobs as nonpregnant employees. "Decisions about the wel- 
fare of future children must be left to the parents who conceive, bear, support and raise them ' 
rather than to the employers who hire those parents." Id. at 206. 
The Court was not unmindful of the liability concerns that had been raised'by ~ohnson  as a 
defense. Id. at 208-09. Acknowledging the risk of lawsuits for prenatal injury, the Court majority 
stated that employers who adhere-to OSHA standards (provide blood tests, proper ventilation, 
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It is important to stress that my argument does not depend on the notion 
of a "right" to become a research subject. However, even though no one has 
a "right" to'hold a particular job or to live in a particular apartment or  to 
attend a particular school, discrimination in employment, housing and educa- 
tion against members of protected groups still can be prohibited. An individ- 
ual may have no "right" to sit as a juror in a particular case, yet have a right 
not to be excluded from the venire.249 An individual woman may not be able 
to insist on access to a particular protocol, but that does not legitimize the 
wholesale exclusion of all women. The claim here would be very similar to 
the denial of an "opportunity to compete."250 
Would a pregnant woman also be able to utilize these anti-discrimination 
statutes? Well, on the federal level, the policy embodied in the Pregnancy 
Discrimination which rejected the Supreme Court's absurd dichotomi- 
zation of pregnant women and nonpregnant people in Geduldig v. A i e l 1 0 , ~ ~ ~  
strongly supports an affirmative conclusion. While the Pregnancy Discrimina- 
tion Act is limited to protection of employment rights, its analysis ought to 
hold in this context. Any other stance inevitably reduces pregnant women to 
the status of "fetal container."259 State statutes also offer protection against 
safety equipment, etc.) should face no liability. Id. In concurrence, Justice White noted that 
OSHA compliance is not always a defense to tort liability; that parents can't waive their children's 
claims and that parental negligence can't be imputed to ch i l i en ;  and that strict liability, rather 
than negligence, might in fact become the basis for successful legal action in some instances. Id. 
at 213-14. Nonetheless, he did not deem this possibility of future liability a sufficient counter- 
weight to the protected interest of women in equal treatment, and the majority responded that 
the incremental cost of hiring women was not so high as to "threaten survival of the employer's 
business." Id. at 210-1 1. 
As I try to show here, given the sources of potential liability that remain even if researchers 
continue to exclude women subjects, the incremental cost of the necessary insurance o r  self-insur- 
ance likewise does not "threaten survival" of the research enterprise. 
For a less rosy view ofJohnson Controls, and a persuasive argument that it represents a "lim- 
ited" and perhaps "short-lived" victory for women, see Jennifer Morton, Comment, Pregnancy in 
the Workplace - Sex-Specific Fetal Protection Policies - U.A. CV. v.  Johmon Controls, Inc. - A Victoty for 
Women?, 59 TENN. L. REV. 617,634 &passim (1992) (noting that several concurringJustices would 
- - 
uphold sex-specific fetal protection policy based on emp~byer9s concern for potential fetus, and/ 
o r  (in dicta) extra costs associated with employing women, and Justice Marshall's replacement by 
Justice Thomas subsequent to this decision). 
249 See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex ref. T.B., 1994 WL 132232 (Apr. 19, 1994); Taylor v. Louisiana, 
419 U.S. 522 (1973); Strauder v. West Virginia. 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879); see alro Batson v. Ken- 
tucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986); U.S. v. DeGross, 913 F.2d 1417, 1420-23 (9th Cir. 1990). 
250 Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford v. F.C.C., 876 F.2d 902,917 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see also 
Carol Levine, Has AIDS Changed the Ethics of Human Subjech Research?, 16 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 
167, 172 (1988): 
[I]f there is a right to be a research subject, and again that is arguable, it is not a general 
right to enter whatever trial one may choose but the right to be offered an equal oppor- 
tunity to be considered for all trials that are appropriate, given one's medical condition 
and other scientifically relevant characteristics. 
My partial rejection of Levine's analysis in this piece stems from my inability to muster much 
confidence in the use of terms such as "appropriate" and "scientifically relevant." 
251 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e(k) (1978). 
252 417 U.S. 484 (1974). Geduldig's "continuing vitality" has recently been reaffirmed by the 
Court. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753, 760 n.3 (1993). 
253 George Annas. Protecting the Liberty of Pregnant Patienb. 316 NEW E N C .  J. MED. 1213, 1214 
(1987). For full development of this contention see Merton, Ethical Obstacles, supra note 79. 
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policy or  action that "singles out pregnant women for [different] treatment 
. . . solely because they are ~ r e g n a n t . " 2 ~ ~  
(c) Institutional Review Board Liability for failure to ensure "equitable 
selection of subjects" 
Another legal avenue for challenging the exclusion of women is more 
indirect. Since the mid-seventies, and in some jurisdictions 
state256 law requires that virtually human subjects research be con- 
ducted only after protocol review and approval by entities called institutional 
review boards ("IRBs"), which must include a few non-scientists and commu- 
nity representatives who are independent of the entity conducting the re- 
search.258 The responsibilities of these boards include assuring the informed 
consent of subjects and a reasonable risk-benefit ratio of potential harm to 
subjects and the potential value of the research; and, most germane to the 
present discussion, enforcing the federal regulatory and general ethical man- 
date for the equitable selection of subjects.259 
254 Elaine W. v. Joint Diseases North General Hosp., Inc., 613 N.E.2d 523, 525 (N.Y. 1993). 
255 42 U.S.C. 1 2891-3 (1974). 
256See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW 8 2444 (Consol. 1987) (Protection of Human Subjects). 
This statute largely tracks the National Research Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 852 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), but it does not explicitly require the 
"human research review committees" it mandates to seek equitable selection of subjects. 
25' Initially the National Research Act mandate applied not only to research done with fed- 
eral funds but to all research conducted at or sponsored by an institution receiving federal funds. 
45 C.F.R. 5 46.101(a) (1977). The original regulations of the Secretary of the Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare specifically limited the requirement of IRB review to "activities 
supported under grants or contracts from DHEW." 45 C.F.R. 5 46.102(a) (1977). The require- 
ment of IRB review now applies to all research "conducted, supported, or otherwise subject to 
regulation by any federal department or agency" that has adopted the new Federal Policy for the 
Protection of Human Subjects. 56 Fed. Reg. 28,002, 28,012 (1991). In practice, most institu- 
tions that receive any federal funds (and most research institutions do) review all protocols 
through the same process and generally do not differentiate those that are federally funded. 
Note, however, that the New York state law, for example, applies to all research condltcted in the 
state, regardless of funding source. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW 8 2444 (Consol. 1987). 
258See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. 8 46.107(b) (1992). Seegenerally ROBERT A. GREENWALD ET AL., HUMAN 
SUBJECTS RESEARCH: A HANDBOOK FOR INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS (1982); LEVINE, ETHICS 
AND REGULATION, supra note 22, at 321-28. Interestingly enough. the original flat requirement 
that an IRB could not consist entirely of one gender has been revised to mandate merely "every 
nondiscriminatory effort to ensure" that no IRB consists entirely of men or women. See 45 C.F.R. 
8 46.107 (1992). From the perspective of the role IRBs could play in changing exclusionary 
research practice, this seems an unfortunate and unnecessary regression. 
259 Federal regulations have always required IRBs to determine that "selection of subjects is 
equitable," taking into account the purposes of the research and the setting in which it will be 
conducted. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. 8 46.1 1 l(a)(3) (1992). A provision added to section 4ti.111 of the 
Federal Policy for the Autection of Human Subjects, "Criteria for the Approval of Researcl~," requires 
IRBs to be "particularly cognizant of the special problems of research involving vulnerable popu- 
lations, such as children, prisoners, pregnant women, mentally disabled persons, or economically 
or educationally disadvantaged pe;sons" and to ensure additional safeguards to protect the 
rights and welfare of these "subjects . . . likely to be vulnerable to coercion or undue influence." 
See also the parallel provision of the Food and Drug Administration at 56 Fed. Keg. 28.029 
(1991). 
The good news is that this new provision suggests that pregnant women can be research 
subjects; the bad news is that it defines them as inherently vulnerable, requiring special protec- 
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It is not impossible to imagine an excluded potential subject seeking re- 
dress not only from the researcher (who may be shielded from liability on 
various grounds), but also from the IRB members. "IRB members may be 
personally liable to subjects and investigators for 'malpractice' or negligence 
in discharging their IRB functions."260 While most lawsuits against IRBs, 
and there have not been many, have involved challenges to their approval of 
inclusion of vulnerable subjects,261 that is merely an artifact. In theory there is 
no reason why violation of their legal duty to ensure the equitable selection of 
subjects by approving unjustified exclusionary criteria would not be just as 
actionable. 
The greatest hurdle for a plaintiff would be proving the indispensable 
element of "causation" - that is, but for the IRB's failure to require more 
inclusive subject selection, the plaintiff would have entered the protocol and 
as a result, benefited either from the innovation on trial or  merely from the 
superior care and monitoring that subject status may Courts might 
be quite reluctant to find foreseeable benefit from the innovation itself - 
after all, the myth of the null hypothesis endures.263 They would be harder- 
pressed, however, to reject as a matter of law the claim that a plaintiff had lost 
something of value when access to a trial was denied because the IRB permit- 
ted unjustified exclusionary criteria to stand. Even if the would-be subject 
could not establish that she definitely would have been among the chosen, the 
law increasingly recognizes the concept of "loss of a chance"264 as compensa- 
ble harm. Plaintiffs who cannot show that they definitely would have recov- 
ered from cancer if diagnosed earlier, for example, can still recover for loss of 
a significant chance of remission from the physician who negligently missed 
the diagnosis.265 
tions from and raising special "problems" for researchers. This is not the place, but the implica- 
tions and premises of this provision warrant more examination. 
260 NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BE- 
HAVIORAL RESEARCH, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: I TITUT~ONAL REVIEW BOARDS 82 (1978); 
see alro GREENWALD ET AL., supra note 258, at 25. For a different view, see Angela R. Holder, 
Liability and the IRB Member: The &gal aspects, IRB: REV. HUM. SUBJECTS RES., June-July 1979, at 7. 
261 Purcell v. Zimbelman, 500 P.2d 335 (Ariz. 1972); Nielsen v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 
Civ. NO. 665-049 (Sup. Ct. Cal. Cty. of San Francisco, Sept. 1 I ,  1973); Bailey v. Mandel, Civ. No. 
K-74-110 (D.C. M.D. 1974); seeaho Mason v. Institutional Review Bd. for Human Research, Medi- 
cal Univ. of S.C., 953 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1992) (seeking injunctive relief to compel IRB to con- 
tinue terminated protocol); Head v. Colloton, 331 N.W.2d 870 (Iowa 1983) (seeking injunctive 
relief to compel amendment of a protocol, but not with regard to selection of subjects). Re- 
cently, a Quebec court held not only the investigator and the hospital, but the hospital's research 
committee (the functional equivalent of an IRB) responsible for the death of a research subject 
due to cardiac arrest after fluorescein angiography. Weiss v. Solomon, R.J.Q. 731 (1989). The  
court suggested that the Research Committee had failed, among other things, to insist on ade- 
quate screening of subjects for the kind of cardiomyopathy that made this subject especially at 
risk for this procedure. 
262 See John Robertson, The Law of Institutional Review Boards, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 484, 531 
(1978). 
263 See supra note 28. 
264 See discussion supra notes 249-50 and accompanying text. See generally, Joseph H. King, 
Causation. Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injuty Tor& Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Con- 
sequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353 (1981); John D. Hodson, Annotation, Medical Malpractice: Loss of 
Chance Causality. 54 A.L.R.4th 10 (1987 and Supp. 1990). 
265 See, e.g., Evers v. Dollinger, 471 A.2d 405 (N.J. 1984); Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 
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111. A PROPOSAL FOR FULL PARTICIPATION IN RESEARCH BY 
ALL PEOPLE, INCLUDING THE PREGNABLE AND THE 
PREGNANT 
The policy I propose will no doubt be criticized on many fronts, but it 
does have the virtue of simplicity. I propose that all research protocols include 
women, without any presumptive exclusion for women of child-bearing capacity, on pre- 
cisely the same terms that they include men; that is, that eligibility criteria define 
subjects as people, not by their gender. Women may not be excluded or ter- 
minated from a study on the basis of their hormonal status (as a result of 
menstrual cycle or hormonal therapy) or their reproductive status, unless the 
hormonal fluctuations and potentially reproductive behavior of the male sub- 
jects is monitored to the same degree. Presumably, with regard to trials of 
therapies for health problems that seem to affect only men, such as testicular 
cancer, women will generally not qualify because they will not fulfill the gen- 
der-neutral eligibility criterion of being at risk for the relevant condition. Be- 
cause of the need to make a clean break with prior exclusionary practices, 
however, it is important to break the habit of reflexively categorizing subjects 
by gender. If a chromosomal female with the requisite condition ever does 
appear, her anomalous gender identity should not be a barrier to her 
participation. 
The first challenge is to change the discriminatory rules; the riext is to 
strive for substantive rather than merely formal equality. It is at that next 
level that one would decree outcomes: the participation of women subjects in 
proportion to their number in the relevant population and provisio~~ of child 
care and other facilities needed to achieve that goal. T o  compensate for past 
injustice, gender-specific and gender-comparative research should receive 
preferential support. 
Uniformly, protocol design should include systematic analyses of gender 
as a variable.266 This should be the case not only when gender differences 
have already been recognized or are anticipated, for example research on 
drugs metabolized by pathways influenced by sex steroid hormones. We can- 
not assume that the questions that would detect such patterns have been 
asked and answered.267 The development of every new drug ought to re- 
quire pharmacokinetic screening and pharmacodynamic studies in women 
664 P.2d 474 (Wash. 1983); see ako  Falcon v. Memorial Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44 (Mich. 1990) and 
authorities cited therein; Perez v. Las Vegas Medical Ctr., 805 P.2d 589 (Nev. 1991). Aware of 
the besieged sense of many clinicians, I feel obliged to note that these decisions do not stand for 
the proposition that missing a diagnosis automatically amounts to malpractice. The doctor who 
merely makes a mistake is nit  liable - only the doctor whose mistake is attributable to an unex- 
cused departure from a reasonable standard of professional care. 
266 See Jean Hamilton, Avoiding Methodological and Policy-Making Biases in Gender-Related Health 
Research, in U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PUB. NO. (PHS) 88-50206, WOMEN'S HEALTH: 
REPORT OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE TASK FORCE ON WOMEN'S HEALTH ISSUES IV-54, IV-57-60 
(1987). 
267 See Eve K .  Nichols, Expanding Access to Investigational Therapies for HIV Infection and AIDS, 
1991 INST. OF MED. 69-7 1 (1991). Unfortunately, the FDA's Proposed Guideline, while acknowledg- 
ing this problem, is guilty of just this fallacy. See Proposed FDA Guideline, supra note 97, at 
39,410 (emphasizing pharmacokinetic rather than pharmacodynamic by-gender analyses because 
"the number of documented gender-related pharmacodynamic differences of clinical conse- 
quence is at this time small"). 
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and men, and reproductive studies in female and male animals that can deter- 
mine the incidence of adverse reproductive outcomes through both parents. 
This policy goes far beyond current federal regulations, and the pro- 
posed revision of the FDA Guidelines. The latter should be redrafted to raise 
identical concerns about the participation of both male and female subjects of 
reproductive potential, and to allow women to decide for themselves, as men 
do, about the relative risks and benefits of participation in Phase I or  early 
Phase I1 trials. Food and Drug Administration regulations require research- 
ers to inform subjects "when appropriate" that the research may involve 
"risks to the subject (or to the embryo or fetus, if the subject is or  may be- 
come pregnant) which are currently u n f o r e ~ e e a b l e . " ~ ~ ~  This section should 
be amended to require researchers also to inform male subjects who are or 
may become involved in reproductive activity of the state of knowledge about 
male-transmitted birth defects and/or effects on male germ cells.269 In many 
cases the current knowledge will be nil; nothing will be known because the 
intervention has not been tested on this parameter. Subjects should be told 
this, and told also that while instances of adverse reproductive effect for or  
through the male parent have occurred, too little is yet known to permit quan- 
tification of the risk. If women are required to use contraception, then so 
should men.270 
The most efficient method of changing researcher behavior would be to 
amend the substantive provisions of FDA regulations to mandate complete 
testing of new drugs in relevant populations, specifically women of child-bear- 
ing age, pregnant women, and nursing women.27' At a minimum, the FDA 
ought to ensure that drug labels state that evidence of both safety and efficacy 
is lacking for these populations whenever that is the case, and that nothing is 
known about reproductive hazards for men, which will almost invariably be 
the case. 
The only major change in the Federal Policy for the Protection of Human 
Subjects would be in the section on equitable selection of subjects, Section 
. I l l .  "Pregnant women" should either be removed from the category of 
"vulnerable populations" or replaced by "men and women actively engaged 
in reproduction." T o  amplify the definition of "equitable," helpful language 
may be borrowed from a fine consensus document, the product of a working 
group on principles and policies for clinical research on HIV-infection, which 
concluded that: 
21 C.F.R. 5 50.25(b)(I) (1988). 
269 On December 15, 1992, a coalition of  the HIV Law Project o f  the AIDS Service Center o f  
Lower Manhattan, the National Organization for Women Legal Defense and Education Fund, the 
AIDS Project o f  the American Civil Liberties Union, and other AIDS-activist organizations peti- 
tioned the FDA for just such amendments, pursuant to 21 C.F.R. 5 10.30. See Citizen Petition 
(Dec. 15, 1992) (petition sent to FDA, on file with author). The FDA's response - the Proposed 
FDA Guideline - is completely inadequate in this regard. See discussion supra notes 118-28 and 
accompanying text. 
270 On the need for careful monitoring of male compliance with such restrictions, see inzra 
note 287. 
27' A concomita~i; of  this change would be for FDA regulations to mandate completion o f  
animal reproduction studies prior to human testing. See Citizen Petition, supra note 269, at 6-7; 
supra note 107-08 and accompanying text. 
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No group should be categorically excluded, on the basis of age, gen- 
der, mental status, place of residence or  incarceration, or other so- 
cial or economic characteristic from access to clinical trials or  other 
mechanisms of access to experimental therapies. Special eBorts 
should be made to reach out to previously excluded populations. 
It is inequitable and discriminatory to exclude women, inclutling 
women of reproductive age, from clinical trials.272 
The last component of federal regulations that would need revision is 
Subpart D. Here, the best option would be to delete Section 46.207, the pro- 
vision dealing with "Activities directed toward pregnant women as subjects." 
Its language is ambiguous and confusing, the subsection requiring paternal 
consent is surely unconstitutional even under present standards, and given 
that about all it permits is activity intended to "meet the health neecfs of the 
mother," depending on one's view of the purposes of clinical research, either 
it is tautological or  it describes a null set.273 The bulk of the other provisions 
of Subpart B, which govern fetal research, suffer from various infirmities and 
illogicalities that ought to be corrected, but do not in themselves pose any 
particular barrier to women's participation in protocols. 
IV. HOW THIS COULD HAPPEN: STRATEGIES TOWARD CHANGE 
The problem defined in this paper has begun to receive some attention 
from researchers and others. Several different efforts are underway to move 
the biomedical community toward a more equitable and, for women, more 
useful model of clinical research. None of these efforts is incompatible with 
the others; people concerned with this issue could profitably pursue them all. 
I will identify some of the advantages and disadvantages that each approach 
presents. 
1. Federal legislation 
The American way to fix most problems is to pass a law. In this area, that 
impulse has found expression in proposed national legislation. In July 1990, 
in the wake of substantial publicity about a Government Accounting Office 
report on NIH's limited success in enforcing its own the Women's 
272 Carol Levine et al., Building a New Consemus: Ethical Principles and Policiesfor Clinicizl Research 
on HIV/AIDS, IRB: REV. HUM. SUBJECTS R~s.,Jan.-Apr. 1991, at 1, 14, 16. The  working group 
that developed this consensus document included prominent clinical AIDS researchers and 
ethicists, as well as representatives of potential subject populations. Their recommend~tions de- 
part from mine in continuing to treat pregnant women as different from men engaged in repro- 
ductive activity, although they do  require that pregnant women be permitted access to Phase II/ 
111 trials o r  treatment INDs if a drug is potentially life-saving, and would create a rebuttable 
presumption that pregnant women are eligible for all trials. See id. at 16. While the context of 
this report is AIDS research, the merit of its analysis is not confined to that. 
273 See supra notes 13 1-32 and accompanying text. 
274 In 1986, NIH and ADAMHA promulgated the Policy Concerning Inclusion of Women in Study 
Populations. NIH, POLICY CONCERNING I N C L U ~ O N  OF WOMEN IN STUDY POPULATIONS (1991) (here- 
inafter NIH POLICY). "Clinical research findings should be of benefit to all persons at r.isk of the 
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Health Equity Act, a package of 22 bills and "sense of Congress" resolutions 
designed to guarantee women greater equity in medical research, health care 
and preventive services, was introduced by the co-chairs of the Congressional 
Caucus for Women's Issues, Representatives Patricia Schroeder and Olympia 
Snowe. Subjects ranged from mandated appropriations for research aimed at 
breast cancer, ovarian cancer, and female HIV-infection to reimbursement for 
mammograms and bone mass measurement. 
One bill in particular, the Clinical Trials Fairness Act, targeted the inclu- 
sion of women in research protocols, essentially by codifying-the NIH policy 
that the composition of the study population must be considered when deter- 
mining the scientific merit of a research proposal. The bill was reintroduced 
in the 102d Congress (February 1991) and actually was passed by both the 
House and Senate as part of the NIH Reauthorization Act, only to be vetoed 
by then-President In 1993, another version of this appropriations 
legislation finally became law: the NIH Revitalization Act of 1993.276 
There is much that is positive in the NIH Revitalization Act. It directs the 
Director of the National ~nstitutes for Health to ensure that women (and 
members of racial and ethnic minority groups) are included as subjects in 
each research project conducted or supported by the National Institutes of 
Health.277 It requires the creation of Clinical Research Equity Subcommit- 
tees, including members with expertise in health conditions of particular rele- 
vance to women, within each of the national research institutes. But the bill 
leaves a great deal to be desired from the standpoint of rectifying the historic 
imbalance in access to clinical research because of its broad and vague excep- 
tions. None of the bill's provisions apply if the inclusion of women in a re- 
disease, regardless of gender." Id. at 1. The Policy requires evaluation of the gender composition 
of each study proposed for funding, and a statement of reasons for excluding members of one 
gender or for "a disproportionate representation" of one gender. Gender representation should 
be "appropriate to the known incidence/prevalence of the disease or condition being studied." 
and reasons for exclusion of one gender mirst be "well explained and justified." The justification 
must be "compelling," but it may consist of "a strong scientific rationale" or "a need to protect 
the health of the subjects." Id. 
A 1990 Government Accounting Office report concluded, however, that the Policy had virtu- 
ally no impact because no mechanism of institutional enforcement had been set up. Applicants 
for NIH grants were not advised about it,  and the grant application reviewers did not utilize it as 
a factor in evaluating the merit of competing proposals. The Policy did not even apply to the 
NIH's own intramural projects. See National Institutes of Health: Problem in Implementing Policy on 
Women in Study Populations, Hearings Before Subcommittee on Health and the Environment, House of Repre- 
sentatives, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1990) (testimony of Mark V. Nadel, Associate Director, Na- 
tional and Public Health Issues, Human Resource Division). See further discussion of the NIH 
Policy infra notes 281-87 and accompanying text. 
2'5See Women's Health Equity Act, S. 2961, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); Clinical Trials 
Fairness Act, S. 2945, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) and H.R. 2507, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) 
(vetoed). 
27642 U.S.C.A. 8 201 (West Supp. 1993). 
277 Id. at 8 131. This'is a serious limitation in itself; although NIH supports and conducts a 
great deal of research, one wonders why the legislation is not at least as broad in scope as the 
federal regulations discussed above - applicable to all research conducted, funded, or regulated 
by any federal agency or department. Other bills have been introduced that would require atten- 
tion to women's health interests in the investigation of all drugs prior to FDA approval. See 
Pharmaceutical Interaction Safety Act, H.R. 2694, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); Pharmaceutical 
Testing Fairness Act, H.R. 2695, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). 
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search project is "inappropriate": 1) with respect to the health of the 
subjects; 2) with respect to the purpose of the research; or 3) under such 
other circumstances as the Director of the National Institutes for Health may 
designate, such circumstances to be defined in regulations.278 
"Inappropriate" is the kind of legislative language that keeps lawyers in 
fancy cars and fur coats. "Inappropriate with respect to the subjects' health 
or the purpose of the research" alone would cover the waterfront in terms of 
authorizing exclusion for just about any of the reasons discussed above.279 
To give the Director of the NIH, an Executive Branch appointee with a defi- 
nite political mission, absolute discretion to ignore the inclusion requirement 
whenever she or he thinks inclusion "inappropriate" is really to vitiate the 
entire statutory scheme.280 It may be that nothing more than this is possible 
in the current political climate, and it is a step in the right direction, albeit a 
small step. But anyone who genuinely wants to change the exc1usion;ary prac- 
tices of researchers should urge Congressional sponsors to retur111 to the 
278 Section 13 1. Requirement of Inclusion in Research Sec 492B.(a). 
(1) In conducting or supporting clinical research . . ., The Director of NIH shall, 
subject to subsection (b), ensure that- 
(A) women are included as subjects in each project of such research; . . . 
(2) The Director of NIH . . . shall conduct or support outreach programs for the 
recruitment of women . . . as subjects in projects of clinical research. 
(b) The requirement established in subsection (a) . . . shall not apply to a project of 
clinical research if the inclusion, as subjects in the project, of women . . . 
(1) is inappropriate with respect to the health of the subjects; 
(2) is inappropriate with respect to the purpose of the research; or 
(3) is inappropriate under such circumstances as the Director of NIH may 
designate. 
Id. at 8 131. Cost is not to be considered as a factor in defining "inappropriate." Regulations, 
intended to explicate "inappropriate," were issued on March 28, 1994, effective June 1, 1994. 
NIH, NIH Guidelines on the Inclusion of Women and Minorities as Subjects in Clinical Research, 
59 Fed. Reg. 96598. The regulations address only Phase I11 clinical trials and require nothing 
more than a review of existing data to ascertain whether they suggest significant clinical differ- 
ences between women and men. If so, then the Phase I11 trial must be designed to elucidate 
those differences. However, in Subsection VI(c), the Guidelines state that in most studies, ap- 
proximately equal numbers of men and women should be subjects unless different proportions 
are "appropriate" because of known epidemiological differences. 59 Fed. Reg. 14508, 14512. 
Thus, "inappropriate" is somewhat circularly defined as "not appropriate," but at least it would 
- - - -  ~ 
appear to exclude factors such as risk to offspring. Researchers are not required to indicate how 
they propose to comply with this legislation until fiscal year 1995. Id. at 5 131(d)(2)(A)(i), (e)(l), 
(2). 
2'9Scientists who want to find a way around this statute will argue that the homogeneity 
rationale fits neatly within the "purposes of the research" exception; that concern for that "vul- 
nerable" group, pregnant women, warrants exclusion of those who are or may unwittingly be 
pregnant "for their health"; and so on. Surely exclusions suggested by FDA Guidelines or appar- 
ently required by other federal regulation render contradictory inclusion "inappropria.te," and I 
am afraid that the Director's regulations, which were to have been issued by December 10, 1993, 
will declare exactly that. 
Zso  Another example of this ubiquitous vagueness: the one federal statute that currently 
mandates the inclusion of women as subjects is the National Commission on Acquiretl Immune 
Deficiency Syndrome Act, 42 U.S.C. 5 300cc-16(a)(3) (1991). the authorization for the Secretary 
of HHS to distribute grants and contracts for AIDS research: "The Secretary shall ensure that, as 
appropriate, clinical research programs [for AIDS centers] include as research subjec~s women, 
children, hemophiliacs, and minorities." (emphasis added) As of this writing, no regulations in- 
terpreting "as appropriate" have been issued. 
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drawing board and restart the process of political organization and education 
- or perhaps, consider an altogether different route. 
2. NIH interpretation of "compelling justification" 
The National Institutes of Health can, through the implementation of its 
own dramatically influence the pattern of excluding women from 
biomedical research. But to do  so, more specific standards than are contained 
in the current policy are necessary. The NIH Policy appears to establish a firm 
presumption that women shall be included in protocols. However, that pre- 
sumption may be rebutted by showing either: 1) that it would be "inappropri- 
ate" to include women in a given study; or  2) a "compelling justification" for 
the exclusion of women. In conjunction, these criteria for exemption from 
the policy are quite capable of swallowing it whole - as with the language of 
the legislation discussed above, the proverbial Mack truck would have no 
trouble navigating these holes. 
For example, the NIH Policy states that "appropriateness" of inclusion of 
women is in part a function of the "known incidence/prevalence" of a condi- 
tion among women. Yet one of the major consequences of the exclusion of 
women from research has been enormous gaps in existing knowledge about 
the epidemiology of many conditions in women. As the members of the Wo- 
men in Research Task Force, a bioethics working group in which I partici- 
pated, wrote in a letter to Dr. Kirschstein, then-Acting Associate Director of 
the new NIH Office of Research on Women's Health, "women could end up 
being excluded from a study based on data from studies which excluded wo- 
men in the first place."282 Moreover, women must be leery of terms like "ap- 
propriate" when those who will be deciding what they mean remain 
overwhelmingly products of the mindset and worldview that has so often 
found subordination, denigration, and paternalistic protection of women 
' 6  appropriate." 
Likewise, with respect to the required "compelling justification" for ex- 
clusion of women, the fear is that the three justifications reviewed above285 
need only be recited to exempt a protocol from the NIH Policy. In its Memo- 
randum OER 90-5, NIH refers to only two situations that qualify as "compel- 
ling": 1) the condition to be studied occurs only in men; or 2) inclusion of 
women would "jeopardize the health and safety" of a class of subjects. With- 
out clarification, it is not hard to imagine that fetal protection may be the 
hidden meaning of the latter. I find disquieting, rather than comforting, Dr. 
Kirschstein's response to the Women in Research Task Force letter, in which 
she states: 
A list of situations that comprehensively accounts for all such 
justifications for "compelling" exclusion is very difficult to 
create. . . . 
One potential basis . . . is the case in which the financial and 
human costs of conducting research trials are significantly increased 
281 See supra note 274. 
282 Letter from Karen L. Hagberg, Coordinator, Women in Research Task Force, to Ruth L. 
Kirschstein, M.D., 2 (June 28, 1991) (on file with author). 
283 See supra part 1I.B. 
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or unduly burdensome in comparison to the benefit gained by in- 
cluding a representative number of both genders in the study popu- 
lation for a disease or  condition in which the incidence is lower in 
one gender than in the other. . . . 
Another potential basis for rebuttal is the situation in whicl.1 vio- 
lation of the established legal rights of a child or  potential rights of a 
fetus are a foreseeable possibility as a result of the mother's partici- 
pation in a clinical trial. . . . [Clases in which studies on animals 
measuring teratogenic or  other significant adverse effects are incom- 
plete or  inconclusive warrant exclusion justification review and 
may serve as sufficient grounds for rebutting the incl~lsion 
presumption.284 
Several questions are raised by this response. First, when Dr. Kirschstein 
speaks of "financial and human costs of conducting research trials," I wonder 
whose costs, or  costs to whom? For women as a class, the costs of their invol- 
untary nonparticipation in research always outweigh the benefits to them. 
Second, what "potential rights of a fetus" (or for that matter, established 
rights of a child) are violated when a woman chooses to take an unapproved 
drug? Surely those same rights, whatever they may be, are violated when the 
same woman now takes an approved drug that has never been tested in wo- 
men, or  in pregnant women, but is available on the market. Or when the 
woman fails to follow a doctor's orders, or  to exercise regularly, or to do  a 
thousand other things that are "good" for her - as once upon a time, 
thalidomide, diethylstilbestrol, routine Caesarean section, and minimal 
weight gain were deemed "good," indeed necessary, for women by their phy- 
sicians. With this language, I am afraid Dr. Kirschstein and the Ofice of Re- 
search on Women's Health, the putative bastion of women's rights and 
liberties in this process, inadvertently reinforce the coercive, intrusive model 
of "maternal-fetal (or child) conflict" discussed above.285 
As for "incomplete or  inconclusive" animal studies of teratogenicity or 
"other significant adverse effects [upon reproductive outcomes]," so far as I 
am aware there is nothing but incomplete, inconclusive data in this area. For 
a start, the absence of such studies with respect to male-mediated effects on 
offspring render them all, by definition, partial and inconclusivc~. If Dr. 
Kirschstein's statement is taken literally, hardly any research should be per- 
mitted. There is an alternative approach: requiring adequate animal studies 
of adverse reproductive effects both in male and female animals. Such studies 
would have to test for all potential male routes of prenatal And if 
NIH is serious about avoiding risk to the offspring of research sub-jects, the 
only effective method will be either to permit participation only of r~onfertile 
men and women - difficult for large-scale studies, and unlikely to be clini- 
cally representative - or to impose much more rigorous controls c)n repro- 
284 Letter from Ruth L. Kirschstein, M.D., Acting Director, Office of  Research on Women's 
Health, to Karen L. Hagberg, Coordinator, Women in Research Task Force 3 (Oct. 23, 1991) (on 
file with author). 
285 See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text. 
286 See supra notes 140-46 and accompanying text. 
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ductive behavior by human study participants, both male and female.287 
3. Protection for researchers: immunity from liability through waiver or 
compensation system 
In our society, we often try to encourage behavior we want to foster or 
protect, but which has major associated costs, by eliminating or limiting the 
costs. So, to address the carnage in the American workplace, we adopt a sys- 
tem of workers' compensation, which protects employers from liability for the 
actual costs of employment-caused disease and injury; to encourage pharma- 
ceutical companies to continue producing vaccines despite the inevitable oc- 
casional deaths or  injury they cause, we enact a parallel system of 
compensation for vaccine-related injuries.288 In New York and elsewhere, 
there is much support for creating a compensation system for people injured 
by medical negligence or  iatrogenesis. 
In each instance, the system is touted as beneficial to the putative victims, 
because it will provide quicker, if much smaller, recoveries and will relieve 
them of the burden of proving fault or  another theory that would give rise to 
liability in the judicial system. The track record of these alternative systems 
has not lived up to their advance press. Most worker advocates agree that 
workers' compensation has turned out to be a nightmare for all but the 
worker who sustains a relatively minor traumatic injury on the job. For the 
tens of millions who have been maimed and killed, or suffer from occupa- 
tional diseases or more subtle effects of working conditions, "comp" is a slow, 
unreliable, frustrating, debilitating experience of haggling, hassle, and hotly 
contested litigation (albeit.*administrative rather than judicial). Even when 
"successful," the process culminates in a meaningless pittance and begrudg- 
ing provision of medical benefits - usually much too late, long after the 
worker has lost a home or missed out on medical care that could have made a 
difference. Overall, workers' compensation has turned out to be an excellent 
deal for employers and a very poor bargain for employees.28g When I hear, 
287 Since it is more difficult to monitor male compliance with protocol restrictions on im- 
pregnation than to require routine pregnancy tests, more stringent limitations on the mobility 
and privacy of male subjects may be necessary for the duration of their study participation, and 
substantially thereafter, until it is established that their sperm are free of any contamination or  
mutation. 
28842 U.S.C. 5 300aa-11 (1991); see discussion of National Childhood Vaccine Act of 1986 
and the California AIDS Vaccine Victims Compensation Fund in Wendy Mariner & Robert Gallo, 
Getting to Market: the Scientijc and Legal Climate for Developing an AIDS Vaccine, 15 L., MED. & HEALTH 
CARE 17, 24 (1987). 
On  the failure of American workers' compensation systems to enhance safety incentives 
o r  to make employers accountable for the cost of hazards in the workplace, see DANIEL BERMAN, 
DEATH ON THE JOB 54-73 (1978) (workers' compensation replaces less than 10% of income lost by 
victims; e.g., life of a Puerto Rican worker is worth as low as $1 1.34 per week in compensation 
system); Keith N. Hylton & Steven E. Laymon, The Internalization Paradox and Workers' Compensation, 
21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 109 (1992) (demonstration of the incomplete internalization of cost); OFFICE 
OF TECHNOLOCY ASSESSMENT, PUB. NO. OTA-H-256, PREVENTING ILLNESS AND INJURY I N  THE 
WORKPLACE 302, 309 (1985); Glen M. Shor, Workers' Compensation: Subsidies for Occupational Disease. 
I J. PUB. HEALTH POL'Y 328 (1980). 
On  the inefficiencies, delay, and consequent harm to claimants, see THE FINAL REPORT OF 
THE STATE OF NEW YORK TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION O N  WORKERS' COMPENSATION A D DISA- 
BILITY BENEFITS 15-19,29-72, 79-83, 101-03, 12 1-25.(1986); Kenneth C. Crowe, Workers' Comp: In 
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then, proposals to alleviate the exclusionary practices of clinical researchers 
by creating a "no-fault" model i f  compensation for research-related in- 
my enthusiasm is tempered by the history of similar grand 
experiments. 
Another option might be to institutionalize anticipatory waiver of future 
claims in the informed consent documentation that subjects execute prior to 
enrollment in research protocols. As a practical matter, this largely already 
happens, through the operation of the legal doctrine of consent and "assump- 
tion of risk." Typically, in the informed consent process the subject learns (or 
is told, at least) about the variety of risks inherent in participation, including 
the risk of the unknown. Under the common law, by expressly agreeing not 
to hold the researcher responsible and/or by proceeding with the research, 
the subject consents to and "assumes" these risks - like the boxer who 
climbs into the ring knowing someone is about to try to hurt him - and will 
have no legal claim later if those very risks, including the undefined 
"unknown" risks, materialize, whatever the degree of the investigator's 
culpability.Z9 
This uniform practice is the principal reason that legal claims against re- 
NY, It5 Hurting, NEWSI)AY,JU~~ 27, 1988, at 111-1; Hearings Before the Temporary State Commis- 
sion on Workers' Compensation and Disability Benefits, Dec. 10, 1984 (testimony c)f licensed 
representative Marilyn S. Brook) (on file with the author); Lawrence White, Workers' Noncompma- 
lion, in HUMAN DEBRIS 74-1 12 (1983); Lawrence White, Living the Nightmare, in HUMAN DEBRIS 74- 
1 12 (1983); Jeny L. Mashaw, Lessons for the Administration of Workers ' Compensation from the Social 
Security Disability Insurance Program, in NEW PERSPECTIVES IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION 97 (John F. 
Burton, Jr. ed., 1988); W. Kip Viscusi & Michael J. Moore, Workerss ~om$&ation: Wage Effects, 
Benefits Inadequacies, and the Value of Health' Losses, 69 REV. ECON. & STAT. 249 (1 987'); John F. 
Burton, Jr., Compmationfor Permanent Partial Disabilities, in SAFE? AND THE WORK FORCE 18 (John 
D. Worrall ed., 1983). 
On the attitude of industry t~ward~workers' compensation as protecting their interest, see 
the following quotation from the physician for a large chemical company: "Industry doesn't 
worry much about workers' compensation because those awards are so pitifully small. The law- 
suits that frighten them are those that don't have the protection of workers' compensation." 
Quoted in Elaine Draper, Risky Business 148 (1991). 
290 See, e.g., Hayley Gorenberg & Amanda White, Off the Pedestal and Into the Arena: Toward 
Including Women in Experimental Protocols, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 205, 228-29 (1992); 
Judith Areen et al., Clinical Research Involving Women as Subjects: Legal Considerations: A Monograph 
Commissioned by the 0Bce for Protection from Research Risks of the National Institutes of H~!alth 25-26 
(1992) (unpublished monograph on file with the author). For years there has been debate about 
taking biomedical research out of the common law tort liability system.' See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S 
COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL ND BEHAVIORAL 
RESEARCH, COMPENSATING FOR RESEARCH INJURIES: THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF 
PROGRAMS TO REDRESS INJURED SUBJECTS (1982); Bernard R. Adams & Marilyn Shea-Stonum, 
Toward a Theory of Control of Medical Experimentation with Human Subjects: The Role of Comp~mation, 25 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 604 (1975). The idea has never become concrete, probably bec:ause there 
have been virtually no legal claims by subjects against researchers - reflecting either that partici- 
pation in clinical research is extremely safe or that the waiver clauses in informed consent docu- 
ments are artfully drawn. 
29' See KEETON, E.r AL., supra note 150, 5 18, 8 68. A release or waiver may be subject to 
attack if it is not "unambiguous and understandable," or if it fails to make clear that it applies not 
only to the inherent dangers of the enterprise, but to those harms caused by negligence. See 
Gross v. Sweet, 400 N.E.2d 306, 309 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979)(waivers of liability strictly scrutinized; 
"should not compel resort to a magnifying glass and a lexicon"); Boll v. Sharp & Dohme, 120 
N.E.2d 836 (N.Y. App. Div. 1954) (blood donor's covenant not to sue construed to permit lawsuit 
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search sponsors have been exceedingly rare, and confined to instances of seri- 
ous misrepresentation to the subject of quality and magnitude of risk. Why 
then, do not researchers rely on assumption of risk doctrine to avoid liability? 
Because of the fundamental m i s c o n ~ e p t i o n : ~ ~ ~  when researchers think of wo- 
men, they automatically think of children, and when they talk to their lawyers, 
they are told that consent and assumption of risk are defenses only to claims 
by the person giving the consent (and those claiming derivatively through her 
or him). The concern of research sponsors is the prospect of liability not to 
the subject but to the subject's offspring, and the issue about women in proto- 
cols becomes whether the female parent's consent, either pre-conceptual or 
prenatal, will insulate the researcher from that liability. Researchers simply 
do not perceive this same question arising from the participation of male sub- 
jects in their protocols. 
The answer? On first analysis, most lawyers will say that the parent's 
consent to risk on behalf of a child is ineffective.299 While parents can con- 
sent to their children's participation in all manner of fairly dangerous and 
nonbeneficial activities outside the medical arena, generally they can consent 
to medical intervention for their children only if the intervention is intended 
and expected to be beneficial to the individual 
for negligence because it included commitment to use "customary procedures" and did not ex- 
onerate defendants from liability for departure from those procedures). 
Express waivers, such as those executed at amusement parks and stables, are quite often 
deemed "contrary to public policy" and not enforceable under certain circumstances, usually 
when the signer is considered to be in an unequal bargaining position. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. 
LAW $5 5-321 to 5-326'(McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1993) (liability waivers obtained by landlords, 
garage-owners, caterers, etc. void). Although the researcher-subject relationship might seem to 
lend itself to that kind of analysis, to my knowledge express assumption of risk in the medical 
context has never been voided as a matter of public policy. However, see 21 C.F.R. $ 50.20 
(1993): "No informed consent, whether oral o r  written, may include any exculpatory language 
through which the subject. . . is made to waive or  appear to waive any of the subject's legal rights. 
or  releases or  appears to release the investigator, the sponsor, the institution, o r  its agents from 
liability for negligence." Waiver and release, of course, are not quite the same as assumption of 
risk through operation of law. Also, it is not the subject's legal rights that concern researchers. 
292 See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text. 
293 For an argument that in the analogous case of work-related harm to offspring, waiver 
would be unenforceable, see Nicholas A. Ashford & Charles C. Caldart, The Control of Reproductive 
Hazardc in the Workplace: A fiescriplionfor Preuenlion. 5 INDUS. REL. L.J. 523, 556 (1983). Ashford 
and Caldart believe that the public policy favoring a healthful workplace and the inequality of 
bargaining power between employer and employee would combine to void a waiver of liability 
required as a condition of future employment, and argue that just as divorced parents cannot 
bind their children to a custody agreement or  particular level of support without court approval, 
worker-parents should not be able to waive a future child's right to sue for fetal damage. Id. at 
n. 158. But see, Katherine Swinton, Regulating Reproductive Hazardc in the Workplace: Balancing Egual- 
ity and Health?, 33 U .  TORONTO L.J. 45, 67 (1983) (United Kingdom Law Commission recom- 
mends, and Parliament adopts, statute making binding mother's contractual waiver of liability 
and assumption of risk on future child's behalf). 
294 See ANGELA HOLDER, LEGAL ISSUES I N  PEDIATRIC AND ADOLESCENT MEDICINE 151 (2d ed. 
1985). If the research presents only minor risk and does hold out promise of benefit, then one 
parent may consent. IRBs also may waive the requirement of parental permission. See generally. 
JAMES M. MORRISSEY ET AL., CONSENT AND CONF~DENTIAL~TY I N  THE HEALTH CARE OF CHILDREN 
AND ADOLESCENTS 22, 90-91 (1986). One sui generis situation that severely strains this precept is 
the case of a child who needs a bone marrow or  kidney transplant that could best be supplied by a 
minor (or mentally impaired adult) sibling. May the parent consent to the healthy sibling's organ 
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The traditional view, therefore, has been that parents lack capacity to 
consent to their child's participation in research not intended to be therapeu- 
tic, and therefore, ipso facto, to assumption of the risks of the child's participa- 
tion in such research.295 This view has led to conclusions that researchers 
must find highly disquieting, such as this observation in the first edition of 
Professor Holder's superb text on legal issues in pediatrics: 
It is, however, quite clear that if nonnegligent damage results from a 
non-therapeutic experiment, the child would have a good cause of 
action against the investigator. There are numerous precedents for 
the conclusion that a parent cannot waive a child's rights under the 
law. . . . If a parent consented to a non-therapeutic experiment (:In a 
child and real damage occurs, in addition to the potential criminal 
liability for child abuse on the part of both the investigator and the 
parent, it is quite clear that the child would not be bound by the 
consent signed by the parent.296 
However, in 1983 the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
promulgated extensive regulations about children as research subjects that 
clearly contemplate and authorize parental consent to a broad range of re- 
search with children.297 This includes research that presents "an opportunity 
to understand, prevent, or alleviate a serious problem affecting the health or 
welfare of children" and research that involves greater than minimal risk and 
no prospect of direct benefit to the subject, but that is likely to yield "general- 
izable knowledge about the subject's . . . condition that is of vital importance 
for the understanding or amelioration of [that condition]."2gs It is hard to 
imagine that the lengthy, detailed provisions of these regulations that de- 
scribe the quality of consent necessary for such research will be treated as 
nugatory in any future liability litigation, rather than as the source of public 
policy they obviously are. I predict that research carried out in accordance 
with these regulations will be considered as subject to the principles of as- 
sumption of risk as any other research, and that parental consent that is not 
patently unreasonable299 will be given effect.300 
donation? Courts have permitted such procedures on theories of psychological benefit to the 
sibling or under the rubric of "substituted judgment" - the legal fiction that the chiltl, if able to 
exercise judgment, would consent to the donation. See, e .g . ,  Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2tl 386, 388 
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1972); Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 149 (Ky. 1969). Other courts, how- 
ever, have refused to honor the parents' wishes. See, e .g . ,  In re Richardson, 284 So.24:l 185, 187 
(La. 1973). 
295 However, the one attempt to obtain a judicial declaration that parents have no right 
either to permit or to compel their children's participation in nontherapeutic research did not 
succeed. HOLDER, supra note 294, at 153-54, 11.16. 
296 HOLDER, supra, note 294, at 170-71. In the second edition, Professor Holder revises this 
assessment somewhat: "There are numerous precedents for the conclusion that a parent cannot 
waive a child's rights under law. . . . If a parent gave permission for research on a child and real 
damage occurred, the child would not be bound by the waiver signed by the parent." Id. at 160. 
297 Additional Protections for Children Involved as Subjects in Research, 45 C.F.R. 8 46.401 
(1983). 
298 Id. at 8 46.406-07. Instead of the term "consent," the regulations speak of parental per- 
mission and the child-subject's assent. IRBs may waive the requirement of parental permission 
and/or minor assent altogether. 
299 It is possible to go overboard. I recall one protocol submitted to the IRB I chaired that 
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In any case, parental assumption of risk for born, living children who are 
themelves the subjects of research is not an instructive analogy to the defense 
' of a sponsor from responsibility for harm to unborn or unconceived children 
because of their parent's consensual participation in a protocol. Just as the 
HHS regulations distinguish research directed toward pregnant women from 
research directed toward fetuses in u t e r ~ , ~ ~ '  it is fair to anticipate that the law 
of assumption of risk will not confound what parents should be allowed to do 
on behalf of their children and what they must be able to do on their own 
behalf, despite potential implications for future children.302 
But assuming that it is legally possible for researchers to avoid liability 
through enforceable subject consent, would that be right? I find this a diffi- 
contained language amounting to a release of the sponsor from responsibility for intentional 
physical assault by the investigator. The IRB. I hasten to add, did not approve the protocol. 
300 For an intriguing argument that the effect of the federal regulatory scheme and IRB re- 
view is legally equivalent to judicial authorization of medical intervention for an incompetent, i.e. 
an unborn or unconceived child, and therefore would constitute a "consent" that would immu- 
nize a researcher, see Hazel Sandomire, Womm in Clinical TtiaL: Are Sponsors Liab&/or Fetal Injuty?, 
21 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 217. 221-23 (1993). 
Compare 45 C.F.R. 8 46.207 with 8 46.208. 
302 Aside from assumption of risk, another potential defense to researcher liability is contrib- 
utory negligence: when an injured party "contributes" to his or her own harm through unreason- 
ably risky conduct, the claim agaiist a third person may be either precluded or proportionately 
reduced. Seegenerally, KEETON ET AL., supra note 150, at 65. (I will dispense with the full complex- 
ity of the comparative negligence system, which in some jurisdictions permits recovery only if the 
injured party's "contribution" is assessed as less than 50% and in others will permit some recov- 
ery even if the contribution amounts to 90%; it has no bearing on the present topic.) It would be 
unusual to find "negligence" on the  part pf a research subject - perhaps departure from the 
protocol in taking unauthorized concomitant medications might be an example - but one can 
imagine the allegation that it was negligent for a prospective parent to participate in a protocol 
with unknown risks to offspring. 
This defense would be of little avail to the researcher, however, because in almost every 
state, contributory negligence on the part of a parent is not imputed to a child injured in part 
because of that negligence, and so the child's recovery is not barred or reduced. See KEETON ET 
AL., supra note 150, at 8 74; Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers 
of Am., UWA, v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 199 n.3 (1991) and authorities cited 
therein. Recovery for mental or emotional distress of the parent occasioned by the harm to the 
child might well be abrogated, but that is not the major element of damages feared by research- 
ers. See, e.g., City of Louisville v. Stuckenborg, 438 S.W.2d 94 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968); Davila v. 
Bodelson, 704 P.2d 11 19 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985). (In theory, a researcher held liable could also 
seek indemnification from the negligeni subject-parent, but given the financial status of the typi- 
cal research subject, this is an almost frivolous observation.) 
As discussed previously, the real significance of being able to attribute negligence to the 
research subject-parent in this context is to sever the causal link between the researcher's con- 
duct and the harm to the child by interposing the subject's contributory negligence as a supersed- 
ing cause. See supra notes 149-89 and accompanying~text. As may be evident from.what I've said 
so far, the law of intervening or superseding causation is a true morass, and its application in this 
context would require another full-scale article, but Prosser provides a useful illustration of how it 
can work to relieve a putative wrong-doer from responsibility: if someone gives a child something 
dangerous, like dynamite caps, and the child's parent becomes aware of the danger, but allows 
the child to retain the dangerous item, "it is at least possible to conclude that from that point 
forward the responsibility is the parent's rather than the defendant's." KEETON ET AL., supra note 
150, 8 44 at 318. Likewise, if the parent-to-be is fully apprised of potential risk, including un- 
known risk, to future offspring from participation in a research protocol, and enters the protocol 
anyway, arguably "the responsibility is the parent's" rather than the researcher's. See supra note 
175. 
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cult question. In terms of moral calculus, it is important to realize that waiver 
and compensation schemes do not reduce costs; they merely distribute them dif- 
ferently than, in theory, the common law liability model would. Under a com- 
pensation or waiver system, the costs largely remain with the unfortunate few 
who suffer injury, rather than being imposed on those who direct the activity 
that produces the costs, and indirectly on consumers of the product or service 
generated by the activity. When a President says that failure to enforce work- 
place health and safety standards for six months saves $20 billion, he means 
that it saves the owners and operators of business that amount; it may cost 
workers and their families a great deal more than that in the currency of 
limbs, senses, organs, and sometimes their lives. The cost of nonregulation 
or nonresponsibility does not disappear into the ether. 
In an analysis of the limits of autonomy in clinical research, Alvin Novick 
has developed a strong argument against allowing subjects to waive the rights 
and protections guaranteed them by the regulatory system because, as he 
puts it, "each subject's waiver would be like a leak in a dam. Thc damage 
would not be easily detected or repaired at first but would threaten to sweep 
away our carefully constructed regulatory wisdom."303 To permit waiver, he 
says, is to "affirm that human subjects may be treated with disrespect and that 
safeguards can be consciously bypassed simply because the investigators and 
the subjects agree to do so."304 Novick is referring more to problems of re- 
search design than to the issue of who bears the risk of harm, but his notion 
that widespread individual waivers can undercut basic principles -.- such as 
that those who stand to gain from an activity should shoulder its costs - 
deserves serious consideration. My expectation, and fear, would bt: that be- 
cause researchers are so reluctant to recognize' the fact that male exposure 
can endanger progeny, only women would be required to execute these spe- 
cial consents, just as often now only women are required to undertake reliable 
contraception - creating yet another special obstacle (would legal advice be 
required? at whose expense?) to women's participation in research 
Proposals to protect researchers by finding ways to immunize them from 
tort liability could, in one swoop, eliminate an important rationale for the 
exclusion of women from research. That is an inviting prospect. The trouble 
is, it could also mean that the clinical trials women would finally get to partici- 
pate in would become incrementally more dangerous, and that they, their in- 
jured offspring, and the injured offspring of male subjects, would have to 
absorb whatever injury was entailed. It remains hard for me to see the justice 
of eliminating liability for those who sponsor and conduct research, unless 
they are willing to share their profits, in the broadest sense. Liability is an 
important disincentive, and at present one of few, for the kind of callous dis- 
regard for human health and life that has been all too prominent a feature of 
drug development and other kinds of biomedical research.305 Perhaps we 
303 Alvin Novick, May a Human Subject Waive the Right to Be Treated m A Human Subjxt ?, 5 AIDS 
& PUB. POL'Y J. 45, 48 (1990). 
304 Id. 
In addition to the classic horror stories o f  Tuskegee, MER/29, DES, Dalkon Shield, and 
thalidomide, other examples, including the resistance o f  aspirin manufacturers to labels that 
would warn of  the risk of  Reyes' Syndrome; the failure o f  Eli Lilly to reveal deaths asst.)ciated with 
the arthritis drug Oraflex; the criminal charges against company officials for concealing the liver 
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have progressed to the point where such deterrence is no longer necessary, 
but without more evidence, to jettison this one proven mechanism of prevent- 
ing harm seems rather reckless. 
It is conceivable that the best way to bring about change in this area will 
be through litigation on behalf of individual and/or classes of women, utiliz- 
ing some of the theories of liability outlined above. In one case, involving a 
woman with HIV-infection denied entrance to a tat-inhibitor trial because its 
entrance criteria limited enrollment to women who had been surgically steril- 
ized or were one year post-menopausal, a letter from a lawyer seems to have 
persuaded the research sponsor to offer that woman a slot in the 
(The sponsor did not, however, change the general criteria. How is that for 
good science?) 
Because the fear of litigation seems to play such a large role in the exclu- 
sion of women, counter-litigation - perhaps the threat more than the turtle- 
paced reality - may be the only effective means of persuasion. After all, it 
has been the near-universal experience of public-interest lawyers that even 
the most successful legislative reform campaigns, culminating in well-crafted 
legislation, turn out to be hollow delusions without enforcement from the 
private sector to give the legislation teeth. That is why it is imperative that 
poor people have lawyers who have the will and the means to litigate on their 
behalf. 
But the drawbacks of the litigative approach cannot be denied. It is ex- 
cruciatingly slow, and the time frame for those who want to enter trials is 
usually short. It will require the enlistment of experts in the design and con- 
duct of research, who however strongly they believe in the need to change 
research practice may be reluctant to become involved with anything that 
smacks of the courtroom. The practical reality is that many research spon- 
sors, including the government, have essentially unlimited resources to ex- 
pend in opposing and appealing judicial remedies. And, as happened in the 
case described above, the remedy too often may be of benefit to particular 
individuals, but not produce an overall change of policy or of heart. Like the 
2" x 4" that gets the mule's attention, litigation may be a necessary tool to 
induce researchers to focus on the need to do clinical trials with subject pools 
that more accurately reflect the clinical population, but it seems unlikely to 
accomplish the whole task. 
C .  PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION: THE ROLE OF SCIENTISTS, CHOLARS, AND 
IRBs 
On balance, the best option to overcome the obstacles to women's full- 
fledged participation in biomedical research may be the most laborious: to try 
to incorporate into the various mechanisms of professional socialization a 
damage associated with Selacryn, are described in Teresa M. Schwartz, The Role of Federal Sajety 
Regulationc in Products Liability Actiom, 12 J. PROD. LIAB. 305 (1989). See generally, JOHN 
BRAITHWAITE, CORPORATE CRIME IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY (1984). 
906 Memorandum on FDA's Proposed Guideline, supra note 128, at 1-2. 
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new ethos of biomedical research.307 
Regulations and funding criteria that require researchers to include wo- 
men in protocols ought to be instituted, and those that exist need to be made 
far more specific and effective. But I doubt that these will suffice. The other 
forces that operate on researchers must be brought into play. The leaders of 
the research establishment, the people who command respect and control re- 
sources, need to reinforce the message that research that fails to include sub- 
jects of both genders is no longer acceptable. It has to become clear that 
exclusionary research will not be rewarded by the prestige and recognition 
within their own community that is of such paramount importance to those who 
consider themselves scientists. 
The Office of0~rotection from Research Risks (OPRR) and the Office of 
Research on Women's Health (ORWH) can and should take a leading part in 
this enterprise. Educational material should be generated and distributed in 
consensus conferences, workshops, and with applications for research sup- 
port. Articles should be submitted to the major medical journals; a "Sound- 
ing Board" in the New England Journal of Medicine and an editorial ill Clinical 
Research would probably accomplish more than ten lawsuits. OPRR and 
ORWH could undertake outreach to educational institutions: it is always a 
tough fight to insinuate any new issue into the already-overcrowded profes- 
sional curriculum, but the medical schools, public health schools, and gradu- 
ate programs that train future researchers - not to mention the law schools 
that produce those researchers' future lawyers - have a responsibility to 
make their contribution to redressing the injustice of current research prac- 
t i ~ e . ~ O ~  The professional organizations could be mobilized; a few, like the 
American Public Health Association, have already gone on record supporting 
adequate representation of women in all research populations and eshorting 
researchers to analyze all study results by gender to detect differe~itial pat- 
terns of risk or  response to intervention.309 An endorsement of the inclusion 
of women as an aspect of the equitable selection of subjects from a policy 
committee of the American Society for Clinical Investigation would be highly 
significant, not so much because American scientists automatically conform to 
such judgments, but because of the debate within the profession it ~rould oc- 
casion and the thinking it would provoke. Unquestionably, the recently re- 
leased report from a special committee of the Institute of Medicine will 
forward this 
Then there is the next circle: the bioethicists and social scientists who 
comment on and criticize scientists' behavior. The Hastings Center, the Ken- 
nedy Institute, the Center for Biomedical Ethics in ~ i n k e s o t a ,  the Center for 
307 An excellent summary of  the variety of  sources of  influence within the research commu- 
nity can be found in Mark S. Frankel, Human Experimentation: Social and Professional Conttol, in ENCY- 
CLoPEorA OF BIOETHICS 702 (Warren T. Reich ed. 1982). 
30s On the importance of  transmission of  norms and ideals in the process o f  professional 
education, see Jay Katz, The Education of the Physician-Investigator, 9 8  DAEDALUS 480 (1969); see also, 
THE STUDENT-PHYSICIAN: INTRODUCTORY STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF MEDICAL EDUCATION 76- 
77 (Robert K:Merton et al. eds., 1957). 
509 See Governing Council of  the Am. Pub. Health Ass'n, Interim Policy Statement l .BI ,  Support 
for Women j Health Research, 81 AM. J .  PUB. HEALTH 260 (1991). 
3'0 See supra note 8 .  
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Clinical Ethics in Chicago, the Center for the Study of Society and Medicine 
at Columbia's College of Physicians and Surgeons - all these institutions 
could air the issues associated with exclusionary research, a process already in 
progress to some extent but not yet as systematic and comprehensive as it 
could be. Perhaps OPRR and ORWH could sponsor a national meeting that 
would bring together representatives of these centers and researchers. 
- - 
Institutional Review Boards are major sources of influence on the design 
and conduct of protocols. In carrying out their function of assuring the equi- 
table selection of subjects,g11 IRBs can assist researchers who encounter diffi- 
culty in designing gender-neutral studies. My experience as Chair of the IRB 
of the Community Research Initiative of New York suggests that an IRB can 
work as a partner with researchers in a collaborative, problem-solving mode 
that seeks to enlighten researchers rather than impose conditions on them.312 
But first, the members of IRBs themselves need to become versed in the is- 
sues and achieve clarity about their own interpretation of the equitable selec- 
tion requirement.313 OPRR, in particular, can foster this process and inform 
IRBs of their duty (and self-interest, given the liability questions raised 
above)s14 to carefully examine the justifications for protocols that, for exam- 
ple, limit the participation of potentially child-bearing women but express no 
interest in the potentially reproductive status or conduct of male subjects. 
Still other entities than those I have named - foundations, for example 
- could help create a textured, subtle, persuasive discourse about subject 
exclusion that would be heard and taken seriously throughout the halls of 
academic medicine and governmental research centers. My point here is not 
to draw a precise blueprint but to suggest a general strategy which would be 
less an Operation Desert Storm assault, more a guerrilla movement focused 
on the "hearts and minds" of those who plan, fund and do clinical research. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The exclusion of women from clinical research must end. A variety of 
justifications offer superficial support for the practice, but on close examina- 
tion they have scant validity. These shibboleths must be abandoned, and re- 
search practices must change, through whatever combination of political, 
legal, and social pressure is necessary. Nothing less than the health of my 
daughter's generation'of women, and the generations beyond, is at stake. 
9 1 1  See discussion supra 259 and accompanying text. 
312 Merton, Community Based, supra note 109, at 524. 
919 A survey of all IRB chairpersons at institutions with NIH approval, conducted in the fall 
of 1991, found that 80-90% of the 329 responding IRBs had no policy in place with respect to 
equitable selection of subjects relative to gender; that fewer than half the IRBs routinely ask 
investigators to justify a proposed exclusion of female subjects; and that 73% routinely require 
women subjects to use contraception during a trial, while 93% did not have a parallel require- 
ment for male subjects. Surprisingly, several of the IRB chairs indicated that equitable selection 
of subjects was not a legitimate concern for an IRB. Many more respondents volunteered cate- 
gorical statements aboit the requirements of federal regulation, the likelihood of liability, and 
the supremacy of the value of fetal protection as a value above all others, that reflect the misinfor- 
mation and inaccurate analysis of these issues criticized throughout this article. Ada Sue Selwitz 
& Daniel P. Wermeling, IRB Policies and Practices: Review of Subject Population, 20-33 (un- 
dated) (unpublished monograph prepared as NIH background paper, on file with author). 
914 See discussion supra notes 255-65 and accompanying text. 
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TOWARD A WOMEN'S HEALTH RESEARCH AGENDA 
This is a still incomplete list of health conditions, issues, and problems 
that: 1) appear with greater incidence or prevalence in women; and 2) have 
been sparsely researched and are poorly understood. In the case of those 
conditions that have been the focus of significant clinical investigation, re- 
search has involved predominantly or exclusively male subjects. There is vir- 
tually no information available about the natural course, use of conventional 
therapies, or special implications of most of these conditions in pregnant or 
lactating women. In the rare event that research has been done on a condi- 
tion in pregnant or lactating women, the purpose of the research has gener- 
ally been to evaluate the safety or efficacy of an intervention for the embryo, 
fetus or child, not for the mother. 
This list is based on a preliminary review of: 1) the testimony of wit- 
nesses representing a broad array of professional and community organiza- 
tions at the 1991 hearings of the NIH Task Force on Opportunities for 
Research on Women's Health; 2) reports generated by the recently formed 
Society for the Advancement of Women's Health Research; and 3) legislative 
committee and conference reports on the proposed Women's Health Equity 
Act. All statistics are U.S. only unless otherwise indicated. The order is quite 
arbitrary. Additional suggestions would be appreciated. 
1. Cardiovascular/coronary heart disease (women twice as likely to die 
from heart attack as men; 1 in 3 women has clinical cardiovascular 
disease at age 65 and older; # 1 killer of women over 50; more 
women than men die each year) 
- diagnosis, risk stratification, prevention, efficacy of medical and 
surgical therapies and lifestyle measures in women 
- protective effects of exogenous gonadal hormones on coronary 
arteries, vasoactivity, or lipid disposal mechanisms 
- establishing norms of circulating lipids and lipoproteins in women and 
understanding reasons for differential as predictors of coronary risk 
- relationship between oral contraceptive use and other cardiovascular 
risk factors 
- reasons that diabetes is such a potent predictor of prognosis in 
women 
- factors in poorer myocardial infarcation (MI) outcomes in women 
- impact of age-associated/stress-associated factors on prevalence of 
CVD 
- hypertension: gender differences in incidence of isolated systolic 
hypertension; hormonal-antihypertensive drug interactions; factors in 
threefold increased risk of stroke and mortality in hypertensive women 
2. Risk-benefit ratio of hormone replacement therapy (HRT); effective 
alternatives to HRT 
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3. Breast cancer (fewer than 3% of women with breast cancer are or have 
been in clinical trials; 175,000 new diagnoses/year; 70% of all 
diagnoses with no known risk factors; 45,000 deaths per year; 
increasing incidence, no decrease in mortality rate) 
- basic research on causes, progression, links to environmental, occupa- 
tional, dietary, metabolic and genetic factors: hormone replacement 
therapy, hormone-based contraception, infertility treatment, etc. 
- relationship between radiation therapy and distant bone metastasis 
- investigation of access barriers to high-quality screening 
- 
- identification of tumor markers for very early detection 
- psychosocial management 
- improved educational methods for breast self-examination 
4. Ovarian cancer: causes, progression, genetic factors, basic processes of 
ovarian aging, early detection (20,500 new diagnoses, 12,400 deaths/ 
year) 
5. Cervical cancer: new screening modalities (13,000 new diagnoses, 
5000-7000 deathdyear; second most common cause of cancer deaths 
in women worldwide) 
6. Uterine cancer: (34,000 new diagnoses, 4000 deathdyear) 
7. Improved efficacy of mammography and pelvic transvaginal ultrasound 
8. Endometriosis (5-10 million women; most common disease am.ong 
women under 50) 
9. Osteoporosis (19 million women; 35-50% of all postmenopausal 
women; 1.5 million fractures per year, leading to 50,000 deaths and 
25% of all nursing home admissions; lifetime risk of osteoporotic hip 
fracture equal to combined lifetime risk of breast, uterine and ovarian 
cancer) 
- evaluation of bone mass measurement technology 
10. Autoimmune disease and immune dysfunction disorders: need to research 
basic pathology, genetidsex-linked etiology, and treatment of  
- Multiple Sclerosis (70% women) 
- Systemic lupus erythematosus (500,000 people, 90% women, 65% 
African-American, Asian-American, Native American; 5,000 deaths/ 
year) 
- Myasthenia gravis (85% women) 
- Rheumatoid arthritis (2 million people, 75% women) 
- Sjogren's syndrome (2-4 million people, 90% women) 
- Scleroderma (80% women) 
- Diabetes (65% women) 
- Mononucleosis (65% women) 
- Inflammatory bowel disease (55% women) 
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Thyroid disease (hyperthyroidism 5 times more frequent in women, 
hypothyroidism 4 times more frequent in women) 
Gastrointestinal disease: 
gastroparesis and irritable bowel syndrome (3 times more common in 
women) k 
gall bladder disease (65% women; women under 50 develop 4 times 
as often as men) 
differential hepatotoxicity of alcohol in women 
HIV infection and transmission to women (in major American cities, 
leading cause of death for women aged 20-40; 11.5% of all U.S. adult 
AIDS cases per CDC criteria are women, 73% African-American and 
Hispanic; life expectancy of AIDS-diagnosed woman is six months; 
worldwide, '/s infected adults are women and in Africa rate of new 
infection of men and women is equal): 
safety and efficacy of already approved drugs (e.g., linkage of AZT to 
vaginal cancer?) and new interventions in women 
impact of use of oral contraceptives in HIV-infected women and 
interaction of AIDS drugs and contraceptives 
gynecological opportunistic infections 
AZT and dysmenorrhea 
transmission barrier methods that are female-controlled and may be 
used without detection by sexual partners 
relationship of immune decline markers to female genital tract and 
reproductive organ infections and pre-cancerous lesions 
interaction of HPV and HIV 
investigation of case definition and need to incorporate gender- 
specific clinical assessment techniques in routine evaluation of HIV 
patients 
Occupational hazards of workplaces that are predominantly female 
(including the home) 
Metabolism and pharmacokinetics/pharmacodynamics of drugs and alcohol 
in women, especially older women; variation in drug metabolism, 
especially antihypertensives and antidepressants, during menstrual 
cycle and pregnancy 
Pathological and therapeutic effects of sex steroids: 
natural history of endocrine system in menopause 
RU486 and other antiprogestins 
effects on insulin sensitivity, clotting and plaque 
Urinary tract disease and dysfunction: 
interstitial cystitis (500,000 people, 90% women; described in Camp- 
bell's Urology as a "hysterical female condition" until 1980) 
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changes in bladder function and urinary incontinence, especially in 
menopause and postpartum (12 million people, 90% women; '/s of all 
women over age 55; leading cause of nursing home admission:; for 
women) 
urinary tract infections (8 million people, 30: 1 female/male ratio; 6% 
entire female population every year; 20% all prescribed antibiotics; 
linkage to fetal intrauterine growth retardation) 
complications of hysterectomy and pelvic floor surgery 
"urethral syndrome:" catch-all diagnosis requires investigation 
Uterine fibroid disease 
Lactation: 
effect on postpartum anovulation: method of fertility control 
long-term consequences on obesity and maternal energy balance 
effects on maternal calcium stores 
protective effects on breast cancer 
Premenstrual syndrome: patterns and relationships of ovarian steroids, 
autonomic nervous system arousal indicators, and psychosocial and 
environmental factors in symptomatic women 
Menopause as normal life process (25% of women who seek medical 
advice for menopause-related symptoms are prescribed tranquilizers; 
one-third of average woman's lifespan is postmenopausal) 
need to identify markers to track changes in endometrial tissue 
Pelvic inflammatory disease (420,000 outpatient visits, 200,000 I.lospi- 
talizations each year) 
Post-hysterectomy vaginal/pelvic reconstruction and breast implants 
Polycystic ovarian disease; premature ovarian failure 
Amenorrhea, dysmenorrhea 
Iron-deficiency anemia I 
Nutritional needs, especially in lactation and pregnancy: understanding 
of metabolic adjustments that redirect nutrient use to milk synthesis 
and secretion 
Chronic migraineheadache (1 6- 18 million people: 70% women) 
Hyponatremia (post-surgical low blood sodium leading to death/brain 
damage) (90% woman) 
Health risks of cosmetic surgery 
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3 1. Vascular and genitourinary complications in paralyzed women with 
spinal cord injury/disease, including menorrhagia and amenorrhea, 
autonomic dysreflexia 
REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH 
32. Safer and more effective contraception and fertility control for women 
and men, including female-controlled barrier contraceptive/STD pre- 
ventive devices (half of all abortions result from contraceptive failure) 
33. STDs: chlamydia, human papilloma virus (associated with cervical 
cancer) 
34. Chronic miscarriage and recurrent spontaneous abortion 
35. Ectopic pregnancy (fourfold increase in incidence since 1970) 
36. Etiology of pie-term labor/membrane rupture (leading cause of infant . .  
morbidity/mortality) 
37. Toxemia, pre-eclampsia, eclampsia (pre-eclampsia occurs in 10% of all 
white pregnancies, 20% African-American pregnancies) 
38. Effect of greater participation and control by birthing women and 
traditional birth attendants in prenatal care and birth process decisions 
39. Gestational diabetes 
40. Effects on mother of exercise/physical stress in pregnancy 
4 1. Immune responsiveness and immunosuppression in pregnancy 
42. Gametotoxicity and other adverse reproductive effects in men of toxic 
exposures, pharmaceuticals, food additives and hormones, etc. 
PSYCHOSOCIAL/BEHAVIORAL/MENTAL HEALTH 
43. Antiwoman violence: etiology, prevention, treatment for rape, sexual 
abuse and domestic violence (battering most frequent reason for 
female presentation to ER; 4 women killed/day; 3-5 million assaults 
on women/year) 
44. Postpartum stress/depression 
45. Affective disorders, especially depression (7 million women; women's 
risk for depression twice that of men) 
46. Impact of gender roles on health-promoting behaviorhealth status 
- effect of caregiver role: exposure to children's diseases, stress of 
elderly parent care, occupational hazards of nursedhealth aides 
- effect of multiplicity of roles on health status (role overload) 
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- effect of role as family medical mediator: responsible for diet and 
clothing of family members, arranging access to health care, purchase 
and administration of OTC and prescription mediations, etc. 
47. Impact of gender role on sexual function/dysfunction, susceptibility of 
STDs, ability to utilize contraception, etc. 
48. Incest/sexual, physical and emotional abuse of children (rate of child- 
hood sexual assault on women 22-37%) 
49. Multiple personality disorder 
50. Anorexia, bulimia, eating disorders 
51. Factors affecting the onset, continuation, and cessation of tobacco, 
alcohol, and other substance use/abuse behaviors in women 
- treatment modalities that do not impair maternal-child relationships 
- treatment modalities for pregnant and lactating women 
52. Pornography and media images as factors in antiwoman violence 
LONG-TERM PROJECTS: 
53. Review and revision of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders and the International Classification of Disease to promote 
more accurate diagnosis and treatment of women 
54. Investigation of new specialty in women's health 
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